calculate/gentoo-full-overlay
4
1
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Releases Wiki Activity

Sync with portage [Fri Feb 21 11:37:27 MSK 2014].

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
root 2014-02-21 11:37:28 +04:00
parent 34edc6d0a4
commit 6c5d5c40eb
683 changed files with 6561 additions and 12314 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

8
app-admin/eselect-php/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
# ChangeLog for app-admin/eselect-php
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/eselect-php/ChangeLog,v 1.64 2014/02/17 21:07:42 ago Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/eselect-php/ChangeLog,v 1.66 2014/02/20 14:05:11 ago Exp $
20 Feb 2014; Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org> eselect-php-0.7.1-r3.ebuild:
Stable for ppc, wrt bug #501312
20 Feb 2014; Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org> eselect-php-0.7.1-r3.ebuild:
Stable for ppc64, wrt bug #501312
17 Feb 2014; Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org> eselect-php-0.7.1-r3.ebuild:
Stable for arm, wrt bug #501312

30
app-admin/eselect-php/Manifest
View file

@ -12,24 +12,24 @@ DIST eselect-php-0.7.1.bz2 2251 SHA256 10aa400e2d08bc71989366993f12ddb546a0ea29f
EBUILD eselect-php-0.6.2.ebuild 667 SHA256 72faed5e958e25f61ef1c082caf856a66588148641c1b268159e24f6ce425775 SHA512 0f69db4bfdd348c8fd98c6ca64549e0c0d07e673ba260daf9941fa058f2aa9d5038f87cefd9e1a282cf5f74ab2dfa15a9ff3d5ebf97c72c23790675e357f1bb0 WHIRLPOOL 0be89d938bd52b19b4ee1022c437f46d21e3fc8d429814fe2019ff160131ea239f3aec29a4b98ce5a5af2c3f8f0144f3604b7f3ecd16e681daf0226406c764bc
EBUILD eselect-php-0.7.1-r1.ebuild 1391 SHA256 536bbf3c7b9cba046a831e04c8c283d15a6c47477018ed6f78cb1146990be2c7 SHA512 666c40700118862764dab19806b6b1814dd4ca5a0d36da900470b282e38afe33579fe34cac6447d2d4b8f405de7ee69da059dd20e6f591603d4a611fea35737c WHIRLPOOL 5901ab349cea93f697cc4bd9365ae9592f081fc5c192dffd8f31bfb2fd1dcb0fa252134512b6183555d3b278c6ea557a73baa372d39f2d2fdcf7e84c61fed862
EBUILD eselect-php-0.7.1-r2.ebuild 1394 SHA256 7c4e4e6065cc8d8b3303f17712a403b92a5818b2ecae91109a5eaa0665b930d7 SHA512 1507a752d475149199ed10e0b0b0544f3d2e4d3ef0e033095bdf85a2aa4b3a864c320e5db29cd576f5a3f2d9ca40784cf2c4923fed9a1cd37bc7a1f83b7adf82 WHIRLPOOL e76dd9f1382322bfc35072e8dc82382d38b92658e0018bb2db0f63730782f7f05a98e506fb80bc08e63f430db0a1a863436d8f610a026c0c95e2fb095a9810ec
EBUILD eselect-php-0.7.1-r3.ebuild 1312 SHA256 14696e758ba36b4b116ad887fbd671a808537f3688193b4c964fba4546fc4c5a SHA512 f082a9138b624d8f7da36af711b84ec9c6dc660c7bda99f4ea4d32ce0707e06636fbf28afcba7cfec5dcff06ba579769c0b561f693341e80703ac3b246f27e34 WHIRLPOOL 0ce993f45e02c8475f62987f4e89ecd360992948c370326e10f01ebdfc549f2c552c3216a4667584ea3ca452894b4d122d100eb447e2e6da2ebfef08be0a70b1
EBUILD eselect-php-0.7.1-r3.ebuild 1310 SHA256 5bdd8f6e1a32b1e30fefa7cd445606ad2a678b7dbf5b2a82fcb0f011a49ffbcb SHA512 6483a7be627662d52d372808c4c5e322d93fb62d40d08c6b914adfe44d466d93ec19e317ad9334bab489ddec9bc1ae4981255176471ad5c9c115571d3d99e223 WHIRLPOOL 510f69b1176adc60ebdd5cee4e4d31cece1317c5d4d6774a3c6df7a9a7808d98c87cdd2c03e79a83516e0ee714595e862e0c10f363eb4cebd38faf4b41931091
EBUILD eselect-php-0.7.1.ebuild 1183 SHA256 29e25cce35f65ff2d46e31824a14c9c3557e0930d19750bfa5b7df412bab334f SHA512 a4ac1a6a718612404a14d98b4f3b8d31e8177e2906e5f2936f548559a4962254c0ef71e2407d307d47383fb94e33c2ab0b99d3f686d6f989f75101c9b21d049a WHIRLPOOL 801e25f0987e12f793553676cdc9a81026a670aad8c7e17a17006c91152b306ecf7e0e84eea47c3e7c3cac596f0637e46758459688c2deea872a159420d01fbe
MISC ChangeLog 7486 SHA256 7d67be81afb38857c957e97bee4457dc3a8ec3c870577e85a15c4e1a5f7d0c4c SHA512 01349da2d1f02421b9af81b2c239c714ee2660a2af7b6d96aa94d210eabc687933df1ad1f59e0a47925bac27654b199c95300edadb0b94d656933566540fc3e7 WHIRLPOOL b887b41d7a9e51c1581298a79c4395f157144b5939b2af95c50d415786e6f2f8a1232edf37f22488e4b8d0364ba8d1d87f159bfd6fdfe7e4243627fea37d7872
MISC ChangeLog 7714 SHA256 c5f2f2bc827fa1084a45aebf560be492d47685f427d629a7b3347d1c9a62d470 SHA512 a94fc15a6865fd1a370679632f6e31d1ab6c2d3dd3c540c94298565feec524e22e17c30b6a2a07854a22f43449c55380f1ebeb3869ab1286d74a0f7f4fc798cb WHIRLPOOL bc568c129911d7dc985764dde0397b8946a9606449471a59bedf8d52346debb77c86289764062c87064ae01f7aa0aafcf847052c8b9c4269964b75aa915f80f1
MISC metadata.xml 306 SHA256 007582443454394a0817ca5100a5bf091e027ddcc8d2639b8666fd264166e201 SHA512 661dd3eaea921697e52084355592a93158c63ca15bbb43c35ea62df8f864c5edee04d521f63d4b9a831ee82ff616203096bc9e50834a0f2550895c3cfcc770a3 WHIRLPOOL 5111e517b0c290c2294858d5391ff775825a045242b582f732b80b7434f9ee56630a84e6e97e978810dca268b5a4a62ccef582003276db4f21181a269fc8f777
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)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=Z90m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=O9bS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

4
app-admin/eselect-php/eselect-php-0.7.1-r3.ebuild
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/eselect-php/eselect-php-0.7.1-r3.ebuild,v 1.7 2014/02/17 21:07:42 ago Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/eselect-php/eselect-php-0.7.1-r3.ebuild,v 1.9 2014/02/20 14:05:11 ago Exp $
EAPI=5
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~olemarkus/eselect-php/eselect-php-${PV}.bz2"
LICENSE="GPL-2"
SLOT="0"
KEYWORDS="alpha amd64 arm hppa ia64 ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~s390 ~sh ~sparc x86 ~amd64-fbsd ~x86-fbsd ~x86-freebsd ~amd64-linux ~ia64-linux ~x86-linux ~ppc-macos ~x64-macos ~x86-macos"
KEYWORDS="alpha amd64 arm hppa ia64 ~mips ppc ppc64 ~s390 ~sh ~sparc x86 ~amd64-fbsd ~x86-fbsd ~x86-freebsd ~amd64-linux ~ia64-linux ~x86-linux ~ppc-macos ~x64-macos ~x86-macos"
IUSE="fpm apache2"
DEPEND=">=app-admin/eselect-1.2.4

8
app-admin/glance/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
# ChangeLog for app-admin/glance
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/glance/ChangeLog,v 1.30 2014/02/13 04:36:33 prometheanfire Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/glance/ChangeLog,v 1.31 2014/02/20 21:00:22 prometheanfire Exp $
*glance-2013.2.2 (20 Feb 2014)
20 Feb 2014; Matthew Thode <prometheanfire@gentoo.org>
+glance-2013.2.2.ebuild:
BUMP!
*glance-2013.2.1-r1 (13 Feb 2014)

30
app-admin/glance/Manifest
View file

@ -8,27 +8,29 @@ AUX glance.initd 2504 SHA256 8000f93dfacd93fa5c4a6d07090bc3c27b63912b6ae55a026e2
AUX havana-1-CVE-2014-1948.patch 1340 SHA256 12e12e016154dd5c8ca6c1e7093f46024a3f4e3c48d06492e0dd4dc76dfe7dbb SHA512 3976077da2c00c6e847c67e36c37e646a9186e0d123b7fbfb2e5adac61ffcf3c8a6f36f6e935b5a1c94ef519d8062db0ab7e14bb32da031c75a9270d9a400a41 WHIRLPOOL 53b735fe5ff6028cae7d506d67933fa232b45a1ef7096f8680fa410d48f36d3260493f5936aab7f48875cf0817b88bb5bb7d0d0b81cd6cb716c077a9f3b0c550
DIST glance-2013.1.4.tar.gz 724110 SHA256 dfb8070a12bbf5761db1c55d21db4772fe81ed903d57cf991618e5224cbdcd67 SHA512 31c6c4ba0e777fcd345fe24d32eab548f8e9756764051d8b3c50d4d54404c902473760a0dc1158e8b6b42a0b81e14ae6a31d03bb07d4254fcb4960b05dd747a9 WHIRLPOOL 770f782f539b0ac465c00e726552f4b7fc8824c4a9da1a94ef4103ef56ce17ff1c2ccc75140b71c9f4d3d875885f169d3c1c6d761fed7ff691c83484b86de74f
DIST glance-2013.2.1.tar.gz 1616541 SHA256 f04eb070a862c0d14bdd94204a6f17f4a813dbeacc1978dffb53752c360731aa SHA512 42a30004d7677c946216bd934712094f585d1a98c8e4d7a4b51a14af93eac3e251bd7ef16fa9d9915f3c2f75974969306439742aaeaa64bf3d983ab458531ee5 WHIRLPOOL b76513207e56f3ceb18976b901a79fd5fbff2a9779df1179e79dc5d10049d3b100124e61b55e26ef47f5df54f03a1122752939e4b028d7873b0b0b771aabe9ac
DIST glance-2013.2.2.tar.gz 1333129 SHA256 311805e1df5005ee554871f0096845c966af3cec41cbcf00f1a7e906582b05e1 SHA512 4516b0ce08be63aa22ffaeb7b0f2bf7ef5e6637d9058461337bdaffb18c5876637cef5240068954f40c72a8021969d755a678c4d7172606592acce1e731594ae WHIRLPOOL a8c6ad325f3e78786762b5717dcee5878540cc0a06f4428cd47657ee85d93db5c2a3d7b47dc758e88e174c9ea141aba48bef902b52671b4d415c5f2d9463da2a
EBUILD glance-2013.1.4.ebuild 3146 SHA256 1ea12e958ef036f33d7479bf594251c189d922af33cf4ddb0441ad429193bd96 SHA512 b8fa8788dbd8274fa43fa0dfe88fc8f43f832a82913d4816174bf771639eeb907659faad3315981706bac41b7143b75c5c3ae50d5ad8794d4fd9c88c932ae99a WHIRLPOOL 6a7826ce32d9ba75111c58d130366602d706f406ad0cfd4fa17f42694d73c985cf0c19ffb3f26f78fad58cf88f101456bd6e4614c29f54609e620c313f19626d
EBUILD glance-2013.1.9999.ebuild 3106 SHA256 fc2b671e94bc47402a2e1037c68ca57791ff573b52b56b0b98b972b7e757ad8c SHA512 5a0a9517f6538c8824c18dcd3add74003c6f06d5277b11e6b62606c17428ecef6db7d6f35e0b7f5cdc29573cc08d3e702da0e20394c0e72f1b0bbea28fed852e WHIRLPOOL d6b1811af8f6ce1dfb190815c7f8b4ea6f23e9b8091939b816b4657c293dcd9e8652ae5443b5777c009c6ba9bf310c5b4be6665d64c966f0b5673138e7011070
EBUILD glance-2013.2.1-r1.ebuild 5244 SHA256 4557b4ba949f54fe9f3079bc1b2eded9bd0cc914f536f7d6a797e846837dafcd SHA512 ce7b13fc86cf13f43e40fc847d95f8c6011a0e7b694ec9a08c7000d2c1234da958ed6e9f10aca3f37e0899d1e1575ee2b358d027e34600daabafd352b383ef66 WHIRLPOOL 371c3b19ac96435f9003c600778756f765ca8bb2875077c261f920be1554289ee5d80b070ce8c55232a36acf29a30aac6db59b1e032a37bbdfa2c39ab139790a
EBUILD glance-2013.2.2.ebuild 5196 SHA256 941826da1ae57b2deb2b602e503cee0baf9f6286d68b15ad709ce8ba8147c7af SHA512 3375a9912dd019077819897cedb867508421002f96165a8f7b6770de58057a36f613c50fc06cda3e4f9b35fc8761347b390b07acc2cdbece13c403fc791fc1db WHIRLPOOL dccc6fd870afba584011f99498d61e0c5e69a96dc68b2ad5fd224c5cb733ad59eac3fbc9a94f033b751401b56b2119700ba7567e42de16f1c37004fe4ff2c7be
EBUILD glance-2013.2.9999.ebuild 5204 SHA256 5499738bac7a4433bcb65240c77d777a346dc1213e456186a016e3b40b5cb920 SHA512 f630539d3ff76825f22f836660503e996a6dcfa6f7432ca7920c8dd48efb0f5cd085b99e4b42d8928678a15ab7751abc02b34af87add05a23b6625f07ebba2c8 WHIRLPOOL e7576b7c5e6a57e0b363fa306ff9aa105ed5cdf9a20677597474483a4db4121c9877de2e1bfe8bfbc80ae0ddc315eeb370a41c3ef336a74262c5983d19db1613
EBUILD glance-9999.ebuild 3029 SHA256 a0274ad3f834ad7be23bbcaea00c4a8422857bb3903f89954da901ebeeb7872b SHA512 2c9baf347f3577c4fcb62d1bed5f328e2dbd8e2c2149e1dd4b5b4d317520da5e8fa09d8c352d7bbeeb65c4debb35d3fc9df5c436fc51f707717e18bddeb4743e WHIRLPOOL 7f3a20e0ff8404c4ef130b1b2a84543e91acc95d51d332028dca474a2e2e44c2aae2f5e409b2258eec35a09c4c34c93939f99fd182c8050fb845d462e9bde0d4
MISC ChangeLog 6837 SHA256 f5b1cf42533e3bf923bacb1aacf6451962d74ab023a960edcd36241a77e2e418 SHA512 cda47f074eea0435e1ead27cc6b7c0f1c6f6d05b3a684bf7e8ebaf686948cd0b7015d7ef86805bc7fd696e9f16efdcd40b4ba651ec8306a3ec2173779af08d7e WHIRLPOOL 91662aa89e62aec8818397aa8a42dd9b468cd1341d110cacdd9da540503b9fed663af56716c4d12cbb790180563928941b9c3f31a2312d3614f9d834492bef06
MISC ChangeLog 6962 SHA256 41b10dfae6d94397894eabd9d5b7746c8c582b57acf45cadaaf9ff5ccc311be0 SHA512 2463c6cd96a22ae4bdb79c105559ee2a7473b57be1795091f1683aab42289e777f913cf2a45c2e3c209e20161a7da8d497213bc8761939f27afd07475a751890 WHIRLPOOL e730ac02cbd0b8fe36c47bddb2272575bc93bfb3720566b3e41941a24a1b9a1b3b65a668fd3a2937d87bd37ea40ca6db523518a22e0002c58f0c68f1fdf201bf
MISC metadata.xml 551 SHA256 de9d9d349c334c740b04384a4f1288e7f2f8491751c38b5846fa5fdc801dd3c0 SHA512 0141af1612f84846713c8ffe8d0c4e653a77772d4e050deb5b9a47882aed9f803c7a0ebe7709f64279b04a19658f10da4aef962a70ecc7aebc2e7dce2ede4c68 WHIRLPOOL 4858e7841f26f04b1e35838cfb475cf34506fdb26e1a03f75c219d599dddac73fbc3429c80b5ac7c752fe2782445e2d492f58fc0b87da44ddc6d03b4710c8f13
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)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=hEk0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=cFV1
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

139
app-admin/glance/glance-2013.2.2.ebuild Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/glance/glance-2013.2.2.ebuild,v 1.1 2014/02/20 21:00:22 prometheanfire Exp $
EAPI=5
PYTHON_COMPAT=( python2_7 )
inherit distutils-r1 user
DESCRIPTION="Provides services for discovering, registering, and retrieving
virtual machine images with Openstack"
HOMEPAGE="https://launchpad.net/glance"
SRC_URI="http://launchpad.net/${PN}/havana/${PV}/+download/${P}.tar.gz"
LICENSE="Apache-2.0"
SLOT="0"
KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~x86"
IUSE="doc mysql postgres +sqlite +swift test"
REQUIRED_USE="|| ( mysql postgres sqlite )"
DEPEND="dev-python/setuptools[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
dev-python/pbr[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
test? ( >=dev-python/coverage-3.6[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/fixtures-0.3.14[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
dev-python/nose[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
dev-python/nose-exclude[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/openstack-nose-plugin-0.7[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/mock-1.0[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/nosehtmloutput-0.0.3[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/sphinx-1.1.2[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/requests-1.1[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/testtools-0.9.32[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/psutil-0.6.1[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
dev-python/mysql-python[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
dev-python/psycopg[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/pyxattr-0.5.0[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
~dev-python/pep8-1.4.5[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/pyflakes-0.7.2[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
<dev-python/pyflakes-0.7.4[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
~dev-python/flake8-2.0[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/hacking-0.5.6[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
<dev-python/hacking-0.8[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/Babel-1.3[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
=dev-python/pysendfile-2.0.0[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
dev-python/qpid-python[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
dev-python/oslo-sphinx
>=dev-python/sphinx-1.1.2[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
<dev-python/sphinx-1.2[${PYTHON_USEDEP}] )"
#note to self, wsgiref is a python builtin, no need to package it
#>=dev-python/wsgiref-0.1.2[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
RDEPEND=">=dev-python/greenlet-0.3.2[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/eventlet-0.13.0[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
sqlite? ( >=dev-python/sqlalchemy-0.7.8[sqlite,${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
<dev-python/sqlalchemy-0.7.99[sqlite,${PYTHON_USEDEP}] )
mysql? ( >=dev-python/sqlalchemy-0.7.8[mysql,${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
<dev-python/sqlalchemy-0.7.99[mysql,${PYTHON_USEDEP}] )
postgres? ( >=dev-python/sqlalchemy-0.7.8[postgres,${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
<dev-python/sqlalchemy-0.7.99[postgres,${PYTHON_USEDEP}] )
>=dev-python/anyjson-0.3.3[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/pastedeploy-1.5.0[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/routes-1.12.3[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/webob-1.2.3[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
<dev-python/webob-1.3[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
virtual/python-argparse[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/boto-2.4.0[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
!~dev-python/boto-2.13.0[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/sqlalchemy-migrate-0.7.2[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
dev-python/httplib2[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/kombu-2.4.8[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/pycrypto-2.6[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/iso8601-0.1.8[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/oslo-config-1.2.1[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
swift? (
>=dev-python/python-swiftclient-1.5[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
<dev-python/python-swiftclient-2[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
)
>=dev-python/lxml-2.3[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
dev-python/paste[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
dev-python/passlib[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/jsonschema-1.3.0[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
!~dev-python/jsonschema-1.4.0[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/python-cinderclient-1.0.6[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/python-keystoneclient-0.3.2[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
dev-python/pyopenssl[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
>=dev-python/six-1.4.1[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]"
PATCHES=( "${FILESDIR}/${PN}-2013.2-sphinx_mapping.patch" )
pkg_setup() {
enewgroup glance
enewuser glance -1 -1 /var/lib/glance glance
}
python_compile_all() {
use doc && "${PYTHON}" setup.py build_sphinx
}
python_test() {
# https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance/+bug/1251105
# https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance/+bug/1242501
# 2013.2 requires =dev-python/iso8601-0.1.4
nosetests glance/ || die "tests failed under python2.7"
}
python_install() {
distutils-r1_python_install
newconfd "${FILESDIR}/glance.confd" glance
newinitd "${FILESDIR}/glance.initd" glance
for function in api registry scrubber; do
dosym /etc/init.d/glance /etc/init.d/glance-${function}
done
diropts -m 0750
dodir /var/run/glance /var/log/glance /var/lib/glance/images /var/lib/glance/scrubber
keepdir /etc/glance
keepdir /var/log/glance
keepdir /var/lib/glance/images
keepdir /var/lib/glance/scrubber
insinto /etc/glance
doins "etc/glance-api-paste.ini"
doins "etc/glance-api.conf"
doins "etc/glance-cache.conf"
doins "etc/glance-registry-paste.ini"
doins "etc/glance-registry.conf"
doins "etc/glance-scrubber.conf"
doins "etc/logging.cnf.sample"
doins "etc/policy.json"
doins "etc/schema-image.json"
fowners glance:glance /var/run/glance /var/log/glance /var/lib/glance/images /var/lib/glance/scrubber /etc/glance
}
python_install_all() {
use doc && local HTML_DOCS=( doc/build/html/. )
distutils-r1_python_install_all
}

10
app-admin/hardening-check/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
# ChangeLog for app-admin/hardening-check
# Copyright 1999-2013 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/hardening-check/ChangeLog,v 1.5 2013/12/29 17:49:34 ago Exp $
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/hardening-check/ChangeLog,v 1.7 2014/02/20 13:11:53 ago Exp $
20 Feb 2014; Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org> hardening-check-2.5.ebuild:
Stable for x86, wrt bug #500100
20 Feb 2014; Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org> hardening-check-2.5.ebuild:
Stable for amd64, wrt bug #500100
*hardening-check-2.5 (29 Dec 2013)

32
app-admin/hardening-check/Manifest
View file

@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
Hash: SHA256
DIST hardening-wrapper_2.4.tar.gz 21082 SHA256 411248b1f89e512bd27f96cfaef2aac4fe5c50884ca0769ba94dd2b90bea5d5a SHA512 59366393821116493e204972009bc614a3aee61b15427ecf0a4bc23accea00e0891196b1250f6a3c30e9633ca54022f39ad83d49a213cd4c9aaa78e992647a07 WHIRLPOOL a2aef6b6b302a2b238953b53946865ab7864b36914d0f168073a958c8ae8041d75456283f806d99a124fd853bf775635c7bb4af0f74a5245f49b378eb28ee763
DIST hardening-wrapper_2.5.tar.gz 21157 SHA256 9ae2cc44d9543476b5b8655b4699af5421218dce44ce0d4a89cf5d81ba12b9bf SHA512 e2c183736e9f1dd1b39ecde7d2bf2c22d4c87c69cb158d98bb527b8325d88ea86bceb6087633cc761e973a22d0cf97c6266464d117e408ed2aee2e67c8ab5565 WHIRLPOOL 652327876a29ad8a69529bcb85b1331a227348a1ca87c1e5cf69fbcea0ad7c57afdcb14536eebfc8668834a701ee80f8579b8851f596e41ee782e4c6dbf47cb9
EBUILD hardening-check-2.4.ebuild 825 SHA256 3e2bcb30f6981b5f1bcec47e5bff7e60e6d189ca2d529559a3e062639dc70577 SHA512 5505731706834792b6f1b443551bb4cba0f44f0bb06fdce81ba39f4b240b2bcd55bdf4d47ed1d0b8e1aeada137986ef3ec5069eaf28e0cc98e0319b3d76e8609 WHIRLPOOL bea1c320462f74eba8c85b65c91023820de93414c2cb4e74cc8e16ef26ba58a930b275264f5d083a32eeb2fe4e55b0a0ea6c16f78ee1304c5f5bd45d41ade7f7
EBUILD hardening-check-2.5.ebuild 622 SHA256 db7063e1d432ed1303602ec61faf2780e37176aca7951b158777ccbec43ee4ac SHA512 a686ab2b1164ee33140f090cbe45fa0c08f6aceb155a70a3af73004bc1be3fb3ca8bedffd66ff7ad20ffce8310e8ca59ce63d65584ed4ab7aa7c023a6d20a2ec WHIRLPOOL 530fcf599f3a245317c20417e1d18bf730b865be58f6f7e6de8f80a5ae81c52fc784b205a49174be68ab81d7c8ad37adff9f87e3e1048184ff014160eb133123
MISC ChangeLog 907 SHA256 aaf8b1947c50d85741f6028bce84b14bf9b073b8230c9a7b3af3244af97c9e5d SHA512 a7c12c63c507b4b0dbe346b825ec6ec8e152c616ebac6470d2f939c38475aa4de58f7f8b6c8b7eaa294aeab85c322d933a0c01baf65f9b02e2a2aff662ed3154 WHIRLPOOL 8bd2192db9fb7b21834d2cf3f91f2182db316bcd032bcd9effb1f3a0ad52dd3ce33f402b9642ec24b2fc50b4c49fe7f1839fb44e7521d577df8b284c8dedae73
EBUILD hardening-check-2.5.ebuild 620 SHA256 4aee4fe4e2850a77025f1e69b9ac77f72e103d5b3434dde196ec85555957c31f SHA512 a729b7f28a3ab4d8364e67e42f2dbaceb38eb61764c130e6de524ce3cb7e598292017a72be620c81b18b3ab2ba3f35843659cb7c8a122d3e9deff4e5ed21cc16 WHIRLPOOL ae39077e7ec7c9dbb3a652ae38391b78e8dae418b7d1d5f979af15e5b6f072c9899373f79ccd882af273281738adada169e476e6bfc8423467cd88fffaf24501
MISC ChangeLog 1133 SHA256 eba64262d560c19696fb8d9b26c23c943d724d43d569e247e25ccbf44b9c20d0 SHA512 5f5183ec6e6a09be7fdac7a1ab31f65df52051bc04b55da73d1fa4f32b47886d988c439de3c874dcd1eb527b31e87fa3819776ae119954b7df21ccfcba6d8d4a WHIRLPOOL c2dc84106af2bd6e83072f8b72a57fcc43a9928b7d67a7c1438259c0444ecbe9c52f9cf5121d9d8d5a45eeccb8a0a31e682f232b82f5141bab2c7a3565b3b336
MISC metadata.xml 402 SHA256 8e563d839499fad9af4524f6e182c346f266114b4044259ec839b2d4e42dd0ae SHA512 c7f67d4270ee05d04ca308cff1361d8fb3bea568c358ec88c442aa265f46cac6def3935bb42018c04a4ecbfb757441c9c8fb0f5223cb371ef0de4c20fa41fe0a WHIRLPOOL 0df4ab069199d2128166881f7439f20456ee5c9b6d546f214c5b77201dad2d32c4ce59246730399c89b905cf7a020690af4bb8a946b4c99ca22ebb870a418e8c
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)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=vfgl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=Y1ZC
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

6
app-admin/hardening-check/hardening-check-2.5.ebuild
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Copyright 1999-2013 Gentoo Foundation
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/hardening-check/hardening-check-2.5.ebuild,v 1.1 2013/12/29 17:49:34 ago Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/hardening-check/hardening-check-2.5.ebuild,v 1.3 2014/02/20 13:11:53 ago Exp $
EAPI="5"
@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ DESCRIPTION="Report the hardening characterists of a set of binaries"
HOMEPAGE="https://wiki.debian.org/Hardening"
SRC_URI="mirror://debian/pool/main/h/${MY_PN}/${MY_PN}_${PV}.tar.gz"
KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~x86"
KEYWORDS="amd64 x86"
IUSE=""
LICENSE="GPL-2+"
SLOT="0"

5
app-admin/verynice/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
# ChangeLog for app-admin/verynice
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/verynice/ChangeLog,v 1.24 2014/02/11 14:28:40 nimiux Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/verynice/ChangeLog,v 1.25 2014/02/20 20:37:58 ago Exp $
20 Feb 2014; Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org> verynice-1.1-r2.ebuild:
Stable for x86, wrt bug #499838
11 Feb 2014; Chema Alonso <nimiux@gentoo.org> verynice-1.1-r2.ebuild:
Stable for amd64 wrt bug #499838

24
app-admin/verynice/Manifest
View file

@ -6,18 +6,24 @@ AUX verynice-1.1-build.patch 2525 SHA256 672c404f155a8be7e0ffa91997f25d2a13d1647
AUX verynice.service 158 SHA256 f30efe2dbe6b87e637c458c7d618114b9cf9af5f3d12653de18aae9ff5a079f5 SHA512 03a88cc405c8d6fa18f1e523e6987b1455011cf17ff38f1e937d523b33d88cae839f256811b487ec3141d8b396a15b8af778998d53bf55dd69f6a6a6dbc6a148 WHIRLPOOL 7da0946a0b67425bf7e80b0d660bd5f9f601f86ac1364ccbd324bcfbd361e8721870f6d3112bfd593114cfeab6d6d866f5d648b06846f4f335705bbdd8f4aff2
DIST verynice-1.1.tar.gz 37576 SHA256 5830fd4ac14ba3677e49159adbb7cd61e3d42d1f0b9aa73e4ed0aa154af6cd8d SHA512 731fa22162bb4f48b943839ccf8ccdc769587e323da11e4a77ad14539a724ffbb89e5f4122e1ab36df3306c507afc958d1125160d34d9cbf55df4dc69e4a0139 WHIRLPOOL ed1b7790aa333497e869830b2aacc3fa2289864e363bef3362ffee115c8afa0eb36b8cc29f255d87b929bb3dec3f8d9e839f30668c4572bccfdfb61f95da07c3
EBUILD verynice-1.1-r1.ebuild 794 SHA256 e308327307afc1170a0b1c6e3e67a32d75ea46b546305e4bf7c47138b9b57c7c SHA512 7c7689fd41d0ee4ee3e0433e6ccd86d1c73dffffac71ab592fec76b792571bad4dfe81d7ec15b831daeda426f2a10beb93a338a437e31a5a421aa5b69feafe12 WHIRLPOOL 9b4fab2bb7bb4cc88eaf0e52584924af09eeb8f18e455d263ea9759f69ccef359b7afae65f884a23f6097bd12b141559b416777d7ba0dae5c8d665a2da2f2db9
EBUILD verynice-1.1-r2.ebuild 854 SHA256 b489b5175b4eb7ed482456095f812906e743aebfd9968afd0595e6cbe184ab95 SHA512 bb19c618d3a026987a557de9e49901f0c9e1c69bcb2dff167dd28db46eb552e744ec29eee7fd74c4444276fd2e6a9d4ff9ea515e461c4eb8cd13a9bb063e075d WHIRLPOOL 119511afd7b148a8bd45b76c61e649196d08f7818c0586eb42ec36d18f981e8fbf03a203cb736a4f08da80b638c3642f4b2ffb2217e3f3abed11dc7ec340f9b2
EBUILD verynice-1.1-r2.ebuild 850 SHA256 0ebda4cdbd0de4afee3a180c1d131ef4708c2d7550520319b2144fe1050c5c71 SHA512 a967695ee332be2611bd0e3f57e791807d0f2412b5e21429102ad2f18f9cbc97db567753dd261e0d937b6906ddf1d72738a5c1ffd08fa750a344dc26815efc7f WHIRLPOOL df645245b1ba9c3488cc02b51f8696a194d3d3c68ffa8af3bbf3d87f915cfee81fc697e5fa6a56f8e0babc46e4fc49d904f807bb9f5ec286bb8b7cb158070578
EBUILD verynice-1.1.ebuild 1179 SHA256 4f7e402c954f441f235c7658b88ead07ec88b5682cd3d90a4f4c7084380fbf08 SHA512 eb8da360b867c27445e0035ff86428531714f0834448270509563c7a29c7e8d3e0d4fbfe25b31202960b2001faf07f57424d5e3ca5c1e8e4d9bb36c6b116e479 WHIRLPOOL 098cf696a304cd5c638d5ed087b1d7ab066d1ce3132181c3808aedf38484fd88dd4f2680f9d7f3804b4dc083cee87fd6e8f8f0000d2814b840ec26b86c2b9bc9
MISC ChangeLog 2821 SHA256 367b8a8cd0fba3fc4133343258f14c4f821aa43d1c827dae5b52281797ab5eca SHA512 ddec4334c04c7a041c9e27bc873532e0890e73e5442e1faee7170fa9d18eedcfa431a8a3d9b277ab5debac130087ced3471235d9833fbbf224f16ec83c138edc WHIRLPOOL df7eb658d47a3e459d8e9cebb2647b327b87db0e78e985dfb30dae0ae54a52527ca500e79d244da325e3dfb61c4f308a18dba5909a1c702f31ab9d1ffd036a77
MISC ChangeLog 2926 SHA256 6760b21d91c21ba208438385cbab3c80ce6a57c5f58c31e036dc57e10b300329 SHA512 3f9a8dda4c2b33fa9d4a4b8a4a4b4199698c94a27acd0bd4541e4238caf9b0612804823f22ff154c08edbeba3af11d305d66756c411595cd73752768fe1bec26 WHIRLPOOL 922d55750ab2b08dbc397f162f13ba262e72ae6bfe474b99b7d842be79dde3fd1a5315ca44726e837f61e0191bf3eaaa6147e6055653fc9758ef5a7d8535616c
MISC metadata.xml 356 SHA256 6e8d66dd876aee03ea5a74b1b9d2cc15c528ff95b2b534719ea11fc8232cc86c SHA512 254c087a67c211201643cd084c6bf4391608e6d56ed06a2dbd58eee68408f8e0a8673bfa9a960652bd83372c2fc9457829f1c5b45d684b05d527cf8535421067 WHIRLPOOL afd49131b1444bf7225d09d842ed0995b885fab62970bbd8143f930fb9298d24a21dd7273abb6fc614653c5f3f397e15471a44a81704c51d0d045690ec96e278
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)
iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJS+jPQAAoJEA2sAkrWKOU20WMIAKUh8Mkdt5PYzhWHGQWL8UI2
EC0BdUzK/4UeRWFDLidM5H4pyfOHI4RiS6lEyvtsoHu1C5IaVw8Xcezz/H2cajW1
bleA2cILIrmWWJZK48miBHnllCWXkussewa6sp6NdBx9Y9crDpSKWnZGTh+7mvnT
BSQxrMY/czbbddRtl8t5BmOhBSXeIh9VuVzMORrL7VhIeS3SL6o8QbBhUpIGtiiE
fj0mVmladpFGr1BecLiiBY34rwaMEicXwPrYXrB88fffvZCNQnSRJpleJK50Hxp7
ZrHx5Lc2d+Y/Dfjh5iKTSlkVZEA0Ak/3K/bqEQoBvwDvE+LimOmIf9IOJBpeu6g=
=kZd4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=Ripu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

4
app-admin/verynice/verynice-1.1-r2.ebuild
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/verynice/verynice-1.1-r2.ebuild,v 1.2 2014/02/11 14:28:40 nimiux Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/verynice/verynice-1.1-r2.ebuild,v 1.3 2014/02/20 20:37:58 ago Exp $
EAPI=5
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI="http://thermal.cnde.iastate.edu/~sdh4/verynice/down/${P}.tar.gz"
LICENSE="GPL-2"
SLOT="0"
KEYWORDS="amd64 ~ppc ~x86"
KEYWORDS="amd64 ~ppc x86"
IUSE=""
S=${WORKDIR}/${PN}

5
app-arch/tar/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
# ChangeLog for app-arch/tar
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-arch/tar/ChangeLog,v 1.201 2014/02/19 14:49:03 polynomial-c Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-arch/tar/ChangeLog,v 1.202 2014/02/20 18:02:38 maekke Exp $
20 Feb 2014; Markus Meier <maekke@gentoo.org> tar-1.27.1-r2.ebuild:
arm stable, bug #496212
*tar-1.27.1-r2 (19 Feb 2014)

20
app-arch/tar/Manifest
View file

@ -14,24 +14,14 @@ DIST tar-1.27.1.tar.bz2 2573070 SHA256 9b0fb3ce8512059337add0da5f8f0f7d7647f2201
DIST tar-1.27.tar.bz2 2530071 SHA256 2238c5c63c7ecaccc962f10482d76875b45cedfed69138ed852a88e344af3c7b SHA512 7f9c9fa07f67c0a3ca7593ffb334db1c32206ee3cccb4484543b4c055ff3a4b72d46671aa534b4e754158653654ac04c9272d6738e7f06ab502b9c4c8d60c433 WHIRLPOOL fc296b654611545fd8cedabf52b231330371af7c396ebe28bd0c66633cb58f143bbdce4cf9d75e15f770851ebd96426781a050abf770a1d0dc194819e460637f
EBUILD tar-1.26-r1.ebuild 2290 SHA256 03651edf07bc9cc141a524efd006f4361c4cd79b1d5796dd88ebd3e4fd25eb5e SHA512 346ad7e358e2bc5337011cd076daaff887ed7c83d1bd2c411c409b7327d35dfeb01c4be51102623cb0e004da0c4a24393746b0d8260799e86f5de94ff633958d WHIRLPOOL 492c281e5e6929286c01dc9ecbd37b9de72947d3701237e34adeb690f1cdc84a559fcbc2f346505a64ebc4ae1e25d6d4f6882df03495dd767159e0e04ea89100
EBUILD tar-1.27-r2.ebuild 2396 SHA256 d8c4d189877fb41b7d4d6cbbc029d49bc81e5700e09a792b5a9e9fca53c22422 SHA512 7cfe91695ddc7ddcec6c659a86fc4ff52f30fb55d939264de655b139ef3f74ddd365776d24680893c801c6ce1278f3647613c55a68a3889cb34834355a5ab234 WHIRLPOOL a0eaf2b17d7ce1c4cbbab1f20797c79a128262edcc9bd1100ce01d3a1b011c83632714fdef70a3a68b392c29e3bc3980e835efc2be3003f60ceff51e22c4c211
EBUILD tar-1.27.1-r2.ebuild 2457 SHA256 a47446a10576a395fe7dece987039c8afc01df56e821102acd9754ce2256a781 SHA512 8ca6731b81d0a85f44a30acddd9bc2e0bedca30ae89df7ca2edad1957db9509de7c5a9ca8282a9fdb76ea2c85d41b3ea559d7d2f7a5241824c93d124da0189d7 WHIRLPOOL 4db9b338a6311682444d92138ad91cba9688d314f75218f07e48caf396e4cf4b912cc94e5da02950bfed00a52eff7d2325391c70965faecb8e4723d3de37ce1a
EBUILD tar-1.27.1-r2.ebuild 2450 SHA256 bab15cb68783492f9bb0e745cff36977d13d10036c40e872a167e87f7ec774f2 SHA512 f09972e4672613e6095778898c1106e04596ceaa3dc8f1239a3897554548ea811287a478170e04f6a4edc9baed96ac2865399715a3ead7bbe6292a27887fed84 WHIRLPOOL 16d9c95f433d1c63894cf52e7afb3e9c57cef7cc768b5e360ed2424532da4eb13f2cbc8602131177cc5856cf3b57beb3111327891febe39f7de607c7a91d812f
EBUILD tar-1.27.1.ebuild 2322 SHA256 e8574b521187193a3877aebe38d6f2a62c3156797c0eef7edf2abbbc3cbba4d6 SHA512 c7c52f4548840d855e662fc09337bf73f1d59a608abac029b94eaf0700a8bec3a2587fd0e3f0acae0d9f2c3e205035c7685413d78e6046e4c013504ace9bf3f1 WHIRLPOOL 4ba5a9baf57af269bf3e436f0a9fd328f195e9899f67142d8dd77c0fb910be66768d6778bae47cc971a45f05c1418acf99bf8c8efd6e65d93f508d5839519e4b
MISC ChangeLog 30433 SHA256 de2ab6288f426fe66a580a6ca643e3880643cfe787ebe3971aff360a5e6d40a3 SHA512 0726287b396ee9ef5fdc6ddd50a1efcff521cb0877bb7ff7a1c78dd73ad0d1d9233db8eaaa45fffeed1a1bebaba123c4ee4c457c4005ece7277376ef0d551b5c WHIRLPOOL 63fe3612aecf5a5e562b19cb25a07c236afad10e8e3adaf0b33d3fccd39a9e7c6514539d7c3a845dce8d0361092b49a363e57f224f3857f7411561d06140a044
MISC ChangeLog 30524 SHA256 c5618fbc249f2d5c24b297136862b6860d2dff2ccf92c4254d007707f78cba1f SHA512 5218477e32b68f9d38f9247693ba61582322cd365d43e79a7f1098518262fc5bdd1434794588a6372ced8b560e724f7c7d19a3a3a49b234fc0d383d349bc4faf WHIRLPOOL 5ce3480eecace2c658cdb477a9b3711e896ef8aef225a36ea594eab93b8c951d55ac84b1a00da8e2334fa63877e0463fa18c814953ffa2911a5819cf5b2536df
MISC metadata.xml 298 SHA256 776c92889812df8f8dc072ae2ac1d7091f1613afc6332eccd0e20a0d90caaf0b SHA512 9e7e0d3343fc95c9164d7b5cd7bf9a8cc21d5bba06af0ce19f693f8e6039415ab472411fba602fb99a1728529774cd85e828311a77c34d1f157cf4fedea59f65 WHIRLPOOL ddeaf15e3d36ed3c9e0ac13b17e49a187d0855255f38bf60a3726bd10ebaddbfc269a2101bbc64d4c8f69491228165016b2d76b15aabbd9bc3a0bd1732ca8f2e
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)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=EcIN
iEYEAREIAAYFAlMGRP4ACgkQkKaRLQcq0GKvOgCfe1GKTw17f/dUg5lo6Fhj0FMs
TgkAoIeJWVqcrZqyga7wK6cDEfiXkHwt
=EJnK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

4
app-arch/tar/tar-1.27.1-r2.ebuild
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-arch/tar/tar-1.27.1-r2.ebuild,v 1.1 2014/02/19 14:49:03 polynomial-c Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-arch/tar/tar-1.27.1-r2.ebuild,v 1.2 2014/02/20 18:02:38 maekke Exp $
EAPI=4
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ SRC_URI="mirror://gnu/tar/${P}.tar.bz2
LICENSE="GPL-3+"
SLOT="0"
KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 ~arm ~arm64 hppa ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~s390 ~sh ~sparc ~x86 ~ppc-aix ~amd64-fbsd ~x86-fbsd ~x64-freebsd ~x86-freebsd ~hppa-hpux ~ia64-hpux ~x86-interix ~amd64-linux ~arm-linux ~ia64-linux ~x86-linux ~ppc-macos ~x64-macos ~x86-macos ~m68k-mint ~sparc-solaris ~sparc64-solaris ~x64-solaris ~x86-solaris"
KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 arm ~arm64 hppa ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~s390 ~sh ~sparc ~x86 ~ppc-aix ~amd64-fbsd ~x86-fbsd ~x64-freebsd ~x86-freebsd ~hppa-hpux ~ia64-hpux ~x86-interix ~amd64-linux ~arm-linux ~ia64-linux ~x86-linux ~ppc-macos ~x64-macos ~x86-macos ~m68k-mint ~sparc-solaris ~sparc64-solaris ~x64-solaris ~x86-solaris"
IUSE="acl minimal nls selinux static userland_GNU xattr"
RDEPEND="acl? ( virtual/acl )

8
app-crypt/p11-kit/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
# ChangeLog for app-crypt/p11-kit
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-crypt/p11-kit/ChangeLog,v 1.55 2014/02/18 20:56:22 pacho Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-crypt/p11-kit/ChangeLog,v 1.57 2014/02/20 20:39:48 ago Exp $
20 Feb 2014; Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org> p11-kit-0.20.2.ebuild:
Stable for x86, wrt bug #500718
20 Feb 2014; Akinori Hattori <hattya@gentoo.org> p11-kit-0.20.2.ebuild:
ia64 stable wrt bug #500718
18 Feb 2014; Pacho Ramos <pacho@gentoo.org> p11-kit-0.20.2.ebuild:
amd64 stable, bug #500718

20
app-crypt/p11-kit/Manifest
View file

@ -14,13 +14,23 @@ EBUILD p11-kit-0.19.3.ebuild 1000 SHA256 e017919bcb7b148547050c59b1d89985285f751
EBUILD p11-kit-0.19.4.ebuild 922 SHA256 c909352f236c2a44d4c7ed1037e86d3bbd852685af89220bf509ecf42c4c3acd SHA512 1f2683a49e209bed33bad63965404040cdc7ffb0bc10ac9b7936c571b648e1d266f77f2ebac5be6d019237bba18683abdfbe7282025dc6d92d0ca08c774c1de8 WHIRLPOOL 5357e28da9260c80de9f77367b21a7b5fc0ce9c03e5fc7961c845d2e944eeb9a60d9d7bf31435a69d6999c8be3453ced1f0bd4df3fba746035f677e62fc5a37c
EBUILD p11-kit-0.20.1.ebuild 922 SHA256 fda3f1a8acb7377c48c798de38bbcccb0405c7d5b1bbc5af507628df96e003d0 SHA512 1ef5512ac6ad9256e57f1a9cdc9a4b2396c6e529a3530d9c03921122bf9d69f022a5b9b44d04ed8c194f8d7e3d0c9ef245a3511fc6cd1159a1ffedd9dad14328 WHIRLPOOL f31cbf5b74a139ef95a554d5f88e062d07ce47c5f163ea8368ce5e217aac719176335970476776026c88a5443ce0b3b2789d5fb3e9daaec314126df13e2f13bf
EBUILD p11-kit-0.20.2-r1.ebuild 992 SHA256 085290dce7f62db592cf17a2f55d88b1bd42446275c3518ef74ebb17fecd8547 SHA512 7fd9a38f39131bdade94f8e682774cd9bec36aa75e113c810b11a9db02039860c6be3c12b900cbd75ae12a8253255abb18fd58b33cf1c75ed28e30a98fd30de5 WHIRLPOOL 5c1289a45da15268b4a6814835962d4dc37c67a36d55a3c125d92041e566422d7117ac417366dc0afd41b1c97368e5ec4ccf413a5896f5770ed155112812a558
EBUILD p11-kit-0.20.2.ebuild 916 SHA256 f51b56eeaecfdfd053706f769d8ee28d553bbb855330b15c523d43ff17be64d1 SHA512 ff1c227776732f8196ed8f58f49e649817ba26878f33056d4ffc6c92c7919085ede1d6616ce8a114f66ae58d87027214f711d0dd0cd8d9d4e3c024fb61ca69a6 WHIRLPOOL b8ab38a9035f883e285868b583f1167cf481066992fec10bfe4a8d95901cdcd17f6d215f7355c640ba1c7f70fe56a906457f6d451cb4734318a98d24046b87ff
MISC ChangeLog 6764 SHA256 7d6335b3cc9dd893d0e1c9b9157afc7a9568a82961054fb62239a6ab368cb3c7 SHA512 cd23e7f8aa00ee0e140628e8b0d9542ffda5e7491ec036fc1c549b468fd391fbc1d77e4e1470cbd410b337aa233ff4dd7d1632d8e1620dce4729514dc26fccf8 WHIRLPOOL e9d84e887730dd72177d912e4d008414d99797eeef39d8b6c21cc4db0e031321ef965b695addc648cebe7f656b3e9417715ccc2cb0438b604ba1a7df892534ab
EBUILD p11-kit-0.20.2.ebuild 912 SHA256 f61b663c8396e3442e79ee531a77ef9f7e5a2357572d9a28dc4ebc73a0ac53ab SHA512 b7142639d34e7174eb89b2f2a68b4550ef9a823983227a66455a9522a325a4c5aa502cc6e67fd3e6cc67ab3d29415442419105b59e42f27a9866ca24b874b9f7 WHIRLPOOL db7c1a918c1b31062f1b995c82c3aec11a8c535f1c2e316a103c336dd33f37605efc6491d702ab792f9ac1fc0a728c4f2bf33b43d86d2d8d2719b015555b400e
MISC ChangeLog 6974 SHA256 5f3205bc8f4739646ae3272725637faa42855e9d4bd8157536107d4bb3ba7b01 SHA512 4a30f9b21494be7de67b73c5a4954995d77e98cd63f065a1f83c6c3df78270e2cec5b1021716f18af258ab4f725c06364d7ca99c5ddf8ea8bf90359c499dab4c WHIRLPOOL 386181ce4660e47922c901f32e48c869fa88f038385c7fd8f2f62d659cad800944fe9674db94fc404843f3bae40b15a4af7c3853b5626b05b5a8dd6b147bc645
MISC metadata.xml 293 SHA256 24f5bd96c485f51ba93ed3d4789f0455e6c1aa4d36d73ab1b8cedbcaff194d3a SHA512 fb812d3b9cca8a2968d511aa790a4b84cfa2195a5fc91d1c4aec2ea6ffbd8fc4365c3eb19e8fb288b183b6407964c3ebef54d52e0de9ea568933f9edc5d0651a WHIRLPOOL 71a0af9fe956651660e65ee58f9804636a0ab0e04d5b77400ecae3bdc1eea56de5a40cbaa018fb6a9bd9b64d1f49832c5f57c4630fc577a4ed128959a41597db
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)
iEYEAREIAAYFAlMDyPcACgkQCaWpQKGI+9QfRwCeN9Zyx+40Br5+sIYN+L9bXg4m
GloAnRGz+VaRZkP12TiV6LuODnRuyoRg
=F0ru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=VhxT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

4
app-crypt/p11-kit/p11-kit-0.20.2.ebuild
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-crypt/p11-kit/p11-kit-0.20.2.ebuild,v 1.3 2014/02/18 20:56:22 pacho Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-crypt/p11-kit/p11-kit-0.20.2.ebuild,v 1.5 2014/02/20 20:39:48 ago Exp $
EAPI=5
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI="http://p11-glue.freedesktop.org/releases/${P}.tar.gz"
LICENSE="MIT"
SLOT="0"
KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 ~arm hppa ~ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~s390 ~sh ~sparc ~x86 ~amd64-fbsd ~x86-fbsd ~arm-linux ~x86-linux"
KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 ~arm hppa ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~s390 ~sh ~sparc x86 ~amd64-fbsd ~x86-fbsd ~arm-linux ~x86-linux"
IUSE="+asn1 debug +trust"
REQUIRED_USE="trust? ( asn1 )"

5
app-editors/emacs/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
# ChangeLog for app-editors/emacs
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-editors/emacs/ChangeLog,v 1.606 2014/02/17 08:18:21 ulm Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-editors/emacs/ChangeLog,v 1.607 2014/02/20 20:59:41 ulm Exp $
20 Feb 2014; Ulrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org> emacs-18.59-r9.ebuild:
Fix SRC_URI, old-gnu is not on GNU mirrors.
17 Feb 2014; Ulrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org> emacs-23.4-r6.ebuild,
emacs-24.3-r2.ebuild:

24
app-editors/emacs/Manifest
View file

@ -16,25 +16,25 @@ DIST emacs-24.3-patches-5.tar.xz 3260 SHA256 ed9928b23a8b73b3ad265ba6866f609cdf6
DIST emacs-24.3.tar.xz 35565352 SHA256 70aa2942e9ae689ed17eddedfca5027c364ffbcc8b59968b1645e935f4c7058d SHA512 a1300fa10a9fba2db9735db3d01382bcda89ceec033976c4622796dfdf6d2748ed5fa73edf229182b368190c8acbf706810dd5f344542d2c0d294154bc2d0ca9 WHIRLPOOL 687ad4c7d69b41884bf28269bdea1808e03cdcec5a5218d0bac23c07cca3ced341ef98b4d5892149e2dbe899774a5e60edde9931d6c0fe41687995f530fb61d8
DIST leim-21.4.tar.gz 3291433 SHA256 db24946985dd644bfed18815d6e991dad27f8ab1fd5823dd6dc4eb8dcd04333b SHA512 c361996f7a3fcc550e7af30a7df3f692071ded2c9dce998e72f537b0e8011f319cfae1742d0be463608a86852046cba23037a29c3ecdcbaf5976807e1d1a1e2c WHIRLPOOL d7f25d5d491f323b80609567ce5cbcb5f20109cdd4671e9972c79279a3ca5338bbf67d35ae8f0bc627bc06917f545d71ab1f66a09c647f47ddaea26772bfc5c1
EBUILD emacs-18.59-r8.ebuild 4717 SHA256 c02f78fe6fd68875a658b7e50f5587e449db5586237e83a3242dab206bb1c5ce SHA512 ed924f35e1eda58dbfb807f61cbfe32bb549bc311662e6cbe2394dd64faf7939a23216ef9eb4d8c3f723f9ab80938556923bf385f739aba7bc8050bdccdbfe5c WHIRLPOOL a3fa2c4041bf29c562d2e18664ed7c4b2659487e0d5657aefef3f1638e5f1a8d042ea5b20ef4a8e73385b83331a2559c07e75dcbb9722a0b3565c4701250e289
EBUILD emacs-18.59-r9.ebuild 4766 SHA256 9f98a015268909cb72d1249ba03be2e8ce50cb287cdc3e98fd14d8c55ce4703e SHA512 4d58e5b85c62504cf1c1ed1f3f0b65f1352ee7a9128bfa3f81f4ee556cd473a173ecbf0d3df8d15a33c54f2f6332e815dde837572b8d41e99dde47ae81e6b271 WHIRLPOOL 010235119630bc118128713defdd390a01263e31f7908fea924a04cd7e2f0ca7398c28519c5a0bb6e519c02cd35b21450f6622d0bd13fcec98f719b923c19478
EBUILD emacs-18.59-r9.ebuild 4771 SHA256 861bf1a45fa18686eb3d221b8670e9263ef84018546fd26ea8ae7d9330582460 SHA512 5c7b2835a05d6dcac87873856d1471603f80fd0307c4d8cb1c7cacbdd3543f2156c89ff6ebcb85a0c6268f75115afa06d0d03adc8272b08e2fe0589671828456 WHIRLPOOL 817e9454f4afb7df3f3f247cb1f4f0db3daa3b82462d5839b742a2b34b2a3566ac60bb5c7ecf18df548f5cd9a036b32a9f656bdce471b4d4f16ac7f7c418e714
EBUILD emacs-21.4-r24.ebuild 5286 SHA256 564082d9d96421342ec92f1d303ea07fb44ccf4c10aaf0d746a4fe8466ce7f74 SHA512 dd34062685d7c81e080d1ecc31de6c2da5ff6bf1e8f86794724c4edfad5dcd325e6f10e90f96a4700f48186bb4c887a962322a97ef15f57544aaab3250885b26 WHIRLPOOL d1baaf141b4833d23f12628b21b168f624a3f448b05103f123034744bd3de45d209369d6c3b91f038a31511e19990eeb0c1ac02ddb6da28123080726a579195a
EBUILD emacs-22.3-r10.ebuild 7738 SHA256 5a219fa5f170f33347f07f4fcd8f52e8290bb3cd0c0be2c4abdadefd311511f3 SHA512 35a1450f8cbaeee5a14b7a8fb5e428e473b86e3b31481fad0144168a07b5f3158c9b2c3e68e244f1c14b8b044b1d0736d66e249239482ca3aa4b8be4ad8cfdbd WHIRLPOOL ace481ef8a33d517cb153545fd310761658d592da4232ab8d58c79e4c42bb742436a44fbc99ad91f472b9586bd62c20549347cbca7418c133a7a5b92ee66ba0b
EBUILD emacs-23.4-r6.ebuild 10801 SHA256 d73125c366b49db835f739fd8cbc1b6fcc3fb9e70e13eb8f36843f21c335d7d2 SHA512 bfbff187751415fc6ffb23932ade7d66950ad8e0420a8c297415e7266010889f29beea3178e6a84a9185cd665d01c437d56cf49eea5fd580765a57de83b19225 WHIRLPOOL 46e90e02677419356a92e7c13c51d6ff7f11b5e12c117c00628700d4def529a9958f661180c13bc9b616ba4abefe68c07451ca8f278130f80faf155d3c4ed26c
EBUILD emacs-24.2-r1.ebuild 11004 SHA256 e0b04d9da0ec883437134abd0253ea6ededef096bebe5c76a64883489eb9b89e SHA512 d3a40b1c261d0b0c217d6fa1b4874781b78c0c27e6f8662f4ce0f279d20dec5e1b32ba566cf56df25cb8f7b1bf72b54a7c4af478dc95cf948edb77ffab3682bd WHIRLPOOL 22e196214a7bc2ab00b40711d6d51bbac08cfadc2e6c9d5778be02b22c406d3601238870172ef28ae2dc47fdef5f86d35ff83aea6d88ee23112b06f2c0fa2dc3
EBUILD emacs-24.3-r2.ebuild 10786 SHA256 a6f2a4ca08e974997d213f0a21fe0b905bbf67e4b1011310d679fd05c0cafe06 SHA512 17a0c52e9fba474ba20fc3a6afdce26d41a33ee072f4402c3cdbd704ffa2163aeec3b7cd90e223f7d2e6abce626744855bebd667cfb6a906f9276c400a9b40fa WHIRLPOOL 56a8fbcafd7cc74fca1065680468073cc2785d17df9aaec90347e5086481f0f0403ffadeae8186bfab9edc504a04dce04617abcfbb24b5b9dc766d878eeccb89
MISC ChangeLog 83918 SHA256 a5a831ed084b21fc113fc497c037d1e0284306c3e4a701e7243f555879f524d7 SHA512 7b0173d8841ead8e695ee7a1fb072f6dfaf310e42f2022bfb033297656fb365504de3d9b31fb60b1887d02ff6c99143768a6e87a3cff5d52afc20d7b8b745181 WHIRLPOOL 394b105f05c164e6a4e100b50ff9517a71c7d482cfb8ac34e47ffc22c894a89ca69ecc0ecad5ab8c13cb8c692a5157171f748dedf71340d5008b269dcd1f145a
MISC ChangeLog 84035 SHA256 f3304e47aea2c1e843be8efb9862be13e79cc38e15ebe2d7697841c2a66a373d SHA512 babf388220c16d605c35927b8f8433e60b94d6c590d5079af881a596c0b4c07c0a36914d6339976f9e013839a5b53d53b7189ca2c66822ea6eee9ad8006c97a6 WHIRLPOOL 3f676084ae387ebd7e7afa1f1a7ef6846a73453a25f4ca04d94d4aef24535b940b29b137d864f98165e11696b4e1b62c42a833e97c2b2b5376678a4c356b6f90
MISC metadata.xml 2554 SHA256 94ab92fa323dcb5747564f95bfd1e2a3eca2511cd3e95b48e4ca95ea40ac8238 SHA512 24207b2227969f1d87126bbca5046f10f848f22584fa9c2a23a88ebb854e4344cc564902be1e6e1b86ae8b9da416f65ccf6172d4595633d6063f78893f9ae0c1 WHIRLPOOL db5cb9f87e4804152bf0a41807497733f4a4c382dd634b2ba7cc41fb6bda07191adca7e68b11dcac79d681b3b17dc9a4d629d0b8d152cd8c148883e754385155
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)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=9sWD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=2z9J
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

4
app-editors/emacs/emacs-18.59-r9.ebuild
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-editors/emacs/emacs-18.59-r9.ebuild,v 1.2 2014/01/25 16:11:17 ulm Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-editors/emacs/emacs-18.59-r9.ebuild,v 1.3 2014/02/20 20:59:41 ulm Exp $
EAPI=5
@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ inherit eutils toolchain-funcs flag-o-matic multilib
DESCRIPTION="The extensible self-documenting text editor"
HOMEPAGE="http://www.gnu.org/software/emacs/"
SRC_URI="mirror://gnu/old-gnu/emacs/${P}.tar.gz
SRC_URI="ftp://ftp.gnu.org/old-gnu/emacs/${P}.tar.gz
ftp://ftp.splode.com/pub/users/friedman/emacs/${P}-linux22x-elf-glibc21.diff.gz
http://dev.gentoo.org/~ulm/emacs/${P}-patches-8.tar.bz2"

7
app-emacs/css-mode/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
# ChangeLog for app-emacs/css-mode
# Copyright 2000-2007 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/css-mode/ChangeLog,v 1.10 2007/10/29 14:13:51 flameeyes Exp $
# Copyright 2000-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/css-mode/ChangeLog,v 1.11 2014/02/21 00:10:55 ulm Exp $
21 Feb 2014; Ulrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org> css-mode-0.11.ebuild:
Update ebuild to EAPI 5. Specify LICENSE more precisely.
29 Oct 2007; Diego Pettenò <flameeyes@gentoo.org> css-mode-0.11.ebuild:
Add ~x86-fbsd keyword.

33
app-emacs/css-mode/Manifest
View file

@ -1,25 +1,22 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Hash: SHA256
AUX 50css-mode-gentoo.el 206 SHA256 8d82f877db8e6a6e136306a6d258e0a0325c4f949bea22f86b485a5f73dfa1a6 SHA512 a6491a40ebe653bac259b8f5c2b1e552b258511d0c87b4ce0b99e172c16ef657efd797924f5835e1760958b9be9ce0eb090cdaded93e3c785ba78d84539298d0 WHIRLPOOL df32720412c25f4437f215037b258f619b6beed14c0f67054879b6ee5794bdf93fe6c6b23d8bebb3f2f12b6d2197067620cd893f6c967d26711fc2e551216c38
AUX 50css-mode-gentoo.el 171 SHA256 1f48e8d470f9a8e8de545a5c10529beb7a9265f17671bd45018455783d1ec8d2 SHA512 18713c42439aa4d076b7154035ba369060bfc8a0e98e845b7140e137b05ed0aacc2a25ec93612e950fe930c5605d6ea909d5d1ed79433d1472f357bc272ce96e WHIRLPOOL c9c97b77bd3f8aa00522be5f7b6e752ad2061f5c32bf6d2d5813fa2e8cc5862e93795fa442f9934272bf70499b2679d204ed11b373bf541499db68e25fddc8ff
DIST css-mode-0.11.tar.bz2 6848 SHA256 f7980d13a2d5ba2ac6873fdc2c7b54db5c13e93294a2c1068b4b04e7b6a2f7d4 SHA512 b93574fde8bb24ffc4dac6ddda20db3ec3c1834c1201f250f24805d31c7972edc2ffc157e7717327e7baac5c71a1d943a9d80bc7bec96be99c44cd2ab16e0e03 WHIRLPOOL e9036b4ef8604025aa123fc56c51b2171f0027d493134b89a96d2eceef3b0de3668c5ced5396c684b3ff8cfa595eb21d3ddd491a3c2b45f486955cee4f020b30
EBUILD css-mode-0.11.ebuild 780 SHA256 1dd1224e15dd85229c25a03167364cbd9127fb5e6b9c62ce412f0bd449ac4019 SHA512 ff7046090d5f5c98c66dd1042b6090f61785af97a40443b97b0828109f343d29b0bf0321226b4b1d16aaf8d130214a2dfc26d901814f928e717ed0418ef4bf2e WHIRLPOOL 4667e81b1089bc878aeb5eccdfe050d69842ba419587628706308984b4c6bd6fb0878332253383ff0a6bd7bc25fe98b028938b5cac78037514a7f09280a4371c
MISC ChangeLog 1039 SHA256 73314476f1279e6275fbd90e10e07e66869e5fb8befc075ff27b29267161bd36 SHA512 d475bab022a795843ec65607d2b4585667d0e9d09bb2acd03308bd9ac59fde8e1497c9d95a75a13040ce5a397dbbd02005465853075774a2a84b91c6026b78f4 WHIRLPOOL ebae4293841fba7501113c32512e709212d47c646f9f1884e1084f5215b1ee940e32cca6be61e41af0a2151522ed7dcd9e07a340ba5f1e28f526f5fa84a38020
EBUILD css-mode-0.11.ebuild 705 SHA256 116b93f10ae4e58ffd06e70031986bfef44cf8df40cc1950bec3f0c6485d67ae SHA512 39651313e542ef7c0c9b814c811e2f04eb6637445cd15d5932be5c3fc34bcd76d3451ae499aaac5324dc4aeed285e453a36a6960d36c9d32dfab6aeb9c854f98 WHIRLPOOL 37d0e752cc78f9ff8b4195e66971d2cd769615358641fc6d7a798dc12265e5fa47c966b2598631c500a9c16fb166fa3cd475ad32e3e105576505a374f807a1c0
MISC ChangeLog 1162 SHA256 8f0df2d11ced4341266bd23eaccfeb9ee1b0ade80e6ecf8f2c2a90934def800a SHA512 4acbe48fcc6c9838ef52ce084ef259873cc2207c33cd61555ea3e463560ecc55d250cd7ac6ab67dc39b70407f49baf814a9b70ad6efb8a58c147b52df73a56d9 WHIRLPOOL df298f1a9e6c8f574a58ec69d9122808592b94b8c014d76a0cb878e480dbd7570cb7ddf129e6eccbf55020f6726ee9e2d0ba4c9a1b4fd79d4e41b13f47825675
MISC metadata.xml 158 SHA256 1393bdef3a74343fdb40a112c7096a1af16f67e7a43413250de28dfe73810eab SHA512 e55d75feae933ba948ae987305ea58e36f5880f18687e8acaf91237e33e251be3ecfd5be27048f4907ea6799e0bcf784b602096dd7e2bc9c450eb5e2bb6a73d2 WHIRLPOOL 1d1676172186235a3e99ca1d148298fb24f6a089f9b7908b3c28c246c8854969835fd3742b8b81e0a30b63d76ee0be0c42bfede2416a30dfc3c8b915a147340c
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux)
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)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=k+hz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=rWfW
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

23
app-emacs/css-mode/css-mode-0.11.ebuild
View file

@ -1,32 +1,27 @@
# Copyright 1999-2008 Gentoo Foundation
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/css-mode/css-mode-0.11.ebuild,v 1.10 2008/02/14 10:07:30 ulm Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/css-mode/css-mode-0.11.ebuild,v 1.11 2014/02/21 00:10:55 ulm Exp $
EAPI=5
inherit elisp
IUSE=""
DESCRIPTION="A major mode for editing Cascading Style Sheets (CSS)"
HOMEPAGE="http://www.garshol.priv.no/download/software/css-mode/"
SRC_URI="mirror://gentoo/${P}.tar.bz2"
LICENSE="GPL-2"
LICENSE="GPL-2+"
SLOT="0"
KEYWORDS="amd64 ppc ppc64 x86 ~x86-fbsd"
DEPEND=">=sys-apps/sed-4"
RDEPEND=""
SITEFILE="50${PN}-gentoo.el"
src_unpack() {
unpack ${A}
src_prepare() {
# Fix documentation
sed -i -e 's,HREF="/visuals/standard.css",HREF="standard.css",' \
"${S}/doco.html"
sed -i -e 's,HREF="/visuals/standard.css",HREF="standard.css",' doco.html
}
src_install() {
elisp_src_install
dohtml -A css "${S}/doco.html" "${S}/standard.css"
dohtml -A css doco.html standard.css
}

7
app-emacs/css-mode/files/50css-mode-gentoo.el
View file

@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
;;; css-mode site-lisp configuration
(add-to-list 'load-path "@SITELISP@")
(add-to-list 'auto-mode-alist '("\\.css$" . css-mode))
(autoload 'css-mode "css-mode" "Mode for editing Cascading Style Sheets")
(add-to-list 'auto-mode-alist '("\\.css\\'" . css-mode))
(autoload 'css-mode "css-mode" "Mode for editing Cascading Style Sheets" t)

29
app-emacs/distel/Manifest
View file

@ -1,26 +1,23 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Hash: SHA256
AUX 50distel-gentoo.el 234 SHA256 381c351c434675e8dce2aa365c6cd444460172541d650d0d69ba678697bf6a33 SHA512 730432ce41672107600cf9256d9c64b41d1a924d8e6209b30acdb6dd6d3ad47272c9521a72652404b04cce964b633ff5ecd3b58ccafa528cbe6c03b17e6a2f92 WHIRLPOOL a8f213f6e5b0239b494e7873631030db42dd6abec8e82a52c8b332449797a572aeadfb400e82f14a69b2d3d23eaf35281823d170e042b053c7eb4a6f784eebb8
AUX distel-4.03-fix-ebin-path.patch 1152 SHA256 0343e67b3fd5f114cf5da5ddf755cae120ef41bbe31cce78122cb530262bfc0b SHA512 564ba0b0ffbf1f2c221f6f0a7b18861fa44a2a979930afb16c49d69c4aebdf12f91e6ea07b1acd96143f2eafeed4d10328d136f1f4434432661fec1aa5428de2 WHIRLPOOL f2b814c0c95eb26198cec6b45c6815a9fb644437f6bfc521ef50b4e976f065ebcddb3921aa0aa8407a957f08582ac6dc7e8b8b829088e23aba2334f275c64268
DIST distel-4.03.tgz 210737 SHA256 0fbf14beacfa6019fbe4f453d9b0748e160a82995798b23f37ff4d02dea16551 SHA512 68bf73c873fe3cf70e1ee29ab27ca71a8a51dcfab8cf3466ccc76ce80f77a12bda15006014648c8ed2e407d278feb15d28d0465fc678aac9b8da37faaadc3e8e WHIRLPOOL f58015272174199eb6dc0ebf79cfd4d09fe2451f5710af2b83c147cbf4d18606c5a799835f580cae2904a365ced9b80cc469d28e7e6b2b5fda1e3af3162c9d45
EBUILD distel-4.03.ebuild 1188 SHA256 b989016cadfcf528a983e55c8a1c2520582c8471360ced826bc8dc7e8ae2f5ce SHA512 bece58ef019b24b31ac88334e32fe0ba4b048c5ba8298a4dcf7b4076009d1c7b60bdfe3f2a33e09848e6cae3ad7233f4384333d3a8578d495e26772bc81aeda4 WHIRLPOOL 92dabd741ac4064913f107b7acc87d5c8b98ea032aed26bc5a6c3172a65b9c3b09e6f90e30780a44900f9620a522c6f643e3b1a7434fd557ebd4b15bd7d8ed6d
MISC ChangeLog 1133 SHA256 c082bac20a75d99cd761b2217d00d044ee608a69a0e92921205605dab2419e85 SHA512 111b24784e04df5492472fc9cb65a66bec857818feac2278391bfb67a307419d5c23fe29b6b16c47e733df0ed50f49f616ae4259f093398d647290df1dc37b37 WHIRLPOOL 4150f384172f4e53f80549ac38d9d1fccba59da70b52d87fe721f6e1568f41901fbf87e9db6801aa775caa5574e359ff3386ec99eea9159cc61295471806ef67
MISC metadata.xml 235 SHA256 1c910e039c2e23bcc3b96f7bd8156735e1f8c1d8e8172f9e99398a13f39975e9 SHA512 fda6d42fcc139674ff870afb4d05de7057c427d828dda8c48e171ab1f5d4831a8d690afd7950afd2ae9b63b7b7bc0fb64fbfa2f1d5149bbe135808fc59ce6afa WHIRLPOOL 9711c8e4e49577fcc8c70decda0e4badca57bb2cb6f8679d7687f5ef8f17e47537cb8b04a08d6b7f7fd6b5fa84f9a4b87d2d89e469ce50bc10e81ed6ec16fb65
MISC metadata.xml 232 SHA256 5b7aaa25f22af9f71a5cefff6bf72d7861c538c8a7870838aab3837219d1792f SHA512 fc48e01b70a11b5fc07e188f4f29c8e35cac6fd12058e370146a28835778f283dfd4872598df7156dfa4b21339211b07b6402ab452d931641a78c9dcb505c634 WHIRLPOOL 4b332e8e897503fbda5c7546e6815c0262c2c97fcf499711c65c7a55cf964339f9b338e8da2509f3793fea85d13ac5d12301e849fb53266f17e4dffbdf7a3f6f
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux)
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)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=N0bL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=CzIl
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

8
app-emacs/distel/metadata.xml
View file

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE pkgmetadata SYSTEM "http://www.gentoo.org/dtd/metadata.dtd">
<pkgmetadata>
<herd>emacs</herd>
<upstream>
<remote-id type="google-code">distel</remote-id>
</upstream>
<herd>emacs</herd>
<upstream>
<remote-id type="google-code">distel</remote-id>
</upstream>
</pkgmetadata>

10
app-emacs/initsplit/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
# ChangeLog for app-emacs/initsplit
# Copyright 1999-2009 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/initsplit/ChangeLog,v 1.9 2009/01/29 02:07:42 fauli Exp $
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/initsplit/ChangeLog,v 1.10 2014/02/20 12:25:30 ulm Exp $
*initsplit-1.7_pre20140203 (20 Feb 2014)
20 Feb 2014; Ulrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org>
+initsplit-1.7_pre20140203.ebuild, +files/50initsplit-gentoo.el:
Version bump. Snapshot of upstream repository.
29 Jan 2009; Christian Faulhammer <fauli@gentoo.org>
-files/50initsplit-gentoo.el, -initsplit-1.6.ebuild:

32
app-emacs/initsplit/Manifest
View file

@ -1,25 +1,25 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Hash: SHA256
AUX 50initsplit-gentoo.el 91 SHA256 07bc4a2888123ddac344ebe1696211b5bb9f8b9ccba0173f33bb3a60ebb9e917 SHA512 531d0f480c3787453b182be3b9fe145fffd9752155b2c26df3fdf0b497cd058f5978687df53e43046c1f44f4908679783756377998f49dc407a6e18956bc34b1 WHIRLPOOL c0b35226570b0f5fea40a51ee0631ec47087658fb8975b6ceeac117a14e7ebc4aa8750c93fa74c121f46f898ab3a3890e1099c70a84ee6576041679265581426
AUX 51initsplit-gentoo.el 521 SHA256 6e66a35f5b0d525880d7d93152b23908514d1ba9f426b1c69c2c006f9ec45a13 SHA512 f36e7d9e07cbd47a69d20c6f61b5db0cce6a07f5ee597917a8811eb28c2bc9f04721c4b4726b6792b35d3287851e876561b2ef86cdae8ea06cd7d313b8fce4a3 WHIRLPOOL 9b4ce0a930c8270898d3d5fa2dad9b41dd9629a4483f93fcca9ff74962c6561a81d9d75390578d55ae4c8bf4d3d083b5796edf004184d1154781891f520336d8
DIST initsplit-1.6.tar.gz 2454 SHA256 64612a8bdc43875b2889549e1182cae39041676dac92151f53bca0473cbc4e4c SHA512 a03217a4d30c539cb0413d517c954015100f17c1183f3ca7d14a7edd5c4ab7e258f05e0c1c8fe5ed6fff1071eda0f9fbe10590a27521bb99eabb4cc819fb748c WHIRLPOOL 9fdbeb2ab62934bdc669ea50b74436a317df8181f06645d4085d3108af4b0d2f3ff6ff87eaf71ec131b0172413285b9b4960ea99b62237ea64f859a1613845eb
DIST initsplit-1.7_pre20140203.el.xz 4792 SHA256 4005271af94ca4dad7a3b6b084fcb1e5b93097e98ee15810b766efddd2f8a718 SHA512 f2c894bb9d0359b5e95760541feb83f465950de732266059b9498b7ee7361ebb843e0d900fec92fa5e9c37547ea160836b9fc24f64c56083e3ea4416b4b52e50 WHIRLPOOL d10ba44154fc6030fed39a2cb325ced928501d8bfddc47b5364ac95b0ee55bea6f3a7d01a2dad166622d2baa247a0188b30da6d2fa5f42ad43cbd20259b8ef9d
EBUILD initsplit-1.6-r1.ebuild 897 SHA256 6a63bfa2c2b83d6b831247491deca69984c84df0f092b7aeea29e64c3b23942a SHA512 8deed0598984932f653701995c659874494110589c0f47c816fa6b4827021065aa85362e6b49f5ae4802e4473863a6ff5d898f8c16c44c067e9fecf10a3805de WHIRLPOOL 32c5a4c4d98c9ca846d73361315aee18b207fde2b2942a7dbafe157984ae69e5b3830181540022ea8c81cd44fd7a7def68bcee5f416c739d13118b132bbff67d
MISC ChangeLog 1366 SHA256 049dd348011c081276706396cc210d44665ea64141a07d8367afa41d7e1ca110 SHA512 1139d43879927482e1d6ae0e81145d0160cf85f0ca6d61ea142a67bc8ce29c3e42cde673fed1651fdef855a1239988f3da604a6c18a1191d3dc2b9a3622dd684 WHIRLPOOL 59c807c7b3cc580a63a0f45032a975c397ae368f0eb3b5efb2b8f9ebf6d291731a0380f0c79f118489c8c9dbd89af16339cd60eaf64b96fb148601c7a243e899
EBUILD initsplit-1.7_pre20140203.ebuild 876 SHA256 281cb2b86fa47f47d0ef9f42f83ae7b7bbaacd14a884b849cb98b6df2e81dc08 SHA512 3a323c8b0db2e5d61ec9a7a717378ea05b212f56dee020815cb227d38985ba84043586922091f2fe3302f902844e16c28e33fdede52460e7787095708e7cd58f WHIRLPOOL c48b8aaf36e95e78e7cd606d973b96efc483d8a02a208929b43c280d9feb4da567c9ced6a4da0960804b496846cf07f7abce46ceba6004b5bf557d4bb3cd032c
MISC ChangeLog 1571 SHA256 c1c13e1ecf0e2ee9d5b722de2c30f6df6290d9feeba8e70219dd6c465c8f2dc0 SHA512 f995580f6c300f344494d3ff824eae9d101aa085aada716acd2fa740e742da8404d68166a49e2035192a66006831c3d483e7607f23f084ccad59d24f22181dae WHIRLPOOL b82ca4b446104e3d136a73bf80e7bc3154aa1110d7ca540476122c0f5674712022393e4da8ebf423d138853ba17ac3b080ad069cf702674b4ffb4d4908088f0e
MISC metadata.xml 158 SHA256 1393bdef3a74343fdb40a112c7096a1af16f67e7a43413250de28dfe73810eab SHA512 e55d75feae933ba948ae987305ea58e36f5880f18687e8acaf91237e33e251be3ecfd5be27048f4907ea6799e0bcf784b602096dd7e2bc9c450eb5e2bb6a73d2 WHIRLPOOL 1d1676172186235a3e99ca1d148298fb24f6a089f9b7908b3c28c246c8854969835fd3742b8b81e0a30b63d76ee0be0c42bfede2416a30dfc3c8b915a147340c
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux)
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)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=vRNQ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=8WoA
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2
app-emacs/initsplit/files/50initsplit-gentoo.el Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
(add-to-list 'load-path "@SITELISP@")
(autoload 'initsplit-byte-compile-files "initsplit")

23
app-emacs/initsplit/initsplit-1.7_pre20140203.ebuild Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/initsplit/initsplit-1.7_pre20140203.ebuild,v 1.1 2014/02/20 12:25:30 ulm Exp $
EAPI=5
inherit readme.gentoo elisp
DESCRIPTION="Split customizations into different files"
HOMEPAGE="http://www.emacswiki.org/emacs/InitSplit"
# taken from https://github.com/dabrahams/${PN}
SRC_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~ulm/distfiles/${P}.el.xz"
LICENSE="GPL-2+"
SLOT="0"
KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~ppc ~x86"
SITEFILE="50${PN}-gentoo.el"
DOC_CONTENTS="Initsplit is not enabled as a site default. Add the following
line to your ~/.emacs file to enable configuration file splitting:
\n\t(load \"initsplit\")
\n\nIf you want configuration files byte-compiled, also add this line:
\n\t(add-hook 'after-save-hook 'initsplit-byte-compile-files t)"

9
app-emacs/mode-compile/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
# ChangeLog for app-emacs/mode-compile
# Copyright 1999-2008 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/mode-compile/ChangeLog,v 1.3 2008/06/14 23:28:25 ulm Exp $
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/mode-compile/ChangeLog,v 1.4 2014/02/20 17:36:48 ulm Exp $
*mode-compile-2.29.1 (20 Feb 2014)
20 Feb 2014; Ulrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org> +mode-compile-2.29.1.ebuild:
Version bump. Update HOMEPAGE and SRC_URI. LICENSE is GPL-3+ now.
14 Jun 2008; Ulrich Mueller <ulm@gentoo.org> mode-compile-2.29.ebuild:
Do not assign SIMPLE_ELISP since elisp.eclass now detects this case

33
app-emacs/mode-compile/Manifest
View file

@ -1,25 +1,24 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Hash: SHA256
AUX 50mode-compile-gentoo.el 302 SHA256 e882a46f36a9e920f5ac2656d97f41e653dce6e0ff23086ce17b3b84f5a38634 SHA512 135f6ec692c1330e3bbb49cae08ccb4ad7b27ea1604f39517ed94784cb47502ffcbd1323b4dabd8429ea282ca98f6b1306facd78368bea8c90493a636108784e WHIRLPOOL 28497bbfddc6e76f460b39b923ca84458b8b75de69784da4accec084d24812b053d722e698d38d47479ffd57f89ba75845534d2fad8734779994953ca727eb3a
AUX 50mode-compile-gentoo.el 255 SHA256 a222c3c4d39a0b5febf275e2594611182d862c044e0fb74d0bdc92959e8e7b65 SHA512 4214eb678ef2ee902bce458f906d19cc90f2d2f793e34e45b98393dc0d6eddd29334bfbdf1983793aa840f827654b093519686bf643a9593df9b0cd5783d4241 WHIRLPOOL 0f97ac0e55798dfa34224fec1d3f8645e75b12332b40b0193cf6b9978a08b0d74a1287417d55a86f0b3fa8883aea8a4ee357e0b3a6dfd8ca462f5e2bde6aeecb
DIST mode-compile-2.29.1.tar.gz 22924 SHA256 9c7dafa3a5c5706316a01071a2769beeecf228d0831fceb53d27d4e47c9d0421 SHA512 bc43d9cae411f5177ce70c736041db74c6db1dc5b766b22b92227e9e1324d304276bd104d8e3cac9ff5a877fc48b6da5b904e1acdb6cca7396fc7c26cc572815 WHIRLPOOL 3980e43e28438f5eefbd1d8e689cc18d9cc922857ec3e32b58c6aa6d056cc6798c2094b65de28705db6dfc95e493a06858a208c536f2c9d217027d47c4b311a9
DIST mode-compile-2.29.el.bz2 21579 SHA256 c7cd617d5b1445638621b37f21a062de41f9b3b3eef829d9aa045a5571cb6556 SHA512 31573552298f2ffa8e89dbdb4155f3c95c5e354966ec4966098fe90bffd0e8fd8ecd86a7453adc10fb551622b9929aa58ce3abeb90b605373d6d4a874aa5ba7c WHIRLPOOL 85f1f740d3f3fe311bbc888bcdeba0a9ebb614b0adaae231d0aeb0912862e79c44130880d1e636a7465c9bc8f92261e0eecf961ecf800b60bbba1d76ee5b0e40
EBUILD mode-compile-2.29.1.ebuild 586 SHA256 7c77e7f39a92b166f125d55ff1f3ddcd9c345a010bdbfa09e4a0fce5a2fa23b7 SHA512 f599daf6488b343297b92155260eb323f6562955a23ed4e73ed9ac5c5e9844cf8631061c55a5448e7ec6dc57626312a9f18f38079e092f3a1fe23e54d3b9a36e WHIRLPOOL bdcfeeba8a5efa060017b108a487e5b489aabc764f69d4bd4ba1ced7582890a9927f34c49b48e58f92bb2f97d09323ae42bb04fdc35e56ad83c7cc06717bdd4a
EBUILD mode-compile-2.29.ebuild 553 SHA256 3eb3a7535aa60870248455abdae2cb144f5ec6d737dc6de0ed3f16baf5755d37 SHA512 5ac4a741f0ab1d032c0765aa253bfcd7d18e3f5b03681ac7176b2b68acd635346c507fe17cb7314ba7c1f74959d6f1abb5dd2435e56d647c252d870ea1b1df79 WHIRLPOOL b8bf52c5c2846689e011091446021325379b7c942d9ea785f8db17a62ab1f9569ed16ab7b31e9c4633732c0226cd2edcd086c0aa48f6d25c6d923eec8f6c3c91
MISC ChangeLog 748 SHA256 bfdbc25727d48ba5ca2d749a4d00220c04e385c92bedf600aebde5bfab207de6 SHA512 bd78379bf9a1534e74c82dabb6fb6db318f084e1739a8388be46e6fc51a57a422b3388b7a2e4c079620d4c563f67994a24c3990a615c20a9eb0fb9af50b40f68 WHIRLPOOL 3508e4f914fa8cd8bd880863c4014996db7f1ac33c164d68d8e4cd1385c76d23bc0d263ad73a0d35e18f86a916913d4aa80b6f9999122ae1acd489213c03e0a3
MISC ChangeLog 929 SHA256 ae327cda445259c7899cf8cfa50e1773df176c4dcb5128bbafc17a1c671cffa6 SHA512 0a0952bfde2fb34fe3e189304b4a03ddc585cb73072b720ca4c78274373f5874e49eead99c09c57238d22bec8c8c9ad76a98dee8664e2b376137bbd3b109dc00 WHIRLPOOL d31d6fad00662e51a928e099428bd9d6285b2769524e8e4f1df5b50006f94e288d06b21c847c7ffe238cb528cd735e61deb21dfecae3af65714bb04425fe59f8
MISC metadata.xml 158 SHA256 1393bdef3a74343fdb40a112c7096a1af16f67e7a43413250de28dfe73810eab SHA512 e55d75feae933ba948ae987305ea58e36f5880f18687e8acaf91237e33e251be3ecfd5be27048f4907ea6799e0bcf784b602096dd7e2bc9c450eb5e2bb6a73d2 WHIRLPOOL 1d1676172186235a3e99ca1d148298fb24f6a089f9b7908b3c28c246c8854969835fd3742b8b81e0a30b63d76ee0be0c42bfede2416a30dfc3c8b915a147340c
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux)
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)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=PGZX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=pkxx
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

3
app-emacs/mode-compile/files/50mode-compile-gentoo.el
View file

@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
;;; site-lisp configuration for mode-compile
(add-to-list 'load-path "@SITELISP@")
(autoload 'mode-compile "mode-compile"
"Command to compile current buffer file based on the major mode" t)

18
app-emacs/mode-compile/mode-compile-2.29.1.ebuild Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/mode-compile/mode-compile-2.29.1.ebuild,v 1.1 2014/02/20 17:36:48 ulm Exp $
EAPI=5
inherit elisp
DESCRIPTION="Smart command for compiling files according to major-mode"
HOMEPAGE="https://github.com/emacsmirror/mode-compile
http://www.emacswiki.org/emacs/ModeCompile"
SRC_URI="https://github.com/emacsmirror/${PN}/archive/${PV}.tar.gz -> ${P}.tar.gz"
LICENSE="GPL-3+"
SLOT="0"
KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~x86"
SITEFILE="50${PN}-gentoo.el"

10
app-emacs/mpg123-el/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
# ChangeLog for app-emacs/mpg123-el
# Copyright 1999-2012 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/mpg123-el/ChangeLog,v 1.36 2012/11/20 20:43:21 ago Exp $
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/mpg123-el/ChangeLog,v 1.37 2014/02/20 18:25:34 ulm Exp $
*mpg123-el-1.59 (20 Feb 2014)
20 Feb 2014; Ulrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org> -mpg123-el-1.55.ebuild,
+mpg123-el-1.59.ebuild:
Version bump.
20 Nov 2012; Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org> mpg123-el-1.58.ebuild:
Stable for x86, wrt bug #441070

23
app-emacs/mpg123-el/Manifest
View file

@ -1,7 +1,24 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
AUX 50mpg123-el-gentoo.el 121 SHA256 f98c0b7674758684be83e3311060a51ddaacd9576ffe88d87083c0406bc93839 SHA512 65b1d2039ce0773a65cf26fc88699ccb6fa26d7db2312ac6a9d0712512c214ba7b5758bd1556365836fdf840bcfc9eedef12f18bcdd1866fde6937777979a032 WHIRLPOOL 38a4b9b8ee3c5edcd344e2f192531ba453d458089c69218a31d87a1cd0ffe7614283b6d1f8a8473843a3433bd5635b02d9ad6afda52fffca8a134c3f3c6939f1
DIST mpg123-el-1.55.tar.bz2 33925 SHA256 c388bf8e93b772c90126b905224c43cfc2e709be503e3508b684f05750d19499 SHA512 49737d9eab292599f446d87ace8155be0227fc2f18910e3d184d238f323b40218630a91cef2438dd0e5453a289f32f4fe9cff3f884a7e20cc63dd4668cb48c7f WHIRLPOOL 5b067cdc810c843f693cfd1445e9ddaf57dc19cf0ad7440e23482af5146da3aa008cdafb4828a2191153551d81e3e885d924b119b107c2d50c712d2930c65d0b
DIST mpg123-el-1.58.tar.bz2 34097 SHA256 efdd491329ba56096ad971bd5c2e2ceeea296fe8e26340d2370ae63bcdc33606 SHA512 53a67eb219acbeefeb8360a9d43279d2bb3efa48fa5df3787f2b7fad4f6b49402f319925bac3fc17ee1cad0dcbe38494c8162d4eb5e08261b2e505b40a66a987 WHIRLPOOL 83c8d660fd18d3faefff106c62127c0487c47824f9b53f157c27b127cd1dd624dad445217b99e5e3183ab02bf13fef3abdd077451ec8ce934c188fc356522181
EBUILD mpg123-el-1.55.ebuild 992 SHA256 f8b4a12ff5b1703e8869e83f49768886a5fceaaddd3750299a67cd1e7a40706c SHA512 65a697b65b1fd29a62796ede35ec5a966dfa833872ef283a3e83d840452844db14948a8eee6676cb47927af6923424f88889a640c491adbdba7c18042f6fed60 WHIRLPOOL d2fd011e88b4c402c959753e5a46be1d5a142b95469f43019ff8a5ce95ac091e12aa94cc33f96013c0a186c467492f486c0562dcedf0284bacd1c0b14d2a0ea7
DIST mpg123-el-1.59.tar.xz 34076 SHA256 6105c3d11099a96cc5cb77909ca8d9e5ea4d5cb78b6a7ca185eb350425e075b4 SHA512 48fae024529be7b88553fc43fb626253f3d3a10d6709378a565a0d407374569e5573e52c0b26abc4d6f2f51ad7f680d655a1ac15ff696f4534c39a9a3536bc0e WHIRLPOOL 6434aa2368976698437c0a7ec12c126861c7f0096f4263f59b555b59c8d20377b5279ce09ceb99bb4b333318541126bb990009234cbd611ffdc2b91e980903f0
EBUILD mpg123-el-1.58.ebuild 1002 SHA256 b13e69fef0d8d2fa676d446eab4d2fbb50f4082be5ada07fdea7fa2cd5ea6dac SHA512 ebf112c9f96212b2ab317ad0e85606d12834121711ad1b73817153bf1ae63cf0271f070fa5e591549286645362ef94547c03a4aeb805cf3d16e486259f766f57 WHIRLPOOL 5345d7c9a25bd8b7acaab8980a3f1b1fa4743369924141fffc0a5efc91e15117396f843759c919bb21c6456e92b47523f3757540a1250088e733ca6d8adcc182
MISC ChangeLog 4338 SHA256 dacb08bc41f31a0d0e11d427ea8bb817b9ed88db451cadbd04c189042ea5fee4 SHA512 91ce75dac05dbfde19d318ad15f5c7a2c3a2a5536071fdfbf95be3045e9add20fac3662c1828aaa4a32dbfbe7cd5737749cf784da9c74f3f1d725dfb478f6244 WHIRLPOOL f669b2c69d70788ba03ee559c5266f4e669845948ab671a1b4f6690271f8c7f8b41dd2914d18a3ab64b2749a958f542c7a2fc5064f6dc70863a5d6e22c2bd85d
EBUILD mpg123-el-1.59.ebuild 1004 SHA256 99923c34f4c385f22937306d025274a8c7500a9152d9f5d6bc0c658150e5e8b1 SHA512 e1c75dd44a80041eef0bd5804842e290c17a2e8a6d311f53f87aa0d3074d281135977a945422700ca6b33bf7d937824b46e24bdfa2b142a73354fcbd1b9cb67c WHIRLPOOL ef523272ee4ec38f23005156f1b2d759b415755e3f2783e93bcc00200fb821a8a85319133acf959bccb9eb05e3c757487a6a2cf4d0f3d5f6814377a12cc4a5f9
MISC ChangeLog 4483 SHA256 78889cc3dea55ab29eebc4f5170ab8016f6c49240a7520e5e33a62f615c964ea SHA512 aa8401af6ca39b69bc4c33b4b69db9dc8d230c5ddf36a61390a61ff9d5b1466f3e4803e8085f295871124c0c6417f69f477be38398cbe0a87c003bc0f9e41931 WHIRLPOOL ef4e32d5538d66b9c65d4e90c1b534db18ed265b2e62756ce7c7c9a5d135689b976203b733c8b4ca171869175f6395aa58e89efec4c740fe9c5a79d2cb1fda19
MISC metadata.xml 158 SHA256 1393bdef3a74343fdb40a112c7096a1af16f67e7a43413250de28dfe73810eab SHA512 e55d75feae933ba948ae987305ea58e36f5880f18687e8acaf91237e33e251be3ecfd5be27048f4907ea6799e0bcf784b602096dd7e2bc9c450eb5e2bb6a73d2 WHIRLPOOL 1d1676172186235a3e99ca1d148298fb24f6a089f9b7908b3c28c246c8854969835fd3742b8b81e0a30b63d76ee0be0c42bfede2416a30dfc3c8b915a147340c
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)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=8fSY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

24
app-emacs/mpg123-el/mpg123-el-1.55.ebuild → app-emacs/mpg123-el/mpg123-el-1.59.ebuild
View file

@ -1,34 +1,38 @@
# Copyright 1999-2012 Gentoo Foundation
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/mpg123-el/mpg123-el-1.55.ebuild,v 1.7 2012/09/25 21:18:36 ulm Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/mpg123-el/mpg123-el-1.59.ebuild,v 1.1 2014/02/20 18:25:35 ulm Exp $
EAPI=5
inherit elisp toolchain-funcs
DESCRIPTION="Emacs front-end to mpg123 audio player and OggVorbis audio player"
HOMEPAGE="http://www.gentei.org/~yuuji/software/mpg123el/"
SRC_URI="mirror://gentoo/${P}.tar.bz2"
SRC_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~ulm/distfiles/${P}.tar.xz"
LICENSE="mpg123-el"
SLOT="0"
KEYWORDS="amd64 ppc x86"
KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~ppc ~x86"
IUSE="vorbis"
DEPEND=""
RDEPEND="media-sound/mpg123
media-sound/alsa-utils
vorbis? ( media-sound/vorbis-tools )"
SITEFILE="50${PN}-gentoo.el"
src_compile() {
src_prepare() {
sed -i -e "s/\(mainloop:\)/\1 ;/" tagput.c || die
}
src_compile() {
$(tc-getCC) ${CFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS} -o tagput tagput.c || die
$(tc-getCC) ${CFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS} -o id3put id3put.c || die
elisp-compile *.el || die
elisp-compile *.el
}
src_install() {
dobin tagput id3put || die
elisp-install ${PN} *.el *.elc || die
elisp-site-file-install "${FILESDIR}/${SITEFILE}" || die
dobin tagput id3put
elisp-install ${PN} *.el *.elc
elisp-site-file-install "${FILESDIR}/${SITEFILE}"
}

11
app-emacs/protbuf/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
# ChangeLog for app-emacs/protbuf
# Copyright 2002-2008 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/protbuf/ChangeLog,v 1.11 2008/12/06 17:16:53 fauli Exp $
# Copyright 2002-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/protbuf/ChangeLog,v 1.12 2014/02/20 23:14:09 ulm Exp $
20 Feb 2014; Ulrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org> protbuf-1.7-r1.ebuild,
+files/50protbuf-gentoo.el, -files/51protbuf-gentoo.el:
Update ebuild to EAPI 5. Update HOMEPAGE. Specify LICENSE more precisely.
Move site-init file to canonical name.
06 Dec 2008; Christian Faulhammer <fauli@gentoo.org>
-files/50protbuf-gentoo.el, -protbuf-1.7.ebuild:
@ -33,7 +38,7 @@
*protbuf-1.7 (31 Oct 2002)
31 Oct 2002; Matthew Kennedy <mkennedy@gentoo.org> ChangeLog,
protbuf-1.7.ebuild, files/50protbuf-gentoo.el,
protbuf-1.7.ebuild, files/50protbuf-gentoo.el,
files/digest-protbuf-1.7 :
Initial import.

33
app-emacs/protbuf/Manifest
View file

@ -1,25 +1,22 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Hash: SHA256
AUX 51protbuf-gentoo.el 567 SHA256 6d0b7a8a2e2d7e28d61131fc4c299444404dfb066a71aad24f3e4236d10f708c SHA512 670d4798b71f1242ddfd6fbb31a2a5e60c0a54cbcd92018fd615af05ced971024f539022533e878df91b42f18d4608cab7a28cf9dd648ef38d4a67f0201d3b34 WHIRLPOOL 88c0200a27b3490920f4b1a759ea54f57f27e6d11640ea40da77ae40cb77666a4f80469a67d20b945cbe8373fecef657e6f56cf92d499b2c7b518ce326684112
AUX 50protbuf-gentoo.el 529 SHA256 5407e0aa60151748d63d51bc9dc37bda6252820b77f9a95d0773f85e6115a65a SHA512 f1cd37bdeb9568cbff9ffb989334237213b8c1bc50704195708fcac4848cc3c128c8121422a0ea42af8c2ee94647e325cd293e4b29c513ad8cdeb37d33fd3f4c WHIRLPOOL 97c2701d4d4d489f028e21e6ed9dcbb6a251be8a9783dfb2a494fb6c19a2c74c861b9d32d9461a7c8524ee1f9fd6467a3a6ff91457b54a255fd2f8addf4b5366
DIST protbuf-1.7.tar.bz2 2270 SHA256 a3c78450bc9e04934d842913984e36f674a7c8d54eaf1c63aef61d8904d2fca5 SHA512 9dad81784b71234812ac35be695895c3063e5337dddbed73b28fde800d12110cec6bb9faa42b6ed74d9a2d4f12da96b8e692d193edfc775fd33a7922a019b8b2 WHIRLPOOL a55039d8f4d4dedf4b8c7083204c9cf45c8d9de18b9763ad1f1e05ecd92af93e3c10a0c745b8c3888d6d797704d61dcab0272e2dfffa0c36fade9e89d9a4903f
EBUILD protbuf-1.7-r1.ebuild 493 SHA256 360d3ad820579f92876ead0f40f196173b445a54240edf0cf3e009739ddeaf45 SHA512 56dc678e1f32ebe013ccf4519d409d2ac29a86342fc381045c0ed5ff2526b73538f3d9bfa5802529279747f93e25f4d67db7014ec11bb7b0714c3ee1fb8761d7 WHIRLPOOL 29f164d363bcdcabb01aff6b501dcf9bc9fb0b8f29d13e55039e29afe302c8c97b92fcf6d90804b86ba3bc6b811f7554e80e3ecdd7b900c3d776078cf2920f49
MISC ChangeLog 1258 SHA256 e24220ac970014038eb114ad6037904e24772f50e17cf941224210fefd60f85f SHA512 cdbe0eae64c42f3e814f434c4eca295c2ef59596c7de7a74c27804b382a6ca253df88951792dc4194b5ffdf686bae2954810c6659add4d13afd95946cda10975 WHIRLPOOL 34c34eb5177ebbd82edb7213a1095f7ac190412be8688ea3f30d583b84713ee54a66d4656f227e736db2b4924a034d25b10c56d8611f6c70a59dcd73a63095cf
EBUILD protbuf-1.7-r1.ebuild 538 SHA256 32be7026604cd5cf2cee7c0597406be3f400f2871973a4359380167dbe134b01 SHA512 52ee3ed18ad548a2d9a52a9d00c02dbbe535d3d86e03b7664afb5f52be1cb140bd83cfea1881d0009ce387bb2e11100b32fd7f2484907034fda8fdf349d98151 WHIRLPOOL f9c74619427ea8d0037248ac6b01b64a95889543d35da53b44dea22931ef3d56a94e7aea625355823b187e32059f59bdd1218d79affbf12d7564278b2fffed47
MISC ChangeLog 1501 SHA256 75b40134f21eb66ec5f79a0f071a7663f00e0910604af2a2c61abee992b564db SHA512 41a0e9e8d42fef37a81bd959929bacabf2a15c1220683fb28bc81bc82e3691fdf910702a3fd87f21e9a1e986e727321ac9fb8f3d70264213bf728c34f706b16c WHIRLPOOL 01d97d44e4fe844a6b212e5176e362be4e24c3477fe75f54519e521ddcbb9421899cdb6889c6a85e439967a6b0ba661fe5aa13068a253a2b02538ce30c49e464
MISC metadata.xml 158 SHA256 1393bdef3a74343fdb40a112c7096a1af16f67e7a43413250de28dfe73810eab SHA512 e55d75feae933ba948ae987305ea58e36f5880f18687e8acaf91237e33e251be3ecfd5be27048f4907ea6799e0bcf784b602096dd7e2bc9c450eb5e2bb6a73d2 WHIRLPOOL 1d1676172186235a3e99ca1d148298fb24f6a089f9b7908b3c28c246c8854969835fd3742b8b81e0a30b63d76ee0be0c42bfede2416a30dfc3c8b915a147340c
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux)
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)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=nKI5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=F5cv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

3
app-emacs/protbuf/files/51protbuf-gentoo.el → app-emacs/protbuf/files/50protbuf-gentoo.el
View file

@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
;;; protbuf site-lisp configuration
(add-to-list 'load-path "@SITELISP@")
(autoload 'protect-buffer-from-kill-mode "protbuf"

14
app-emacs/protbuf/protbuf-1.7-r1.ebuild
View file

@ -1,16 +1,18 @@
# Copyright 1999-2007 Gentoo Foundation
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/protbuf/protbuf-1.7-r1.ebuild,v 1.2 2007/12/02 14:07:50 opfer Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/protbuf/protbuf-1.7-r1.ebuild,v 1.3 2014/02/20 23:14:09 ulm Exp $
EAPI=5
inherit elisp
DESCRIPTION="Protect Emacs buffers from accidental killing"
HOMEPAGE="http://www.emacswiki.org/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?ProtectingBuffers"
HOMEPAGE="http://www.splode.com/~friedman/software/emacs-lisp/
http://www.emacswiki.org/emacs/ProtectingBuffers"
SRC_URI="mirror://gentoo/${P}.tar.bz2"
LICENSE="GPL-2"
LICENSE="GPL-2+"
SLOT="0"
KEYWORDS="amd64 ~ppc x86"
IUSE=""
SITEFILE=51${PN}-gentoo.el
SITEFILE="50${PN}-gentoo.el"

17
app-emacs/psgml/Manifest
View file

@ -7,11 +7,18 @@ DIST psgml-1.3.2.tar.gz 252394 SHA256 a020bfe9ab75e325e738726dd850e2b17030b3a5a2
EBUILD psgml-1.2.5-r1.ebuild 885 SHA256 130a4aec3175203d61f52ed08db1b748b6f11f5f58bedf51c3f9afff50a9d6f6 SHA512 3e09a46583c3469ebf54d714c1c4f5a1e1d109fd6bded442422f73d83ec8400ab2e6ef10b43503e0ae8e4ca3b22d693917da131dc7fbe3b5f632fbadd98791b5 WHIRLPOOL be2a3da3f6e3437acb187523df3c8f172d0aef8bb4e9c99b50886ddbbde7f5e9d3f99fd3f7a534e3f6531a57072a8e8c559299ed7a840e5c58704cc73ba806b4
EBUILD psgml-1.3.2.ebuild 884 SHA256 c917a1b92795b2e64cdc7d6e369f7039d3c3d760938e123cb6ebfde18d7549ca SHA512 14b73ad1d3c5b10123f97e4cccb34913f92ba0b90eede0a962a117c22059c41830c0a73b7de9747a402b73010843747517dae5431b3a7d072c2c2b88d43d2909 WHIRLPOOL a7337bc41fe38c3e2003e7750c71540b0f4cf2b516428f3df2bbba599a682f7597eca97072387bfdac54fe473b7b5f026d6c47cae385b26fd9549d41cf78f038
MISC ChangeLog 3771 SHA256 bbc358cfd28d047ed6aa18149037228ac326dc231d6e6edae4be7ee11bd2de48 SHA512 9b5177fe7748ff1ab207c9ae7029dea55d5ed0171d5b9e50b4cdda0461404d52e0a698c1ee3b8101305784b7349fde3bed15f2754006e216e1baa85349ee2f1c WHIRLPOOL 303205093d8e0467e4060128570e1069c6809cce7709d4a9277f50f847f4603ff79ab5858076270428180491be7b679ff3d2d351bb7bebe668f52492b1083f3c
MISC metadata.xml 160 SHA256 6c4aff1c3e014ac91491c0d794cb8a644417fd41d86390f3d220d1d1a24b2403 SHA512 99a1e214dcd19fbf598f40fe2851b47fa34ab640070582c38ca57031b5ef23262e7ef68f107100fc4f740f6acefda15cad13f3574d66920ffafba67f7534966a WHIRLPOOL c7715960df6ab404b7e415769125dc55723d17dd0f1f37839a83233588cd799db3d96f751c3cc242438b9c9843a6e694ab764e6f7cea0bc5c7232961ebd23b11
MISC metadata.xml 158 SHA256 1393bdef3a74343fdb40a112c7096a1af16f67e7a43413250de28dfe73810eab SHA512 e55d75feae933ba948ae987305ea58e36f5880f18687e8acaf91237e33e251be3ecfd5be27048f4907ea6799e0bcf784b602096dd7e2bc9c450eb5e2bb6a73d2 WHIRLPOOL 1d1676172186235a3e99ca1d148298fb24f6a089f9b7908b3c28c246c8854969835fd3742b8b81e0a30b63d76ee0be0c42bfede2416a30dfc3c8b915a147340c
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (GNU/Linux)
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)
iEYEAREIAAYFAlHrsBkACgkQCaWpQKGI+9TxuACfS8K8ZJlBRn+29pEJTxBRuHbD
sZAAnRKcgsfP0DdoYTzNMUBtJnEuNYRd
=Ivas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=p3yy
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2
app-emacs/psgml/metadata.xml
View file

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE pkgmetadata SYSTEM "http://www.gentoo.org/dtd/metadata.dtd">
<pkgmetadata>
<herd>emacs</herd>
<herd>emacs</herd>
</pkgmetadata>

9
app-emacs/rfcview/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
# ChangeLog for app-emacs/rfcview
# Copyright 2000-2007 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/rfcview/ChangeLog,v 1.9 2007/11/04 17:27:04 ulm Exp $
# Copyright 2000-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/rfcview/ChangeLog,v 1.10 2014/02/20 23:46:50 ulm Exp $
*rfcview-0.13 (20 Feb 2014)
20 Feb 2014; Ulrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org> +rfcview-0.13.ebuild:
Version bump. New upstream.
04 Nov 2007; Ulrich Mueller <ulm@gentoo.org> rfcview-0.5.ebuild:
amd64 stable, bug 195512

33
app-emacs/rfcview/Manifest
View file

@ -1,25 +1,24 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Hash: SHA256
AUX 50rfcview-gentoo.el 206 SHA256 f1d6788d696a0fc6535a6d4c6e70b091d46c7d38bd3feb767466de3c21b55aca SHA512 26745d38c005ae05d6f137c0bfcba33a29ec6ce6a6ca2d7e6fd39c172f3451018ea99a6970f73e5ff99b8562d251b29e8e2425062dc0d6b3a133dac1511ea8f8 WHIRLPOOL 2cc21b21438f1b4df79779e0ab9f72333e5a8b62ee9c6da5d0a06ac83f032ff223a75914eef61d9a89385dec171059d4b9c11b3bfc1de3526017e9f19be29a81
AUX 50rfcview-gentoo.el 168 SHA256 46bbda39b134b844be076ad189719834a532406c442cbb2beaec21e29dd3924e SHA512 ed6bec3e4368d4d7e193c5b6ee0493d6c497bce90ec834376371898777a7c3601288bda59232c1ec4920ca20bbcdf4d01ae3d2ea617da55a31568a5824179637 WHIRLPOOL 97a4eaf328300def0ae0e35f7fb20680cf4f5dc7da352624fda0bf41884c977604c1bb594c75e897871f44a946e9b4aa45dc526e02391d676d013b2a8d7a1127
DIST rfcview-0.13.el.xz 8836 SHA256 eff317b01824832288abe4e60884665fc22e3dbec315a1fb1779cf679f0a8d89 SHA512 84cda45b5e941808e2ddc50d5f03d7b2d3831208d08dddd2fe2121a20ddcbb7d24b148b2ec2ba07e0b9a04da81ae4d14269d0062955961679ac5c7532de1e6e5 WHIRLPOOL 6f10e4cd4f2d027804f030ff90430b80b89bfbb1df01b4ed8c30fcba049f11d0d3bb192ad18f453d73c81fbf3406b92f92817c3b9c0fa8c74860a371fbd341b1
DIST rfcview-0.5.tar.gz 6116 SHA256 b74f7918fd9bd40138f5679f45ff8ecdb31dfde3c1f0d2011e6c0a09fe37a3fb SHA512 b83deb28624123f1fdf105cf287b03e45965b9443bcc89c5f1a12b9595791494384af284517ca1f994eddebc2245202811b4001f4cd8a8bdecd15f117392bc6a WHIRLPOOL 0c6debab4c322c7badb782012bcb7df0d570c62e73da5a5e37177ec469cf9bff48e60aabfa1dacdf3137301e48bcf3eea424e5403d50bd9652cda58b19b44b8c
EBUILD rfcview-0.13.ebuild 601 SHA256 b8707e2fe5bfd38439d5d9e48a449e15aefc679f5029f014974fbc577a48c80e SHA512 c2861a23aa47435f017a7779bd71c41aba26fe2269e2bce6ff3ef2d87b20c69c0af002816b41daa307167cae39603e671f63fe2cda8de63b265bf8a380441fc2 WHIRLPOOL 8423e3cb5e7cfb6574951f43bf7ce3c1d04feb31c640bb33be5519e45476c445de2b0b60291de2d83e22a470db9b9b155a33104038efc076fd6353dfc23930f9
EBUILD rfcview-0.5.ebuild 493 SHA256 baf17a1f2ac96d47bf9da49a77e5afa8e9a8190d417fcaf19b9791a3c4b61cfb SHA512 ec11fa6f0440ec6471872436bde0eb4dd215afd39afea35e065560ac59af4f441437b08dc52d9218d762164e5582f91c8f3bb3cb8838c9050af1469b1254e0fc WHIRLPOOL 83a4d987b78c276ae8644516a8278ca8df9b047e40b45b14bbf952f0d78b2e100ec0b57b323db096493bc0d4580ff50f7326b7ca5e4fc2c072b0fa0f7b1a0b7c
MISC ChangeLog 1115 SHA256 43229a48a475a860ba5318ac8708cbdaae8005e3375e612a82ff85677d36101b SHA512 b27f1c8105883e6c3e74e4fc60ce61a634a1d950b7bd6993c807e30c958f0db00a589706858af1ba0f2bcd277ce60f0ab49a75e1efda239fcf08d6d6f9d77e05 WHIRLPOOL 2632c5f292f31dce4aed12722388aed1ca7e6899ffc96b43a1ae2b738d2d16363bd35982676a6984485231fe89f7f1e66cd5ed9d7864d21004a393f2cea7d213
MISC ChangeLog 1245 SHA256 282d041860c5348737cf3049c760cff06ddb4883e77cee7ff86f7e35f5b50f68 SHA512 d0f3a38bc5bc6a1233caa07ab56c6dff16199a002fdb6839ad826c47db50600ab7bb3173f864f01f953486e64465eb57b36dac02e7e2afe89910edfee3c2c204 WHIRLPOOL 36a144c52a88142776c61ef19d7969903b335de09853adeece12e33ea8767e6f458a1dd4449808df2b21a7fd31215c7536f0422691123bfc11da1bb50e8a59a9
MISC metadata.xml 158 SHA256 1393bdef3a74343fdb40a112c7096a1af16f67e7a43413250de28dfe73810eab SHA512 e55d75feae933ba948ae987305ea58e36f5880f18687e8acaf91237e33e251be3ecfd5be27048f4907ea6799e0bcf784b602096dd7e2bc9c450eb5e2bb6a73d2 WHIRLPOOL 1d1676172186235a3e99ca1d148298fb24f6a089f9b7908b3c28c246c8854969835fd3742b8b81e0a30b63d76ee0be0c42bfede2416a30dfc3c8b915a147340c
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux)
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)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=TqOk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=8d8F
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

3
app-emacs/rfcview/files/50rfcview-gentoo.el
View file

@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
;;; rfcview site-lisp configuration
(add-to-list 'load-path "@SITELISP@")
(autoload 'rfcview-mode "rfcview" nil t)
(add-to-list 'auto-mode-alist

19
app-emacs/rfcview/rfcview-0.13.ebuild Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emacs/rfcview/rfcview-0.13.ebuild,v 1.1 2014/02/20 23:46:50 ulm Exp $
EAPI=5
inherit elisp
DESCRIPTION="An Emacs mode that reformats IETF RFCs for display"
HOMEPAGE="http://www.loveshack.ukfsn.org/emacs/
http://www.emacswiki.org/emacs-de/RfcView"
# taken from http://www.loveshack.ukfsn.org/emacs/${PN}.el
SRC_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~ulm/distfiles/${P}.el.xz"
LICENSE="GPL-3+"
SLOT="0"
KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~x86"
SITEFILE="50${PN}-gentoo.el"

7
app-emulation/wine/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
# ChangeLog for app-emulation/wine
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/wine/ChangeLog,v 1.496 2014/02/08 21:50:51 tetromino Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/wine/ChangeLog,v 1.497 2014/02/21 06:31:47 tetromino Exp $
*wine-1.7.13 (21 Feb 2014)
21 Feb 2014; Alexandre Rostovtsev <tetromino@gentoo.org> +wine-1.7.13.ebuild:
Version bump, see http://www.winehq.org/announce/1.7.13 for the announcement.
*wine-1.7.12 (08 Feb 2014)

18
app-emulation/wine/Manifest
View file

@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ DIST wine-1.7.0.tar.bz2 21217085 SHA256 0106ba3c8f0699cc7ae6edfcf505f7709c9e6d96
DIST wine-1.7.10.tar.bz2 21312974 SHA256 44270e4b97ef930e4e4b59088e6e3972e91e85bacf9a9a4d8712a877c9d5cbdb SHA512 157fe4146df3c174643cc1ac29748778aa90fb9e602b417ad772d3da2af3a86307ca818ded860722513efdba57b85e06a2db2869a69a3f579255829dc3d8ac55 WHIRLPOOL eaba07f65c416ce93b9243df402ad0fb5a2f5e7bce43f40b73941f2ea7baddbcab9ce3a999d9086faeaead7552f5d34234cc3b3f3798db2fb98982ef22a98b71
DIST wine-1.7.11.tar.bz2 21359534 SHA256 c07d2771ed96c45d428bb11d164c5e4bbe48d6857a0a4cba2e0b73c5f1044f93 SHA512 9743c4cf382b6846d98aa383d9db22cb99bca510ec2db3e9224f10d08095c4a3fe4449b3019d5a6f401458a98696d096a454d00584c667074aed618c47544dcf WHIRLPOOL 38356b5df2c9f5a78b9eb66c6e0f09f7371c57d84f601e6614228b64c629a2c9c222696078d7627df850792a0111e7876fe460c4575bac4accf2f56a391315c6
DIST wine-1.7.12.tar.bz2 21366705 SHA256 2dcdff7bf8bac2bc10da85e3e632e8add830f22cf416173e53abca4ec580b392 SHA512 7b5be06dd6d71512884bbcc386fb021725125fb95a4493a033624c2b801eaec7fb4be4b70894ee914da138d8e310da3ac49b8a32538ee21d127201cebc44b449 WHIRLPOOL fb04306058403f82df8cf3e88d21d8011bd2e7cdfa4c31f28e64ea0d24393cd6ed8f61724839a1b5cde272ac8dd854c6c6185e7dee8271881b9b3eb1612f4bbe
DIST wine-1.7.13.tar.bz2 21385204 SHA256 a72fdee6e1898007b38f3b30584f86d996567ad8d2f1cc0fe3a877be0493b9df SHA512 ba01933770c0fbaf056fe252b77eb7f2c160f5455450cace638bc288683fb8f6d97421927ec935795eda9aae500bfeb19e6ca8d632822c345f8bfb34b3d27d15 WHIRLPOOL e500fb6cebee9d87aa0c9ed788df37e2f744c0cb1453a6dc20e447dabd9e1becabb00f93ea9272856aa35015703e98b7512c2e233f98e67143abc80b1ae7f182
DIST wine-1.7.3.tar.bz2 21489049 SHA256 c66c93c2ffec8d1d9922fbaa226b169d62deb77fcbfd0fbd7379b77dbd97d47f SHA512 41109866b259a5f939c9ca4c26ed0a5ca74fa9cafa2f348b83510dd386459c87ac044a6f954f2f83ce00961d866a6e636ed96aa9e94584b7a79486d434b406cc WHIRLPOOL 90e6aed8930e3496701292415ce87f29a87870a1d00ad26d4f3c4adf33cd296093d0ef3d363bf5cead1ebd5ab4e86907ccb015c10d85f6f90d5f48cd81681b0f
DIST wine-1.7.4.tar.bz2 21500746 SHA256 517b3465dbf5b516d3fe886c0f9d4f310dc1d4a38ca4e5580c5d66bab3fb6969 SHA512 4267eb43311fe53537a1864a70e88e4bf444b8979dc858725a1170ed06af4e727604a22bafb3deb448eeb62c170ce67ce8eb8082bce040f5488b1a4c4bc6bb95 WHIRLPOOL 7bb14e0dfd4f9a7411e1d5484dba62f8584a0e03997cc3c6192893dccbc7de316eb79a1e5b0ccf96d20e74cf512ebc79e760076ff4882625bc81b410ad8be0bf
DIST wine-1.7.8.tar.bz2 21463503 SHA256 30e17f5f863a09416f3d229666566b318dbb40f683d4ca6630012c60bb511804 SHA512 1fdaddb7909f818050854bf351d20f445cf6a5906b1bcc789c96ee8d5058c90815a91bbbc6444f3e4527748764f03ab5297585c174b433093a3354a827402fea WHIRLPOOL 3b5b18384ff04b80b936160c2c6e03676d69663c023f484981305c9272d0601b74cda5c5f7d56008b3900d702b1a4fe1929f16b1fba304a6480b076ffede663a
@ -149,22 +150,23 @@ EBUILD wine-1.7.0.ebuild 12421 SHA256 411f57e42e30b82d4c1ac099689281582d6f88b6e1
EBUILD wine-1.7.10.ebuild 12756 SHA256 6241d5d9da059712d0f304ff5124f6321c0089d7294be673c20f67fa06f373ba SHA512 fc762b1eedbcfb0cbb204ce601975408d6595c243be22b732c890f093d7157a6a51567e7c74c3497ec0fef203f7a816a1a7fe2bbddd2ed063f2b80977a1b7107 WHIRLPOOL 7411c9db26a9987fcc901effe4d4935220374ae4424da1605c49bf75cbb6563c24068498fa0b1afd4f754ed5b43ea82b9c54bd5dd392dace4bee7d745e1ac2ed
EBUILD wine-1.7.11.ebuild 12756 SHA256 67876f88ce08ae48cb0b8e450a189bd71cb14e1c9e60d35918c78ff55ae6921e SHA512 92a6eff8da9c16dd5206568ae2eaa41bd4c524ffdd76a9913b9b30d179f19f026585eca52aa19e8076e1234976dcfa9ba722e7284099a5abb15bf2cd17a46088 WHIRLPOOL f3bef1cf062095352c9178f0e88490ad05b0c58113e5f2b7dfed20b2520809cb16730e1061f01b2765dd3d90f5b365ab6fec2f5ab8be2d186be37ef5348d5cc2
EBUILD wine-1.7.12.ebuild 12757 SHA256 232d537fb88664ad4e7851ca5ba3d6240243cc535eb77505b53f3c07dbc00fa6 SHA512 de5c7f6abd81b30b77c5d04bc6ec5def62db502f004af6a398ed29296e530d2b23615dc2a46a154ee48be569d0f74eca64a9611c1af3c0003788bfb672a2cfb2 WHIRLPOOL 643f45280cfac304df09c74e5fc686368f24003cc593c4ec7c84967390c4fd0f3ebf5a653253f362b547b9386e1bdf735eea363c23fcc36224b9931c33a51f33
EBUILD wine-1.7.13.ebuild 12757 SHA256 dded05f5a7ba99818f2740420e03614fcd4201d56f00f2bdc1b1d7c0b129aff9 SHA512 61feb4629065435b78bb59c071526d625e62dfcd0e4071bc6c91278ba3eeb322701eb2700f242e9a80cbb9ae9463a6828bc5dbc95acabfd598e7b589935806de WHIRLPOOL 118853eb74f49fbecda867bb99324106724bc7191e65ad634fb00b778aa4d94cda58556184a597df734b29281fcb82337cd24dbd9bf6e096eeeb4fa3f3b700c8
EBUILD wine-1.7.3.ebuild 12423 SHA256 58d6df01c3bede22cb1c84e2b682e273d73060bd869dad74a7d14aa94f2c2aa5 SHA512 5aea1a2b1fa41f3eb61936820aca4c96b7dd404671772894a199cbf12b721f9746ec837020d464c37f49d7da6a4cbd70ffa89746588854a8513a5d16b953d747 WHIRLPOOL 5f267b3b58f5b0e8b6780abf30229e292c836542f684c34042644e28642fab53dccadcb043a22f279e94d5a8f822f8ec2262e1b2cdcdff227c94bf4f13c02dec
EBUILD wine-1.7.4.ebuild 12423 SHA256 7ef9808dc6efaf8c1fb60407b79ef3a19ab112a21d33f5e34188e3962641d2f9 SHA512 fe9281355ae372866431a68b276327cd3e5cf55887aee7eee6d989e1e6fe5e9f4f0fe9e2bcb3c681f886ca57ba26786cf09eee90f66a87d62fa4882775f5775b WHIRLPOOL e4247512391929136600c3d37ecfc6f757cc1a91ae179e73dc30e73d23f7cdaa4a3678d69bdb96951afa4b2a5a189fdb8ef22f5cbe736675839f58ccd916cdea
EBUILD wine-1.7.8.ebuild 12754 SHA256 d6c8decb636bd23b1deba6677bf3167515bd9555ce86d91461c8d6595f17c412 SHA512 94622108c0733bce3c6f60cec2d2dc684228e77d2eaa6f90256e3070186881cd142084feec69098dc460727a06c0e9aed2a6ce9d4082023f0d03b24fb5be3d77 WHIRLPOOL bfd3793ff8530ddf5c76b543a16286af1fc841b6ba4e18573910b5ba6e3de663a180c699266a9dedec71f324b4eee15bc9b99c8acd1e50e9f4ca4bdbea1638bf
EBUILD wine-1.7.9.ebuild 12754 SHA256 cde2305629c14b891331fc2953a5c32b8f7cc9da23e9ace13b5fd3a78100a5fc SHA512 0b5e5e5ec720a3a91e0e1605ed7de09cf2b86675b170293c1cade2a7e70d3d31b956013a36e216324e75845928f0c540584293775b9648831a790eb125bf2052 WHIRLPOOL db9a0dd9a4562eb6ba3172970a1e0e4d094107824b43fa5dade5787f6d3fe7d3e474247d4aec8f95b8c78b67123249fd82b9a67eeeb9573fad3ed0a2ab6eefaf
EBUILD wine-9999.ebuild 12757 SHA256 439e2dfa6696c97df9539f0460015b363a57d3ed60ce338729866b8741ee91ed SHA512 3f5d20b5edb81ae5e106b050f72379db96c81812d900521cff2a2b2db8e0800a63b958b615ac609078143b74d76a045f7c506850fc46406bace8443cb1355f52 WHIRLPOOL 384d9bd51d369b90013efb599bc03d84934c121656d8c66021a9e9bc4d0919e2f1ccacc23bffb4aadeef2dd6d3b6faade9062a002d403581ec35e8f88268ed72
MISC ChangeLog 17312 SHA256 be86b74c30560d2312de640044267a76bb307c3ab7c011c7d927afb9842ea35f SHA512 c180dfc9cea75a52e91a97b95a505c0bf7827cd67770245fe02198f12dbb131a1cc745f9cc6efe8d764c8ff85d92ddfc8c421b7d05fbcd26983db4ca5b7fb01d WHIRLPOOL 37f28c70b4ae7a80612468f13a4852ffed411bea36eed2982debb89fda52e23415951af0bc15ea92f9fa3e2c1db4a7bb02a120c76492d1bd89491da6eed15e94
MISC ChangeLog 17501 SHA256 c786d8d6a0d8b456b1cb624516658e745d06a7cbe4e97a4f23c1f2c03662359e SHA512 6aa39f5c6bcda9848fb739a6b3e41b2d2b4dd66c56d621e14c69772752520ca470ded8986bbbe04c1fe8c64b393f1eb7054bf5df7098f96cceb365ee4c418528 WHIRLPOOL 157e47b7264c6bdd9f5c0ae3945d94d283aa5aad9d1c6fbb08c8c2be4b7f2d9367b843327d7c9c134015789e9471fd6aaa2d0f60486f3dd3f361674717f6f7a1
MISC ChangeLog-2012 100362 SHA256 8e70fc54e7945c1f41e3e0b64fef6b9a7fe89acdaf8c79a06a16048fe8d2e26c SHA512 ca875e847ba100e1f19774b31a2b45a81d776275e3d11944be8a7b01dfcdbf4265b1a340d691bc4fe4054fea006059a06ed52bc0516b1f8b44a1772a1c813278 WHIRLPOOL 36ec708601a25cb8fa93b471112538480b6ef82cc4e6703b3d045f883078b49209ceaeef7bafa8417b881c2d11df84df9c83d1985d0d687a11f3db3de5abb014
MISC metadata.xml 2236 SHA256 2b4d3de73fa84f3f3d192e3d29d8fd22796d4c5630151a380c3c33597263436e SHA512 884a7aa53e7694cec121453103bf3873cba1a8323f8a6ee5fc5e326b05610f1c2d36c07bc357c12777749a33f0ebf986f78341fea5c752dc14f3ab4b90f137a5 WHIRLPOOL 3a2b66e0af17c2e260621e5e065ece87be1a355c8da5bf3c8638f360ed5d1dcd062c44b0e26e72a708e5bc4fb5d8e054e0049ab58b090fc2fe5ed6e2cdee9c19
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)
iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJS9qaKAAoJEJ0WA1zPCt1h2EIIAJWLSSAxO9+vdBVHYynf8bPd
d/AuDt3sB5INr/1R5jL/9dPIhUu/FCf3ybcVKNAuWdE+JRu28VtJQZqSeNwF5kfq
QI590GOuWJQRyjEAhxciyP2dB2VqSHE8T6Vlbkz7jFHh6sMWW2SjwNjD+JsIeyoK
Lmte0TGATDGPgw7zOyczGUoZXWFdLeYA8vO62LnAAX4dj77wkQToPRUxQMcjt7Pj
F/TnCxDECPBmo3dwUkcBpnSejM3vinkobPXA9jRj5j19oDduRa7gnwqwWpJH8Kes
x+ThgSYMmNV6Hri8v5lPc2zuxgeWLxGLVYbi5CSAuw4XjMBkq1cRYQd3rj0ClTY=
=YNuF
iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJTBvKlAAoJEJ0WA1zPCt1h/BEH/1n6itq7jYnk2VGd0yUxxivL
FcKcCKDU3mJe+QvxPml+rlV33s1msha9EKhpQ29ZjYuFQ+Ug4uEzzVS7D4bZmOzr
14k1j/7Hj2Kr5W6wqG80I5/hxEv1+BbQxr40bNqfcAkqW40oqGpuopCm7J2aBkLr
bGiu/6oP04KD9796L2bbf3ymbFcLEnwOj/5Nk4/HkbTYE+qijSclrbOPOLNzb2YF
o3CLfMRmGc+fl92tlSFG+YsdFjZNA2fDWEj+tU8loQUAJ6Z4y4hlmb/2d0KavbDG
i6i6rvnvWWYe8GvSNvqTPCWiceqEAjo9uklb9aQjoB7pBdQLHQbMIK4c0vYTxa0=
=dXRM
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

436
app-emulation/wine/wine-1.7.13.ebuild Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,436 @@
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/wine/wine-1.7.13.ebuild,v 1.1 2014/02/21 06:31:47 tetromino Exp $
EAPI="5"
AUTOTOOLS_AUTORECONF=1
PLOCALES="ar bg ca cs da de el en en_US eo es fa fi fr he hi hr hu it ja ko lt ml nb_NO nl or pa pl pt_BR pt_PT rm ro ru sk sl sr_RS@cyrillic sr_RS@latin sv te th tr uk wa zh_CN zh_TW"
PLOCALE_BACKUP="en"
inherit autotools-multilib eutils fdo-mime flag-o-matic gnome2-utils l10n multilib pax-utils toolchain-funcs virtualx
if [[ ${PV} == "9999" ]] ; then
EGIT_REPO_URI="git://source.winehq.org/git/wine.git"
inherit git-2
SRC_URI=""
#KEYWORDS=""
else
MY_P="${PN}-${PV/_/-}"
SRC_URI="mirror://sourceforge/${PN}/Source/${MY_P}.tar.bz2"
KEYWORDS="-* ~amd64 ~x86 ~x86-fbsd"
S=${WORKDIR}/${MY_P}
fi
GV="2.24"
MV="4.5.2"
PULSE_PATCHES="winepulse-patches-1.7.12"
WINE_GENTOO="wine-gentoo-2013.06.24"
DESCRIPTION="Free implementation of Windows(tm) on Unix"
HOMEPAGE="http://www.winehq.org/"
SRC_URI="${SRC_URI}
gecko? (
abi_x86_32? ( mirror://sourceforge/${PN}/Wine%20Gecko/${GV}/wine_gecko-${GV}-x86.msi )
abi_x86_64? ( mirror://sourceforge/${PN}/Wine%20Gecko/${GV}/wine_gecko-${GV}-x86_64.msi )
)
mono? ( mirror://sourceforge/${PN}/Wine%20Mono/${MV}/wine-mono-${MV}.msi )
pulseaudio? ( http://dev.gentoo.org/~tetromino/distfiles/${PN}/${PULSE_PATCHES}.tar.bz2 )
http://dev.gentoo.org/~tetromino/distfiles/${PN}/${WINE_GENTOO}.tar.bz2"
LICENSE="LGPL-2.1"
SLOT="0"
IUSE="+abi_x86_32 +abi_x86_64 +alsa capi cups custom-cflags dos elibc_glibc +fontconfig +gecko gphoto2 gsm gstreamer +jpeg lcms ldap +mono mp3 ncurses netapi nls odbc openal opencl +opengl osmesa oss +perl +png +prelink pulseaudio +realtime +run-exes samba scanner selinux +ssl test +threads +truetype +udisks v4l +X xcomposite xinerama +xml"
REQUIRED_USE="|| ( abi_x86_32 abi_x86_64 )
test? ( abi_x86_32 )
elibc_glibc? ( threads )
mono? ( abi_x86_32 )
osmesa? ( opengl )" #286560
# FIXME: the test suite is unsuitable for us; many tests require net access
# or fail due to Xvfb's opengl limitations.
RESTRICT="test"
NATIVE_DEPEND="
truetype? ( >=media-libs/freetype-2.0.0 )
capi? ( net-dialup/capi4k-utils )
ncurses? ( >=sys-libs/ncurses-5.2:= )
udisks? ( sys-apps/dbus )
fontconfig? ( media-libs/fontconfig:= )
gphoto2? ( media-libs/libgphoto2:= )
openal? ( media-libs/openal:= )
gstreamer? ( media-libs/gstreamer:0.10 media-libs/gst-plugins-base:0.10 )
X? (
x11-libs/libXcursor
x11-libs/libXext
x11-libs/libXrandr
x11-libs/libXi
x11-libs/libXxf86vm
)
xinerama? ( x11-libs/libXinerama )
alsa? ( media-libs/alsa-lib )
cups? ( net-print/cups:= )
opencl? ( virtual/opencl )
opengl? (
virtual/glu
virtual/opengl
)
gsm? ( media-sound/gsm:= )
jpeg? ( virtual/jpeg:0= )
ldap? ( net-nds/openldap:= )
lcms? ( media-libs/lcms:2= )
mp3? ( >=media-sound/mpg123-1.5.0 )
netapi? ( net-fs/samba[netapi(+)] )
nls? ( sys-devel/gettext )
odbc? ( dev-db/unixODBC:= )
osmesa? ( media-libs/mesa[osmesa] )
pulseaudio? ( media-sound/pulseaudio )
xml? ( dev-libs/libxml2 dev-libs/libxslt )
scanner? ( media-gfx/sane-backends:= )
ssl? ( net-libs/gnutls:= )
png? ( media-libs/libpng:0= )
v4l? ( media-libs/libv4l )
xcomposite? ( x11-libs/libXcomposite )"
COMMON_DEPEND="
!amd64? ( ${NATIVE_DEPEND} )
amd64? (
abi_x86_64? ( ${NATIVE_DEPEND} )
abi_x86_32? (
truetype? ( || (
>=app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-xlibs-2.1[development]
>=media-libs/freetype-2.0.0[abi_x86_32]
) )
ncurses? ( || (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-baselibs[development]
sys-libs/ncurses[abi_x86_32]
) )
udisks? ( || (
>=app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-baselibs-20130224[development]
sys-apps/dbus[abi_x86_32]
) )
fontconfig? ( || (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-xlibs[development]
media-libs/fontconfig[abi_x86_32]
) )
gphoto2? (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-medialibs[development]
)
openal? ( || (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-sdl[development]
media-libs/openal[abi_x86_32]
) )
gstreamer? (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-gstplugins
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-medialibs[development]
)
X? ( || (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-xlibs[development]
(
x11-libs/libXcursor[abi_x86_32]
x11-libs/libXext[abi_x86_32]
x11-libs/libXrandr[abi_x86_32]
x11-libs/libXi[abi_x86_32]
x11-libs/libXxf86vm[abi_x86_32]
)
) )
xinerama? ( || (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-xlibs[development]
x11-libs/libXinerama[abi_x86_32]
) )
alsa? ( || (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-soundlibs[alsa,development]
media-libs/alsa-lib[abi_x86_32]
) )
cups? ( app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-baselibs )
opencl? ( virtual/opencl[abi_x86_32] )
opengl? ( || (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-opengl[development]
(
virtual/glu[abi_x86_32]
virtual/opengl[abi_x86_32]
)
) )
gsm? ( || (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-soundlibs[development]
media-sound/gsm[abi_x86_32]
) )
jpeg? ( || (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-baselibs[development]
virtual/jpeg:0[abi_x86_32]
) )
ldap? ( app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-baselibs[development] )
lcms? ( || (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-baselibs[development]
media-libs/lcms:2[abi_x86_32]
) )
mp3? ( || (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-soundlibs[development]
>=media-sound/mpg123-1.5.0[abi_x86_32]
) )
nls? ( app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-baselibs[development] )
odbc? ( app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-db[development] )
osmesa? ( || (
>=app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-opengl-20121028[development]
media-libs/mesa[osmesa,abi_x86_32]
) )
pulseaudio? ( || (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-soundlibs[development]
>=media-sound/pulseaudio-4.0-r1[abi_x86_32]
) )
xml? ( >=app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-baselibs-20131008[development] )
scanner? ( app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-medialibs[development] )
ssl? ( app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-baselibs[development] )
png? ( || (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-baselibs[development]
media-libs/libpng:0[abi_x86_32]
) )
v4l? ( || (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-medialibs[development]
media-libs/libv4l[abi_x86_32]
) )
xcomposite? ( || (
app-emulation/emul-linux-x86-xlibs[development]
x11-libs/libXcomposite[abi_x86_32]
) )
)
)"
RDEPEND="${COMMON_DEPEND}
dos? ( games-emulation/dosbox )
perl? ( dev-lang/perl dev-perl/XML-Simple )
samba? ( >=net-fs/samba-3.0.25 )
selinux? ( sec-policy/selinux-wine )
udisks? ( sys-fs/udisks:2 )
pulseaudio? ( realtime? ( sys-auth/rtkit ) )"
DEPEND="${COMMON_DEPEND}
amd64? ( abi_x86_32? ( !abi_x86_64? ( ${NATIVE_DEPEND} ) ) )
X? (
x11-proto/inputproto
x11-proto/xextproto
x11-proto/xf86vidmodeproto
)
xinerama? ( x11-proto/xineramaproto )
prelink? ( sys-devel/prelink )
>=sys-kernel/linux-headers-2.6
virtual/pkgconfig
virtual/yacc
sys-devel/flex"
# These use a non-standard "Wine" category, which is provided by
# /etc/xdg/applications-merged/wine.menu
QA_DESKTOP_FILE="usr/share/applications/wine-browsedrive.desktop
usr/share/applications/wine-notepad.desktop
usr/share/applications/wine-uninstaller.desktop
usr/share/applications/wine-winecfg.desktop"
wine_build_environment_check() {
[[ ${MERGE_TYPE} = "binary" ]] && return 0
if use abi_x86_64 && [[ $(( $(gcc-major-version) * 100 + $(gcc-minor-version) )) -lt 404 ]]; then
eerror "You need gcc-4.4+ to build 64-bit wine"
eerror
return 1
fi
if use abi_x86_32 && use opencl && [[ x$(eselect opencl show 2> /dev/null) = "xintel" ]]; then
eerror "You cannot build wine with USE=opencl because intel-ocl-sdk is 64-bit only."
eerror "See https://bugs.gentoo.org/487864 for more details."
eerror
return 1
fi
}
pkg_pretend() {
wine_build_environment_check || die
}
pkg_setup() {
wine_build_environment_check || die
}
src_unpack() {
if [[ ${PV} == "9999" ]] ; then
git-2_src_unpack
else
unpack ${MY_P}.tar.bz2
fi
use pulseaudio && unpack "${PULSE_PATCHES}.tar.bz2"
unpack "${WINE_GENTOO}.tar.bz2"
l10n_find_plocales_changes "${S}/po" "" ".po"
}
src_prepare() {
local md5="$(md5sum server/protocol.def)"
local PATCHES=(
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.5.26-winegcc.patch #260726
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.4_rc2-multilib-portage.patch #395615
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.7.12-osmesa-check.patch #429386
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.6-memset-O3.patch #480508
)
use pulseaudio && PATCHES+=(
"../${PULSE_PATCHES}"/*.patch #421365
)
autotools-utils_src_prepare
if [[ "$(md5sum server/protocol.def)" != "${md5}" ]]; then
einfo "server/protocol.def was patched; running tools/make_requests"
tools/make_requests || die #432348
fi
sed -i '/^UPDATE_DESKTOP_DATABASE/s:=.*:=true:' tools/Makefile.in || die
if ! use run-exes; then
sed -i '/^MimeType/d' tools/wine.desktop || die #117785
fi
# hi-res default icon, #472990, http://bugs.winehq.org/show_bug.cgi?id=24652
cp "${WORKDIR}"/${WINE_GENTOO}/icons/oic_winlogo.ico dlls/user32/resources/ || die
l10n_get_locales > po/LINGUAS # otherwise wine doesn't respect LINGUAS
}
do_configure() {
local myeconfargs=( "${myeconfargs[@]}" )
if use amd64; then
if [[ ${ABI} == amd64 ]]; then
myeconfargs+=( --enable-win64 )
else
use netapi && ewarn "Disabling netapi in wine32; see https://bugs.gentoo.org/494394"
# We currently don't have 32-bit libnetapi on amd64; #494394
myeconfargs+=(
--without-netapi
--disable-win64
)
fi
# Note: using --with-wine64 results in problems with multilib.eclass
# CC/LD hackery. We're using separate tools instead.
fi
autotools-utils_src_configure
}
src_configure() {
export LDCONFIG=/bin/true
use custom-cflags || strip-flags
local myeconfargs=( # common
--sysconfdir=/etc/wine
$(use_with alsa)
$(use_with capi)
$(use_with lcms cms)
$(use_with cups)
$(use_with ncurses curses)
$(use_with udisks dbus)
$(use_with fontconfig)
$(use_with ssl gnutls)
$(use_with gphoto2 gphoto)
$(use_with gsm)
$(use_with gstreamer)
--without-hal
$(use_with jpeg)
$(use_with ldap)
$(use_with mp3 mpg123)
$(use_with netapi)
$(use_with nls gettext)
$(use_with openal)
$(use_with opencl)
$(use_with opengl)
$(use_with osmesa)
$(use_with oss)
$(use_with png)
$(use_with threads pthread)
$(use_with scanner sane)
$(use_enable test tests)
$(use_with truetype freetype)
$(use_with v4l)
$(use_with X x)
$(use_with xcomposite)
$(use_with xinerama)
$(use_with xml)
$(use_with xml xslt)
)
use pulseaudio && myeconfargs+=( --with-pulse )
if use amd64 && use abi_x86_32; then
# Avoid crossdev's i686-pc-linux-gnu-pkg-config if building wine32 on amd64; #472038
# set AR and RANLIB to make QA scripts happy; #483342
tc-export PKG_CONFIG AR RANLIB
fi
multilib_parallel_foreach_abi do_configure
}
src_compile() {
autotools-multilib_src_compile depend
autotools-multilib_src_compile all
}
src_test() {
if [[ $(id -u) == 0 ]]; then
ewarn "Skipping tests since they cannot be run under the root user."
ewarn "To run the test ${PN} suite, add userpriv to FEATURES in make.conf"
return
fi
# FIXME: win32-only; wine64 tests fail with "could not find the Wine loader"
multilib_toolchain_setup x86
local BUILD_DIR="${S}-${ABI}"
cd "${BUILD_DIR}" || die
WINEPREFIX="${T}/.wine-${ABI}" Xemake test
}
src_install() {
local DOCS=( ANNOUNCE AUTHORS README )
add_locale_docs() {
local locale_doc="documentation/README.$1"
[[ ! -e ${locale_doc} ]] || DOCS=( "${DOCS[@]}" ${locale_doc} )
}
l10n_for_each_locale_do add_locale_docs
autotools-multilib_src_install
emake -C "../${WINE_GENTOO}" install DESTDIR="${D}" EPREFIX="${EPREFIX}"
if use gecko ; then
insinto /usr/share/wine/gecko
use abi_x86_32 && doins "${DISTDIR}"/wine_gecko-${GV}-x86.msi
use abi_x86_64 && doins "${DISTDIR}"/wine_gecko-${GV}-x86_64.msi
fi
if use mono ; then
insinto /usr/share/wine/mono
doins "${DISTDIR}"/wine-mono-${MV}.msi
fi
if ! use perl ; then
rm "${D}"usr/bin/{wine{dump,maker},function_grep.pl} "${D}"usr/share/man/man1/wine{dump,maker}.1 || die
fi
use abi_x86_32 && pax-mark psmr "${D}"usr/bin/wine{,-preloader} #255055
use abi_x86_64 && pax-mark psmr "${D}"usr/bin/wine64{,-preloader}
if use abi_x86_64 && ! use abi_x86_32; then
dosym /usr/bin/wine{64,} # 404331
dosym /usr/bin/wine{64,}-preloader
fi
# respect LINGUAS when installing man pages, #469418
for l in de fr pl; do
use linguas_${l} || rm -r "${D}"usr/share/man/${l}*
done
}
pkg_preinst() {
gnome2_icon_savelist
}
pkg_postinst() {
gnome2_icon_cache_update
fdo-mime_desktop_database_update
}
pkg_postrm() {
gnome2_icon_cache_update
fdo-mime_desktop_database_update
}

37
app-emulation/xen-tools/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,41 @@
# ChangeLog for app-emulation/xen-tools
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen-tools/ChangeLog,v 1.225 2014/02/20 10:24:16 ago Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen-tools/ChangeLog,v 1.228 2014/02/21 04:49:13 idella4 Exp $
21 Feb 2014; Ian Delaney <idella4@gentoo.org> xen-tools-4.2.3-r1.ebuild,
xen-tools-4.2.4.ebuild, xen-tools-4.3.2.ebuild:
correct typos, tidy
20 Feb 2014; Yixun Lan <dlan@gentoo.org>
-files/xen-4-CVE-2013-0215-XSA-38.patch,
-files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1919-XSA-46.patch,
-files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1922-XSA-48.patch,
-files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA-49.patch,
-files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA_49.patch,
-files/xen-4-CVE-2013-2072-XSA-56.patch,
-files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-1-XSA-55.patch,
-files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-12to13-XSA-55.patch,
-files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-14-XSA-55.patch,
-files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-16-XSA-55.patch,
-files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-17-XSA-55.patch,
-files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-18to19-XSA-55.patch,
-files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-2-XSA-55.patch,
-files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-20to23-XSA-55.patch,
-files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-3-XSA-55.patch,
-files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-4-XSA-55.patch,
-files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-5to7-XSA-55.patch,
-files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-6-XSA-55.patch,
-files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-7-XSA-55.patch,
-files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-9to10-XSA-55.patch, -files/xen-4.2-CVE-XSA-57.patch,
-files/xen-tools-4-CVE-2013-4369-XSA-68.patch,
-files/xen-tools-4-CVE-2013-4370-XSA-69.patch,
-files/xen-tools-4-CVE-2013-4371-XSA-70.patch,
-files/xen-tools-4-CVE-2013-4416-XSA-72.patch:
clean up unused XSA patches
20 Feb 2014; Yixun Lan <dlan@gentoo.org> -xen-tools-4.2.2-r3.ebuild,
-xen-tools-4.2.2-r7.ebuild, -xen-tools-4.2.3.ebuild:
drop old ebuild, clean up
20 Feb 2014; Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org> xen-tools-4.2.3-r1.ebuild:
Stable for x86, wrt bug #500530

55
app-emulation/xen-tools/Manifest
View file

@ -6,30 +6,9 @@ AUX ipxe-nopie.patch 964 SHA256 0b70407969735f36587fade77f524c1c2077f28585b9e0df
AUX qemu-bridge.patch 3808 SHA256 73155306c318b7a9304eb5b7798f1d2aaf009f45af4d4dcbbc3beeb7ced013b6 SHA512 be35481ea6f9e87a6b1b73bae4c10137379447d9fecf268073015ac10a3091b8f6b0088d494bff18fcb5df27e3417441a63c63bfa3b87dacd62e5a4d31f34cfd WHIRLPOOL e363cb8e666b83b1023e954fd40c4e6d980c6b391a9159cd60d1b4bf775f8376e198e53c3c59a25a820c2f0de9fa94b2245f31d7a77f224362754865a22fe2d2
AUX stubs-32.h 537 SHA256 4c903162da80cefd394404cb8cd9963a6ef6e3ad6c7adcbaa450a002d929bfc5 SHA512 55308dbedaa91909a2213940f7a7b574cabe6b5a3104761a2a6f28d6aed00164544488c00cbf9d66a9a370a14c6b6d3a00434efd3ff0228cc8e4d81af19c0e68 WHIRLPOOL 9c006e266bea6bb9d623e76011a4eac07c5fe4fdf76a041cc42a2289a7e9163988bad0fb2f458e300e45aabf9fb864ec764a496d7f89d58e57a506bac206a5f1
AUX xen-4-CVE-2012-6075-XSA-41.patch 1393 SHA256 6aa21c02e94cb9b4f612c7a9d1a8f980967692b1f20346da9670abb1d7ec688c SHA512 547f63e7eaf0a6db1a9de267cc6f9aa0f28e2221f2c69ca463ada85edbc07ac84c276dcd3ee017ab8846d4e4129e182fb76be35b91ae9a0e0afecdc091e0c305 WHIRLPOOL 848359780edc15895a09bf76afeaa503f907ac98a856b52d64ef4dcb137e2319222a47cd7a2866e6f25731498f487cfca2a462fb6dfcda8404026d8acfff5bcc
AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-0215-XSA-38.patch 2515 SHA256 7d7a5746bc76da747bf61eb87b3303a8f3abb0d96561f35a706c671317ebe4eb SHA512 2abe25c83a3ede047db380b0477ba1aaaf9d955e87244f8d2404699e011cac46ad5501a0f75b76b90b5dc276d19ae08600a2fe57a69681f97088b5d17d977066 WHIRLPOOL 5176ba1c9f3019c50c087c56185c393ae99c0504f10abf08d896998f80d9f0a05c8c103b4276c3370c72171fab2fdc07ba9c68261ac02c6a859ed7a74b6bd056
AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-1919-XSA-46.patch 9844 SHA256 822da2303f1fc69648d7a29eb72fdda8e64baab3edc0e1548456d31e66ed1d7c SHA512 35ed4d580d219e977ee1085c223563f51ccd9ce3675df2660d10d99c366a2fe2446269c98ac9dbf57c37de83340f4b0868d0eb3c5d898be4c0fc80357f6ed780 WHIRLPOOL 36015584e3f72c3eea62cd0658230805645983be571768f068baa605b274d16cca9fc4dcb27152016dde81f6a1dbcd91430654af5c2c1b5211ed5c2441b65c1c
AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-1922-XSA-48.patch 3846 SHA256 dc23077028584e71a08dd0dc9e81552c76744a5ce9d39df5958a95ae9cf3107b SHA512 31dd8c62d41cc0a01a79d9b24a5b793f5e2058230808d9c5364c6ff3477ab02f3258f1bbd761d97dc1b97ee120b41524b999eaac77f33b606496fc324b5fa2e4 WHIRLPOOL 6913705b070daeac8925a44585f94f78ec43cf1d7a8feeba6839499b0340a727f3c39848627bcd58217b589a932fbfce13628bdca2b815e2ddf58b9c69c11721
AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA-49.patch 1877 SHA256 37055cbc74111cbc507af3f09d6ac2e472f24efd54cd3e08583dc635e66a539f SHA512 1e3ef057744076b9fca22c1982f33d38be06ab8e5d57e40e3160fc2850b69711a1765e4a2b037f7bc1fdb8a9f93f1649d86ea3da972ec4af147b7b80191069f8 WHIRLPOOL 43e78ad3ba597e7084b6194507839b8cc4c21f45c8fd70f00cb061a4ad22ec9ec690bf35ffffc7e02c616de5f35b329c6c4e3a9cf5ddaf23cdf0525681f70639
AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA_49.patch 1597 SHA256 f7daee05c81bfa4effa821e22c8b0861c254b3a1d4e14b7da5709a6102997b87 SHA512 f4d49b90b08b5ac52a5e41f0b555db20e846016f0020e67ea243eed24f621b4b356c3c9e7c181e97fa2d428024a941b7b52eb5bfd933a850aafc4a7b51bb3295 WHIRLPOOL e0fb3d0d9463276dc6331547ef13d4117d7c3bb1503f9e60885553056a3452cba4937500834dedc79fde29198420bf0c7e5c7e9e596c8d27202559dd00c94bb7
AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-2072-XSA-56.patch 1748 SHA256 a691c5f5332a42c0d38ddb4dc037eb902f01ba31033b64c47d02909a8de0257d SHA512 26a1c2cc92ddd4c1ab6712b0e41a0135d0e76a7fe3a14b651fb0235e352e5a24077414371acccb93058b7ce4d882b667386811170ba74570c53165837bcd983d WHIRLPOOL 8c3a7b373564f808074f7876d1b25c9ae8960c0f5d9d0eb5b188e845499273bf878998f0a5ca056fb6920e1c15ebfc6f77e996b915e1c483059b5878ee5a7b2b
AUX xen-4-CVE-XSA-86.patch 6112 SHA256 0f715b7cecf3c5d786cd9ac8ac8e7b864aa7b332a478f4d94f6296f6b7ae0689 SHA512 79c3b2d77c5e3ca26f5c1368450575854b08f0928226b4313549fd9b67db733fcce09b522f23741199a83b8f20d89e7762b967cff5e2ddbdffe5e8f41d04e7ea WHIRLPOOL 6ae630b50f83dbd11bc717dd3ea02119108987e93d4ce331ad34b850903a8deff975ac16b1f25941dd280254cdfd147f7e5e2a6fa3e4cd15b9a91546aa228d85
AUX xen-4-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch 9551 SHA256 93c8726fc3e0bd3f54d4162a3fdace45e3c3ea24fecf5f54270c6dc55c3924ab SHA512 64bfc2dd60bf5a7db593250f9da62cdea4daa458aa8c474ec47b065f6e19509555f48d49ec8624c484d873fe947b6f9cab98cdcd2c24ca8795eb1b64b378a004 WHIRLPOOL 341506ced55ae2ad30af1696434df25ba77c665042aa82dda35d0722f0cccbe567c8cebf51c2e20e0df3084f74f7eb7a69808dea2801f911b2d3c46a293b6ba2
AUX xen-4-ulong.patch 463 SHA256 160af74e6149a7c8066fa3f0b59c7dc36d0185adc98a3897de0ea26868778c1e SHA512 5188b1712009168c994ad72f9d0b0e9cd708a79244d2fbdd675b2fedb5f62b5b2f6c9f1bdd2101e2b66f1c08ab94f55230f4f269907671d82b00f510d059f2f2 WHIRLPOOL 86c98b5d698535893cd05f05481486a8a96f8ee96ce2add4e14de1d6a18701810d6a2c5925fa6cb367e95ef605c8bf9ebecb7dff7cf01763da4235a9c79c5b3f
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-1-XSA-55.patch 12309 SHA256 03589da73c958503cc9d3a7403b07ee165cda2a61b696a12e432f071d33c8b8d SHA512 1f1e11233ae2503061f66e23bb8e438ceeb55504f9ce140a4093d7b826e42956baa477e2a02bb660e33874ea6fc671dce89094c6c8959aedf9137ff8e2efc9bd WHIRLPOOL 48fd1c4702ce347bbbc2b5a9cfc1d8198a995cc95182005625df71b4cab1b1dacc38a07d5751d17b411e76acba49ff5669c1fe9afbe208634c25a90a8eae4649
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-12to13-XSA-55.patch 12653 SHA256 0f150534386d4a54e9b8110988f2511b7f045b526e39985dc5dc904b0814b6c6 SHA512 d1c4ef396d90079c2bb4e12e2bfca1be55a12fe9d1f6388d159a996b2cd10d965c96fb84906f87e31fec6831cfd1ce38cb8964fe9b9bde3c19d37e5b88723551 WHIRLPOOL 884215d7cfd8ed1a4254d3dc41725782966f6a32929a5d74610fe350421a07b8e9d34d4b049e8f472d5d5052de8682a8837368be5007bc09e248790576cf4a3e
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-14-XSA-55.patch 10103 SHA256 d9df769e1b6847a84cd85e3909acee85ce71fd3bc84945890d586388bc69cb11 SHA512 fcd09ca508e78a97169daf38ee455df6646c954bce7042259c7528b3cd2e6d24416d293b7c3b7fd4707caa29ee8d3916f07af5295341a043b350293a3dfe826f WHIRLPOOL 7d7599ca36bba2cbc9ea899dab98a231d4bdb60363aa5f5da36c00269bdb67f091e84c823c2c80cef985bfebbc8c1a3a207148c2b296084cf30d5252dee68eaf
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-16-XSA-55.patch 17193 SHA256 345068acdcf4f974d78d2f579c90c6d74ac3b6ed190eae0f182e5f12ac2c48fb SHA512 f650fb7c2a874c6f748a99d228d12931cbd77b45691dbc419d1f319c37534f58bf17aa4d47792931d368b8536e98790cb54fbafe356089964fa22c6366882ad4 WHIRLPOOL 5087bb9940b70a2d8283cbad2f782bf0e0c596f6a6b2a4173a9b2410bf512d063d8f3c2639c402ae61a411006167ecbc293303d00dcb68f5fe61d584b78ff0e7
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-17-XSA-55.patch 18342 SHA256 46665bce2e48a945ac25960f5f9459e9b9b5ffdc6284c0e8622d3fa01636c3a0 SHA512 f8923756911b18996be1a4ce9d8536291b3c7fd97362b840f784854fbe68753a9044da7e1db499f2b7cb85d0bd5e067a2e3ad763b2dad1b5c3dd8d94bd0f9c87 WHIRLPOOL 94001c689fac74225abad6162b3b16f7107e1de33e46090cb17ca5e8a61472236f9cf058737802d21d4fe42546c6c5d72b3cbf3961126abfb51aeff568c2b57d
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-18to19-XSA-55.patch 17592 SHA256 13686af23eba9aa4b60416376b34092c5d69bb2c9e0100063c828398fe144758 SHA512 dcf867589d1b427c97f4367155f61cb30c8cc449bb04ae216b0a432b794ad0f9743f35a96f3c3c4be69710031097261b5fb26110de0c285f4e089592cade3403 WHIRLPOOL c6cad0db64d51dfd1e700272731984a2ba06c5defe9b0df482c5d0858d0e5e8db87295b02742f6b9dffa29c573b59d34120806702b84f045ca92c1d9b6618c66
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-2-XSA-55.patch 2074 SHA256 b7673609a18525f238d411f9b150c90ecf48248542cc95ca969c9a85995768f8 SHA512 d19d0135057a313f458feeb5ce149b31133e5c43dc133e24d2058ade5838e33637bd07cfa82e9fecd98a28dbf85a598c1a70f20c7998d7fae3d5509026e1f6e2 WHIRLPOOL 3eb934e836f84d49bce89b3b79fe19a70734b8590857c1c74954f0c619834546222229912aa9143d9e10c9e912575d3440e53dd8ce19493915e7e347a5c87adc
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-20to23-XSA-55.patch 12908 SHA256 7422a1ae6d9aea2c0f7df0c459ac48f2a0ea5e1b4daaad0fd74a575ee0a5d73c SHA512 d03a0617d9e74e29b9dacc1a86268f164bb14b490c599166bc37b4524240a0d61d9e312cbe50a9eac1c6d98f050638bfb684cb13df1158478f09100948e5f9aa WHIRLPOOL 3142b686bf1279fb17c3a58c43f5b5a11814fbd3d455d7ebee0fe8f949668eed1bcd88ec5e6cbc71963ce99c830af4e21898cf2d4b7252c64d57b89e8ccc2bf4
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-3-XSA-55.patch 6149 SHA256 f5b809eceb7d342bac01f6a204eca7c89e1c62287040d2588b093b9cd0b5be22 SHA512 6f1ae849160076202d7dfacf2b8b880effeec19112ef18bb40ceaeac6649f9cd235e26eaaf78ffc83907f5098926818633b1344a3626454ad95dd97a1894ccf4 WHIRLPOOL 88f142e62caddffc611917e79dbbbda9870a779514fbee86c42888d53a2e94ad23fb25c626630410ef9cbb704fd5a3358d1a9bc98e2f9ef82298c2b00ba2bf95
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-4-XSA-55.patch 2139 SHA256 51b5f8a996f0d84c715235b1497e0816a6b31fbeea593b7c14925d11856e48b1 SHA512 41034da15f7ffdb6efee41dcc763276b1fcdf160edda88a15b0e0c39bc175a592825e9faa78b209a54f01dcb0e5198b6b40a924f49aed1334fdca54739f35e56 WHIRLPOOL 4da524a196fc713f75f57aacc178ad1b0e2e5ab6b00b941620f682a8894fca79a212155bc3e8200b870d3df959ef68f18cdd116ce64f1d3c93007159bdac4201
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-5to7-XSA-55.patch 6392 SHA256 2861fc68d7b9c49784deb43eeb7196e53316f5439d129d686b7b2157543f9c0a SHA512 1f69e1d9c56244bb8a97b0f9a426007e5779a7e88f2add879a289eda923723e3b4bddcc034797a4e79646780bca1b445fbbc857c9155e72d2177739525d5d88b WHIRLPOOL 4bd68553974eab849315ffff90ef7e0d7811923763ab3c0f111d60f15d574e65652aa5c60708bf60410f5caa0914a2d43dfb4242d7451fb76576a4d2b79fe1a8
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-6-XSA-55.patch 10103 SHA256 d9df769e1b6847a84cd85e3909acee85ce71fd3bc84945890d586388bc69cb11 SHA512 fcd09ca508e78a97169daf38ee455df6646c954bce7042259c7528b3cd2e6d24416d293b7c3b7fd4707caa29ee8d3916f07af5295341a043b350293a3dfe826f WHIRLPOOL 7d7599ca36bba2cbc9ea899dab98a231d4bdb60363aa5f5da36c00269bdb67f091e84c823c2c80cef985bfebbc8c1a3a207148c2b296084cf30d5252dee68eaf
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-7-XSA-55.patch 15024 SHA256 4bca58ac49bd56f6defefbfa76cfd0e6d45aabb1641fa9e9f983edbc784a9d89 SHA512 0622b2cbb0dc6f7b6a86a0ed41229fa2574d655b2d7c7727e3c0c4416155e26dbd933af8812f0e3b13f196da4d9de1064dc620751ddd4f66b587ecd6f30902f5 WHIRLPOOL 9ffda09ae380b2417d3599a9fbf894becef9f9bf88277cf8b4195f86e271bb6452aedb33050ddac1c25c7fdf71bb754a361633526a90d61d5489d5dae064c4e4
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-9to10-XSA-55.patch 11035 SHA256 c73c57ff530c15efa62ee4853d8213f0bac9c31280485f7b54e8b96721fadd92 SHA512 2991e7bf598ac2af57a96204a8babb4c15e5eb7c35c2477e4171b6c600ddc98906fe6dcda02fd5c155d196135b6c28631422bde5302db173ebdfc821089b8de1 WHIRLPOOL dbe8fa7421a68c13159b18b3bf898088c02d9b49d587a2f70a733d6a509fea13246b28b73136510b019d2b28fb23c45fb59e8711d189c0538a758639aaa62dd3
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-XSA-57.patch 15550 SHA256 b698fb6230af3bf134e90f1611735ec2c4378df25a0ce2643171fbb75fbab489 SHA512 d2216dabd6265540d7a90002c739817a834c34b53a2c180796f264fb6a845bc3e2a8dd02dd7de9317475ff1659f35061c3e7eb51c4ced673a4b5638dba711484 WHIRLPOOL 59bdca24ab5eeb65c8f25c111edfc8b4ca7f62429502eff99e1612113d4dd8077fc38b13993df296bdb5a75831cc4725c25ab0d8b8843a3e3659f1e245cbcbd6
AUX xen-4.2-configsxp.patch 1216 SHA256 2ac6642cc1db65bb087e8179bb81f3a88230c81042ca951f487faf294def1f39 SHA512 50af6a970be4cbeb7f7c2e721a6f5bea13e73dabe3141131844970838ffc5e04bb65e3c7a98f602a3bbb8326dfb8e3f058adfcffe4e267a07cf081786f5bbc50 WHIRLPOOL ddb0c8ad6ee0653d9b30c86561eee9d6c66675023c0fe2fa7911f9639d5c7b21a1c0fc400978cc23ad075f38c28d97bdd64b3ed4e2ce56740415f8d30d7607ab
AUX xen-4.2.0-anti-download.patch 1028 SHA256 95ff7390d25eddf56af1d98b1310d2ebf97eebcad5c298c8320eb6ce9afd596e SHA512 8d84c3386764e2dd38bd0e93163c016b38d9e634cc4c9078138e593a887f3a9d2cecf391008004ae934a49b24af2a18051aab22b2a83b48fdad60ea50fc6120d WHIRLPOOL d95955f7236c1a4d9e23e5e4be1a8f8e9148511fc16b4fe0bba3854c02e24789c808739654684140d9900f22172b635c9af5bb6910f594b115b1eca4a7c907bc
AUX xen-4.2.0-jserver.patch 900 SHA256 a8f9c0517b7fa4d56f3125515d260e60c51ef2cfe3fc22223c54415a92ffa16e SHA512 7f9bb7189273ecc34b5c66aea8cc9567a15c3d7e0fbd44e0f49669b067d719c9d85d6758cc213145679cbb8c2224cb5704aabb3ed40925bb2529965a5238d411 WHIRLPOOL ed6bcf1135c7dcb58eb2219c02b002fb57b16f50bfb0161bc64319b78dd7f8b87bc6206952755af900245d13073408946e31a51f01e95517f7def072f4810e66
@ -39,10 +18,6 @@ AUX xen-4.3-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch 19143 SHA256 53464dbb766f4437826c084e74aa84e
AUX xen-4.3-jserver.patch 1487 SHA256 3bbf6d06ad1960e30dc84a3e3b179d5d23331ecf60d347871b7008c58456a6ed SHA512 f92bced9f3e7fec84b1bfce6ce3366f134cec2b892ffc3afcdd3fd3f73daf158c17c312260fae39bc9e04c1dab1045d17f0da706dd0dba0279e66dea454aed8d WHIRLPOOL 10828eb65effad714a61a18bcd6c33c2b7fb7fd0007b1a68aed7a653cd7e67acc04cc5eb9574d7d50c92fc7ca8223dff0c73f1cfde994e4ee1d787f536588b99
AUX xen-consoles.logrotate 63 SHA256 0da87a4b9094f934e3de937e8ef8d3afc752e76793aa3d730182d0241e118b19 SHA512 ab2105c75cfe01768aecd5bcbb56269d63666e8a44e42b6a83aee87df6c84ee2f9ab249171c21b2e09f8fec2cae8318f6e87d160989398a3e7dd68db8d52c426 WHIRLPOOL be108bf298202851de434af513ac8c03a533e7621623c2a7e8f26d498074b3eec81b85b2ae29ad2ec67f4fe9937c88bd78c5f5e260793e7e69ec964d4adb989e
AUX xen-tools-3.4.0-network-bridge-broadcast.patch 496 SHA256 d00a1954447fc29500ab2f1a8c7900310e0dee81942be5c922ad66b6b42dfb74 SHA512 496c61ec237506c77577e832828de923283f55ab07ad141718af1a719b1b5bcdb8152a8cffddc679ff4a3e389582e7b8de8aaf1b4c8b1124bf1563467bdf674f WHIRLPOOL f80a557ed62cc26a51f85bc8682a738ab29d4573e3261c440f6e66f50cd81263fa2c6898b1aa1b1c227a2d3923cc9fd718ffad2e123ee69c6d7929def7906433
AUX xen-tools-4-CVE-2013-4369-XSA-68.patch 1923 SHA256 64716cb49696298e0bbd9556fe9d6f559a4e2785081e28d50607317b6e27ba32 SHA512 bd1deab154e129fc63dcc51ce5c4d004f5fe044443755a0b8943d8b6087f2ef7cbfd76f2390d36f7b4ad1797ef28abbb23157401468e1bf33ecc7a17aff9e8a4 WHIRLPOOL fe4094b44455aa265780a20dd6c27eff782161908adb235769411e978fe5c8e1e8c6d24487be6b1dcab45e6eb3830d23ec3eacf1f9e5ab99f491c83617ff535b
AUX xen-tools-4-CVE-2013-4370-XSA-69.patch 995 SHA256 d3beb662aacf628b6a25ff6cfcd9526ab689aa43a56cf25e792a001f89b4edbc SHA512 606bb9e8fbc16893a927cfa1bb45a61cfb0588eead7dd7440301e10275a23590e98af72bb4c01f7772469b4760daeac71a9a3899c55b96f0b88ad4355621ea32 WHIRLPOOL 9f63f44187e1b77d1ace968ee98f46017539b4675e5e164bde97e5e614790eede4754fdd33d57d9e48f8b4cc1607992fa85ae5ccf27b06fa34a4fd5d537f0732
AUX xen-tools-4-CVE-2013-4371-XSA-70.patch 1050 SHA256 2582d3d545903af475436145f7e459414ad9d9c61d5720992eeeec42de8dde56 SHA512 107335f8e4ffddb9cab9e21dfdf745dea0e4d078c71ee59671942291c189dd0e998a9d480fa91ae439e6410591c9fb06491ca8e810006e22640bf0dc9cf5da81 WHIRLPOOL d7c6908432225ccf13093a378ef3cee09facd2c87cec56251f05e91d7a38dc1878c6be5d7148b7f704a2df94cc60e8b286efb403e58fb50a582076363d18f2b7
AUX xen-tools-4-CVE-2013-4416-XSA-72.patch 2633 SHA256 66e11513fc512173140f3ca12568f8ef79415e9a7884254a700991b3f1afd125 SHA512 5b97f1d97f3f3109d63cca37ef4922e69031bee42df620aa5aec9ef91d9499b4310aa1dfac49974ed528fdac9885521026a839f66e69d392e4cfc23fa6b4ece5 WHIRLPOOL 988268db13b5ab72bcf1dc60aeb843cb2b33c638c346f84cae792d734c0b987f9ee26b3ecf1db3449750b355a33d68d508722ffafd38c3f967855ff39369c39d
AUX xen-tools-4-CVE-2014-1950-XSA-88.patch 851 SHA256 7a73ca9db19a9ffe6e8cd259fa71dc1299738f26fa024303f4ab38931db75f14 SHA512 16cb312d5f8f3e83850900ed4c557d9f47e03670ffa8b148a4ac3ca792e309d86706f05119244c9e29b37e366a11d7dbcd4b5f1b47936c9a7b65094fabb4965b WHIRLPOOL a3c21b03a00c3d61bb9d1c843a371f14bb9d3b13aa18bdbc59020bdcf542aadbd027f4357b0b3298f32a4e3e0928ad5b6ccbd4e7462238a91ea8708eaad28fe3
AUX xen-tools-4-docfix.patch 438 SHA256 016120c2333667aa84861ac9289c48a072c4842fb517936570882e1fc4060de6 SHA512 0a67d703749df823f5223b555c6dc896420e73ed7eeb5e77a8f8b950fc8bafaf9e20d66c35b29883b3cee6f8ca5054af3b55f804d20ae20d676feeeabf92b489 WHIRLPOOL fed73bd521b4cbea804ef4bc3b4b3a4007e7765cf0ab67e700e95afd328181ab5fce246b53a5e2a462baf6029664b25f82ffeabc1aaeb45fa99af344ecc957a5
AUX xen-tools-4-qemu-xen-doc.patch 820 SHA256 691b2d84f7312388d528c83f3e9e90521e6b2c97abae8ca8a83325655264c98a SHA512 bc07420be7629796e49e128c1cfbde8fa7d4dc3b66174462448e9033f78c0c982dfdbd4dde9b1c54a9862fd2f9602c6bac0be1dfc0df8280aaaf8de60acb708f WHIRLPOOL 4fc2907a42bc3f824160f92586392f7dba07c2229382585f5f7bf4c0f3ab2574a814e8e8fd076b68abb2580497492e1fc0e6181ffb8f1acb5c70e60caff81505
@ -66,40 +41,24 @@ AUX xenqemudev.confd 156 SHA256 61c5ff72464c5098d9cad50e5dc94a090dd107b4831bb60a
AUX xenqemudev.initd 1847 SHA256 c1b002a54917f60adf6941fecf44453c0072a9048c9c3e318d2e695f7ea12c72 SHA512 3fb6a8c5d35b773e0fb7bc9b6c26aa18be48b97d95cbb21df8aefeebb814e3fd5819d579504a4015acb0e5fd6abe2f864f48ea83c095cedae2c69720b6e355ad WHIRLPOOL 2a286111d18eb1f8701f3d30e1fb0b006e2ab359db1ff32100e18fd0e4f46cf13407d765842542c38a31598f62cc71f246bb5c11d06410336850c0288c9e8d4a
AUX xenstored.confd 42 SHA256 afcc14f014fe4ec478f85d230efefba9ffad024bf8c83b30074e8a3712cc7831 SHA512 0906cbcdc84935d07cf53bc4447a1f9a9dc4e4fb9fda9a7163f6982f1d8a3ada1f0650fcd254fb6f715a54f7971daf0a5e61c3de6db70dfd156156fd55b59fe4 WHIRLPOOL df46f3fde8b13c3427f445bcf08eb4c660f6000164a01e461cff85cf93ce1195009fc3b4457181788da8eef8dec9125b41ace233ec6f169919be64337a57ebb8
AUX xenstored.initd 935 SHA256 d5d731beebe4e24150fab9d79e6a3c48889290324c28180977b97d8d4c5e36f2 SHA512 1fe1df637bb6f01a67ea1aecd2f3648cdd1575187e41cd7ac0f7d6be30d817d37222de914ee97dbe1ac19ea2f772e1db6c09b5e1cb9f5a8f2cfcdec0c912d975 WHIRLPOOL 750a984ef6d2690aa47bd22e2b5fe8617c4bbff0e79a5e4c1d26f7456d07039a9389ca3b70dfd7bfb65f009d8eb738c74052642c775ffd51213bfb5629162746
DIST XSA-55patches.tar.gz 23888 SHA256 e86749d02ca5594ebcfdaea820a6cf1fe11015c7fdcc5836260498fae317d75b SHA512 ed1f321a1351df99cfb05e1dfc62dda1268544b0c0ceb7a01438805046e027fb9d59194d179b7a8c302b091a7bf444811b0b9359c4d42f7e902510515c275b6b WHIRLPOOL 5a611e5260f0fc97471f386da3499f7714e015c5c2556bd7199466558d8e375784d32655bdbe9ed4cbf492fa3b41091677d9fe6d3714b029c9a2b1dda6102edb
DIST ipxe.tar.gz 2867999 SHA256 632ce8c193ccacc3012bd354bdb733a4be126f7c098e111930aa41dad537405c SHA512 c5cb1cdff40d2d71fd3e692a9d0efadf2aa17290daf5195391a1c81ddd9dfc913a8e44d5be2b12be85b2a5565ea31631c99c7053564f2fb2225c80ea0bb0e4a4 WHIRLPOOL 58b7459aaf7323968e2f4d1cdcb563a04a0ee40d7d0e8fc600495baf6914127fbbbcddfb66199cd9f462eb59565b3d1ae90a05b3c771b8f13c2d2dcb6070eebc
DIST seabios-0-20121121.tar.bz2 2199282 SHA256 f7f67181c6c0b4cea3a9db48e2569fdcbbc81b732a2f672079c42fb44153ee62 SHA512 4f886088ebaa911590b8cb19db5c5dbc8f1384d2d5a7c4bf04df083e177513b3123b1839dad744171670eded8b69ce092a774288aec1804d00aa32b1b6778599 WHIRLPOOL f2e62682d7213ee5eaecbc2590637ef36d9c86f746840c0ee758c0c153139f485032ea2cd098c87bb8a2b5f17f91375b8fb65599e3b71b45b1645df85a88887f
DIST seabios-dir-remote-20130720.tar.gz 3201017 SHA256 0cf06b54e8ae1cfc25f2942eea1490a9e7e01f478541577025f6eef76e0c76de SHA512 e9ebe3711e3f678d3632f8e8e645f8be4fb65608aff04aeeb0e1152521bf571bc4d879f136d23bb0aa8bd4c4ec20f294b472cf54dc70916e52d330328aadd357 WHIRLPOOL 6138271f72fd96fabe3cffc07a6efcb9c0e195ed96f4ad708d00e85e0a84a03900dc41389cd4f26d533a3aa42142a9e17708d7b87d722f1c9348f61a5db3e59d
DIST xen-4.2.2.tar.gz 15602746 SHA256 c9bfe91a5e72f8545acebad9889d64368020359bfe18044c0e683133e55ae005 SHA512 4943b18016ed8c2b194a3b55e6655b3b734b39ffb8cb7ee0a0580f2f4460a1d0e92e1de8ac23f5186272914fad1650586af51fd7c3644d0310eb16f2e11c5e80 WHIRLPOOL 519eb87cb2da694696cbc3e72070a0a3bdb07c46fa266d855d8379eec3a92adfa4d434af3ac01c37834ce4a9174081a6c40030b185a70902329b185cb8d0bbea
DIST xen-4.2.3-upstream-patches-0.tar.xz 84436 SHA256 7c2477b9b29c9d84bb26ed60bfc2700f2a614ed8040b93906e801831f3498b41 SHA512 a4e8b53a0efb9d64d4dc65ee3107422c8007537e03f9c8e6f1b2c838cf62e6819d447c1ed44aacb5c4e9979f0dad7ed313d2db61df6e6ad2d7708a81964a7e12 WHIRLPOOL cc3c2224bba3b2e5f057ec95f9e85e58b17bc0dce338da429c7970877967cddf69228258ff491be9c1d022169a90fcde34ef1bcb0c198c9123ca219707a5a99f
DIST xen-4.2.3.tar.gz 15613235 SHA256 69b6a73701383d609ad094a38925004e8595755fb39a6fafd579ba754e8667db SHA512 01521c8724354f92a2555683a8b103e5e16aedeb2c6166cc3ce40a0cc6cd9e07a601aa24930bb7391e00eb97f04003e6523dead09382cf86eb56f5b886509b9a WHIRLPOOL e7f7848ad632e5e77db95b2eb37c82f31a73021af4b6bb44091cc14103faa193bc2d6deb089e2a196daab5a08dbc08f135a8937a25a4ff5d31fe37c789bae1e9
DIST xen-4.2.4.tar.gz 15663999 SHA256 e23e6292affd7a6d82da99527e8bf3964e57eb7322144c67c2025692b1a21550 SHA512 3e5263511e7c40899f580f3384bd987f9c875b8e6816202fd1a5a64fe7e336803d09e58148af074938ef261f0ceeafad121ac541ddd2bf66b76c5aa4ad07c357 WHIRLPOOL 25d23f5d921139ba0f853fcd76ae998647d32292bccfd4e7c4f3b12f860a38fbb33ebda67c839657bf3a25d837c9c02b80d663362263d16d42284ffde09f0bc2
DIST xen-4.3.1.tar.gz 16429423 SHA256 3b5b7cc508b1739753585b5c25635471cdcef680e8770a78bf6ef9333d26a9fd SHA512 f5250ad5ad3defc5dc1207eb6208a3928128ef57ac4162018bd92b750dc1df1eaaf37835528aca33a0f9e04c82d5f8c4ba79c03a1780d2b72cbb90cc26f77275 WHIRLPOOL 087390786cea9aee273a5d81988436303991aa5ea92faf111d3b619517368f8c8feef84f4f8c602cac723980a344eb90414887db4ca88a2ee14bc6b0253e36ca
DIST xen-4.3.2.tar.gz 16472188 SHA256 17611d95f955302560ff72d97c08933b4e62bc2e8ffb71400fc54e388746ff69 SHA512 ec94d849b56ec590b89022075ce43768d8ef44b7be9580ce032509b44c085f0f66495845607a18cd3dea6b89c69bc2a18012705556f59288cd8653c3e5eca302 WHIRLPOOL 72250369fb2c90ba608e1da018cb6417b3089642c8ba59af9f2825ec5ba7c4e6c5d6f86140b20825817e4625727c6d58c5d38b00863c994e31c8a04927997bd3
EBUILD xen-tools-4.2.2-r3.ebuild 11697 SHA256 9407f8c81db48b9c41845cbf60635675b5f0c7917cff073d6b43bf2f9dfc0a41 SHA512 77b16ea53ba72363d77c64722b18705c80c51d0fe4fa63018b2611d9da049186c6914047e3e8683e48bcb53d2a77a05e00f3f3d7bf5a70b5900b3395a04e1382 WHIRLPOOL 046f0e38775b7af9293f713e30aa17725601f0ac5c75b59d0b86262bbab5b89ffb95f808a20be7fe40be419f58e48787857dfffc0ba23dfdbfb650ec7a19a070
EBUILD xen-tools-4.2.2-r7.ebuild 13105 SHA256 b51215ca584b784a5079f632b5c954769440d3d730caf37233032df42a9a7c25 SHA512 7a845a85fa740b01891aaccafadea30d9e1419493db88bfa53cbea79ffcbfe38a4b3394abab27f2c4c02413ebacfcb3f8b49505104f7221c51eabb7271efcffb WHIRLPOOL 4a425e42c1012f31a1d525e9475964afc17f686718f5d2bfb58dc40c9cac21f5d00a38ee0ad3c6020b2f945cb38c7a6d380822793b33aa80599e4be942cb792a
EBUILD xen-tools-4.2.3-r1.ebuild 11981 SHA256 96fa80fc2008281cebb02341e504f21fb11350bba7ed94529cf4955324c8adb5 SHA512 b3942ef5835714db909ad1b5ef5d6fe388d18c40e4d2d15490655b6e16c2f76c78eea155f0263cfb2b59e073a6e09a6d33a4aae00e1fd5066122e6735f0610b4 WHIRLPOOL 50999cf061e11a2cda0dc4798d810ceee61a7b520f481f80070dd31c1757e8d8e810e957923979d193987292441fc5f5500991dd08ceaed7012ba6a2810d83e7
EBUILD xen-tools-4.2.3.ebuild 12375 SHA256 bffeb11cc012d86446442c630df384b195f241d1c7ae6159e618419e09a325b5 SHA512 0f549303d456bcdfdfcbb2422ffb9d6619237f1170f734a071d87d99a28853e6d6542652a36ff3aeeecbace96dc04fb10531c342cb2025f18ea361288292542b WHIRLPOOL c8e83fd3862b5608c10e7cc363604c5de29c391954ee7ab8879aac3acb355e863cb8d894dbfff194ca71a191ba8c8c02fde4b0df44c1f4d95e89dde4c2c9fb11
EBUILD xen-tools-4.2.4.ebuild 11980 SHA256 6f020eabe55fb999097c137e0e6e2923a7d9b451106476910e91233484e4fe3a SHA512 cd4bcaf7cbe9807950ffa7408d5330acf40536a15c3703ea7edc3625f615ee51b4795402f9f1d1c197cfa9cc31a50bfd201dd492c4158e76ea4bd054bc20d93b WHIRLPOOL c4282c7862c18f87f4fef5e9a13dcacf88a6c0838ccb21e9d1b87ac16f81fc2d08138de6dc53b9924f85ec15c8c3dd528bad2136b4dde7ae249a35e996bf31a2
EBUILD xen-tools-4.2.3-r1.ebuild 11986 SHA256 dcdd44857cf2c6c78d63772322c5ccdd54e680eeeaea7fec1bf668270fdfa995 SHA512 088bead44a5e101c638542c211976ba4072864e62cf4c1dc64287af9209ded61de1dd0a8651047886f649abb1c288e0eac0743383671f5be6039c040fb59814a WHIRLPOOL d9a1cfdf14e4a0f5b434a72e0cee9a092178a352d5d650d8066576dd7407a774b10cf2d8c75e8abaaaf8ef89a90fa03650e311af46683fddf8ba141cb3c32739
EBUILD xen-tools-4.2.4.ebuild 11984 SHA256 cbd34696846e9d3323080c52f2195b4ea5e599ba719e77eb98e33336fbef60b8 SHA512 ff42d94717716e0b699db2f01bd92f0f74fdb14420cd851e54f58307bc4ebbdc169915f339f6cd6c9e2effd7198de813c3b69eaca367f1ea3223ce871ae7eba0 WHIRLPOOL 2a996a780f9a9bf3e55f15417e74969f8d5a567645cea0c25786cc5d753a5443524a98d0d6aac97ac0956f657ada149e7b740fdd205966051d2d58396cdfe5d3
EBUILD xen-tools-4.3.1-r5.ebuild 13355 SHA256 df19ea40b75d276dcbbcc358bd39bc2681e6a3b77ba829004e01adc34dcb1a9c SHA512 b5283d8f18f7b41ecd6155ae5cd2fcf31d5fc845eb297c7cc42722b5f4caf5ab184dbcfef2f85310a6ac78e0f535d85ca9e056462db14b7cfc910e173301b727 WHIRLPOOL 3c5580bd53ec61b40537645a1ce53081b4648b5abf1c8d885b2296c375b738085a48e4343cc2504a83a28cfe49ac9d0710d635fd116d3faee6d3cf2768738ff6
EBUILD xen-tools-4.3.1-r6.ebuild 12999 SHA256 1f06e82fe941a8099bee6deaf44bb678c3eb9a1b22babbba9f11de3c6f665b2c SHA512 2ff51434796f04767273d621ebff1a5714734ab6a8449c9ebfd70b073796a349bdbbfa0260bf083b9f25580cfc3a6858956eb4af4568288d382af8023dc74b8d WHIRLPOOL 2a50029c8ce0993bd35d4f7f1761ab21293b666fa08ba1daa1d10fb463a473e8e9fb4df41020365bbc0a58cca3e879075c00b062537377e0d115029c1d7bbc94
EBUILD xen-tools-4.3.2.ebuild 13238 SHA256 00c9c15ce76aa2bb3dab1df3cbc318f041ea702314cfc973eb936ca7286eb5a1 SHA512 0b3d9ab2dc54b21d5689b06eec4fd003a5595e7f3acd9e7bef657e9386f7e1bf7a9a8e6287bc312d5fd0f3928bf7e27ee6b6284558b5facb67dc51bb2c29ba2e WHIRLPOOL 7cff0adfd44f33d96ab44f656d8e568239969873ac4ee2238403949a186bc42fc451b948f657adabad1d6a5cdf42c3025214b5be66d442ed7e7b697aa9feea69
MISC ChangeLog 52803 SHA256 7082aec89af088641c4ebe2ec71b360e01de895754bfa3b57741cf254bcfee67 SHA512 a6980c2573030209b95603587d45e39804e5a052f8cc1ed1ab007b2c85eaedf7da8f664313bbd1a9e6589e9d149e0e76597db373896898636d013c5464cb880c WHIRLPOOL 0c9800f7214a45e3d1ba04dd4e65aca25a3c5e7b5aa45906e6ffb6da955d9e2ff4d1841d1ccf0157d8daf14684ca2e4a5936daf4194e4a46c88812ee541c0cd4
EBUILD xen-tools-4.3.2.ebuild 13242 SHA256 3e060a74d12eba31c9325a1adce942b8bac357500b32d87e480b3ebadb652b8c SHA512 6a8137b0ab7498bd76deeb352aa3f47a1d470cc8f46154653fdd4fc67086f1d56f189492131fbf15912848c3c9986350e29b12455bfd87bffde4d85481b3ea90 WHIRLPOOL c044740a9773112f8a55889766fba7b4fc8612cf78ce00db80a64ab4e2b6a6c005628c1a1a03b01a2ce0297c8c5d6dd2f0d666252d9af2dda7e07c5da3d3f22b
MISC ChangeLog 54284 SHA256 af8fdf00d3fd4d62e7124888fc328c7707a4cc8832f1fc01d8653a2d322f6c98 SHA512 b3edc95f9b6b96038b85fde320492528476569d6a9a1b9b59089266f251f3af3ff104be3f3885e0de60bf5c248b17aae867eab214fb46b4f1bf20f1443ddcc1b WHIRLPOOL 49ba519e03f894e35d37b8ea4fadc18c80f3326e7fd8173ab955de85c0b1732cc59b9de74bc377204f91e1d62e06e5a93105523a7951a9868cf9a9526570e675
MISC metadata.xml 810 SHA256 adf8036cf95a218b6ac09df641acc482e39557e3cfd16728e03af04810c92e36 SHA512 8fd59fc4b8110132df068d3658b8d48b9f10c36243b2ca340c5b178a58eea12bc7531c14b6a41478a0aa754a2b29ec1bf32827d5fca240ad1237c017e50f1de9 WHIRLPOOL 01e873b0cebe4a40f702e0977efc2b3f62984032e3ff81d3e45b3e291712e51c20510f41dd1402bd4d916a674204b02acc49fc6e6be53cbb0f4fc8430cbb53d8
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)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=EJ+A
iEYEAREIAAYFAlMG2UoACgkQso7CE7gHKw34OgCgv6ahZKjsTgTQZZSBZ28q+TNF
cBIAoLHzgLTWm8h6wgGkJOgNedd/pg+3
=2awT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

73
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-0215-XSA-38.patch
View file

@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/partial.ml b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/partial.ml
index 3558889..d4d1c7b 100644
--- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/partial.ml
+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/partial.ml
@@ -27,8 +27,15 @@ external header_size: unit -> int = "stub_header_size"
external header_of_string_internal: string -> int * int * int * int
= "stub_header_of_string"
+let xenstore_payload_max = 4096 (* xen/include/public/io/xs_wire.h *)
+
let of_string s =
let tid, rid, opint, dlen = header_of_string_internal s in
+ (* A packet which is bigger than xenstore_payload_max is illegal.
+ This will leave the guest connection is a bad state and will
+ be hard to recover from without restarting the connection
+ (ie rebooting the guest) *)
+ let dlen = min xenstore_payload_max dlen in
{
tid = tid;
rid = rid;
@@ -38,6 +45,7 @@ let of_string s =
}
let append pkt s sz =
+ if pkt.len > 4096 then failwith "Buffer.add: cannot grow buffer";
Buffer.add_string pkt.buf (String.sub s 0 sz)
let to_complete pkt =
diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xs_ring_stubs.c b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xs_ring_stubs.c
index 00414c5..4888ac5 100644
--- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xs_ring_stubs.c
+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xs_ring_stubs.c
@@ -39,21 +39,23 @@ static int xs_ring_read(struct mmap_interface *interface,
char *buffer, int len)
{
struct xenstore_domain_interface *intf = interface->addr;
- XENSTORE_RING_IDX cons, prod;
+ XENSTORE_RING_IDX cons, prod; /* offsets only */
int to_read;
- cons = intf->req_cons;
- prod = intf->req_prod;
+ cons = *(volatile uint32*)&intf->req_cons;
+ prod = *(volatile uint32*)&intf->req_prod;
xen_mb();
+ cons = MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(cons);
+ prod = MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(prod);
if (prod == cons)
return 0;
- if (MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(prod) > MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(cons))
+ if (prod > cons)
to_read = prod - cons;
else
- to_read = XENSTORE_RING_SIZE - MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(cons);
+ to_read = XENSTORE_RING_SIZE - cons;
if (to_read < len)
len = to_read;
- memcpy(buffer, intf->req + MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(cons), len);
+ memcpy(buffer, intf->req + cons, len);
xen_mb();
intf->req_cons += len;
return len;
@@ -66,8 +68,8 @@ static int xs_ring_write(struct mmap_interface *interface,
XENSTORE_RING_IDX cons, prod;
int can_write;
- cons = intf->rsp_cons;
- prod = intf->rsp_prod;
+ cons = *(volatile uint32*)&intf->rsp_cons;
+ prod = *(volatile uint32*)&intf->rsp_prod;
xen_mb();
if ( (prod - cons) >= XENSTORE_RING_SIZE )
return 0;

293
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1919-XSA-46.patch
View file

@ -1,293 +0,0 @@
x86: fix various issues with handling guest IRQs
- properly revoke IRQ access in map_domain_pirq() error path
- don't permit replacing an in use IRQ
- don't accept inputs in the GSI range for MAP_PIRQ_TYPE_MSI
- track IRQ access permission in host IRQ terms, not guest IRQ ones
(and with that, also disallow Dom0 access to IRQ0)
This is CVE-2013-1919 / XSA-46.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
@@ -968,14 +968,16 @@ static void domcreate_launch_dm(libxl__e
}
for (i = 0; i < d_config->b_info.num_irqs; i++) {
- uint32_t irq = d_config->b_info.irqs[i];
+ int irq = d_config->b_info.irqs[i];
- LOG(DEBUG, "dom%d irq %"PRIx32, domid, irq);
+ LOG(DEBUG, "dom%d irq %d", domid, irq);
- ret = xc_domain_irq_permission(CTX->xch, domid, irq, 1);
+ ret = irq >= 0 ? xc_physdev_map_pirq(CTX->xch, domid, irq, &irq)
+ : -EOVERFLOW;
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = xc_domain_irq_permission(CTX->xch, domid, irq, 1);
if ( ret<0 ){
- LOGE(ERROR,
- "failed give dom%d access to irq %"PRId32, domid, irq);
+ LOGE(ERROR, "failed give dom%d access to irq %d", domid, irq);
ret = ERROR_FAIL;
}
}
--- a/tools/python/xen/xend/server/irqif.py
+++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/server/irqif.py
@@ -73,6 +73,12 @@ class IRQController(DevController):
pirq = get_param('irq')
+ rc = xc.physdev_map_pirq(domid = self.getDomid(),
+ index = pirq,
+ pirq = pirq)
+ if rc < 0:
+ raise VmError('irq: Failed to map irq %x' % (pirq))
+
rc = xc.domain_irq_permission(domid = self.getDomid(),
pirq = pirq,
allow_access = True)
@@ -81,12 +87,6 @@ class IRQController(DevController):
#todo non-fatal
raise VmError(
'irq: Failed to configure irq: %d' % (pirq))
- rc = xc.physdev_map_pirq(domid = self.getDomid(),
- index = pirq,
- pirq = pirq)
- if rc < 0:
- raise VmError(
- 'irq: Failed to map irq %x' % (pirq))
back = dict([(k, config[k]) for k in self.valid_cfg if k in config])
return (self.allocateDeviceID(), back, {})
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
/* DOM0 is permitted full I/O capabilities. */
rc |= ioports_permit_access(dom0, 0, 0xFFFF);
rc |= iomem_permit_access(dom0, 0UL, ~0UL);
- rc |= irqs_permit_access(dom0, 0, d->nr_pirqs - 1);
+ rc |= irqs_permit_access(dom0, 1, nr_irqs_gsi - 1);
/*
* Modify I/O port access permissions.
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -772,9 +772,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
goto bind_out;
ret = -EPERM;
- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) &&
- !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, bind->machine_irq) )
- goto bind_out;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
+ {
+ int irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(d, bind->machine_irq);
+
+ if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
+ goto bind_out;
+ }
ret = -ESRCH;
if ( iommu_enabled )
@@ -803,9 +807,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
bind = &(domctl->u.bind_pt_irq);
ret = -EPERM;
- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) &&
- !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, bind->machine_irq) )
- goto unbind_out;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
+ {
+ int irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(d, bind->machine_irq);
+
+ if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
+ goto unbind_out;
+ }
if ( iommu_enabled )
{
--- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
@@ -184,6 +184,14 @@ int create_irq(int node)
desc->arch.used = IRQ_UNUSED;
irq = ret;
}
+ else if ( dom0 )
+ {
+ ret = irq_permit_access(dom0, irq);
+ if ( ret )
+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
+ "Could not grant Dom0 access to IRQ%d (error %d)\n",
+ irq, ret);
+ }
return irq;
}
@@ -280,6 +288,17 @@ void clear_irq_vector(int irq)
void destroy_irq(unsigned int irq)
{
BUG_ON(!MSI_IRQ(irq));
+
+ if ( dom0 )
+ {
+ int err = irq_deny_access(dom0, irq);
+
+ if ( err )
+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
+ "Could not revoke Dom0 access to IRQ%u (error %d)\n",
+ irq, err);
+ }
+
dynamic_irq_cleanup(irq);
clear_irq_vector(irq);
}
@@ -1858,7 +1877,7 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) &&
!(IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) &&
- irq_access_permitted(current->domain, pirq)))
+ irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq)))
return -EPERM;
if ( pirq < 0 || pirq >= d->nr_pirqs || irq < 0 || irq >= nr_irqs )
@@ -1887,17 +1906,18 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
return ret;
}
- ret = irq_permit_access(d, pirq);
+ ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
if ( ret )
{
- dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: could not permit access to irq %d\n",
- d->domain_id, pirq);
+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
+ "dom%d: could not permit access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n",
+ d->domain_id, irq, pirq);
return ret;
}
ret = prepare_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, pirq, &info);
if ( ret )
- return ret;
+ goto revoke;
desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
@@ -1921,8 +1941,14 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock, flags);
if ( desc->handler != &no_irq_type )
+ {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags);
dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: irq %d in use\n",
d->domain_id, irq);
+ pci_disable_msi(msi_desc);
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto done;
+ }
setup_msi_handler(desc, msi_desc);
if ( opt_irq_vector_map == OPT_IRQ_VECTOR_MAP_PERDEV
@@ -1951,7 +1977,14 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
done:
if ( ret )
+ {
cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
+ revoke:
+ if ( irq_deny_access(d, irq) )
+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
+ "dom%d: could not revoke access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n",
+ d->domain_id, irq, pirq);
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -2017,10 +2050,11 @@ int unmap_domain_pirq(struct domain *d,
if ( !forced_unbind )
cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
- ret = irq_deny_access(d, pirq);
+ ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
if ( ret )
- dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: could not deny access to irq %d\n",
- d->domain_id, pirq);
+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
+ "dom%d: could not deny access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n",
+ d->domain_id, irq, pirq);
done:
return ret;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ int physdev_map_pirq(domid_t domid, int
if ( irq == -1 )
irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE);
- if ( irq < 0 || irq >= nr_irqs )
+ if ( irq < nr_irqs_gsi || irq >= nr_irqs )
{
dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: can't create irq for msi!\n",
d->domain_id);
--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <xen/paging.h>
#include <xen/hypercall.h>
#include <asm/current.h>
+#include <asm/irq.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <public/domctl.h>
#include <xsm/xsm.h>
@@ -897,9 +898,9 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_domc
else if ( xsm_irq_permission(d, pirq, allow) )
ret = -EPERM;
else if ( allow )
- ret = irq_permit_access(d, pirq);
+ ret = pirq_permit_access(d, pirq);
else
- ret = irq_deny_access(d, pirq);
+ ret = pirq_deny_access(d, pirq);
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
}
--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
+++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static long evtchn_bind_pirq(evtchn_bind
if ( (pirq < 0) || (pirq >= d->nr_pirqs) )
return -EINVAL;
- if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) && !irq_access_permitted(d, pirq) )
+ if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) && !pirq_access_permitted(d, pirq) )
return -EPERM;
spin_lock(&d->event_lock);
--- a/xen/include/xen/iocap.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/iocap.h
@@ -28,4 +28,22 @@
#define irq_access_permitted(d, i) \
rangeset_contains_singleton((d)->irq_caps, i)
+#define pirq_permit_access(d, i) ({ \
+ struct domain *d__ = (d); \
+ int i__ = domain_pirq_to_irq(d__, i); \
+ i__ > 0 ? rangeset_add_singleton(d__->irq_caps, i__)\
+ : -EINVAL; \
+})
+#define pirq_deny_access(d, i) ({ \
+ struct domain *d__ = (d); \
+ int i__ = domain_pirq_to_irq(d__, i); \
+ i__ > 0 ? rangeset_remove_singleton(d__->irq_caps, i__)\
+ : -EINVAL; \
+})
+#define pirq_access_permitted(d, i) ({ \
+ struct domain *d__ = (d); \
+ rangeset_contains_singleton(d__->irq_caps, \
+ domain_pirq_to_irq(d__, i));\
+})
+
#endif /* __XEN_IOCAP_H__ */

114
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1922-XSA-48.patch
View file

@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
Add -f FMT / --format FMT arg to qemu-nbd
From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
Currently the qemu-nbd program will auto-detect the format of
any disk it is given. This behaviour is known to be insecure.
For example, if qemu-nbd initially exposes a 'raw' file to an
unprivileged app, and that app runs
'qemu-img create -f qcow2 -o backing_file=/etc/shadow /dev/nbd0'
then the next time the app is started, the qemu-nbd will now
detect it as a 'qcow2' file and expose /etc/shadow to the
unprivileged app.
The only way to avoid this is to explicitly tell qemu-nbd what
disk format to use on the command line, completely disabling
auto-detection. This patch adds a '-f' / '--format' arg for
this purpose, mirroring what is already available via qemu-img
and qemu commands.
qemu-nbd --format raw -p 9000 evil.img
will now always use raw, regardless of what format 'evil.img'
looks like it contains
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
[Use errx, not err. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
[ This is a security issue, CVE-2013-1922 / XSA-48. ]
diff --git a/qemu-nbd.c b/qemu-nbd.c
index 291cba2..8fbe2cf 100644
--- a/tools/qemu-xen/qemu-nbd.c
+++ b/tools/qemu-xen/qemu-nbd.c
@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ out:
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
BlockDriverState *bs;
+ BlockDriver *drv;
off_t dev_offset = 0;
off_t offset = 0;
uint32_t nbdflags = 0;
@@ -256,7 +257,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
struct sockaddr_in addr;
socklen_t addr_len = sizeof(addr);
off_t fd_size;
- const char *sopt = "hVb:o:p:rsnP:c:dvk:e:t";
+ const char *sopt = "hVb:o:p:rsnP:c:dvk:e:f:t";
struct option lopt[] = {
{ "help", 0, NULL, 'h' },
{ "version", 0, NULL, 'V' },
@@ -271,6 +272,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
{ "snapshot", 0, NULL, 's' },
{ "nocache", 0, NULL, 'n' },
{ "shared", 1, NULL, 'e' },
+ { "format", 1, NULL, 'f' },
{ "persistent", 0, NULL, 't' },
{ "verbose", 0, NULL, 'v' },
{ NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
@@ -292,6 +294,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
int max_fd;
int persistent = 0;
pthread_t client_thread;
+ const char *fmt = NULL;
/* The client thread uses SIGTERM to interrupt the server. A signal
* handler ensures that "qemu-nbd -v -c" exits with a nice status code.
@@ -368,6 +371,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Shared device number must be greater than 0\n");
}
break;
+ case 'f':
+ fmt = optarg;
+ break;
case 't':
persistent = 1;
break;
@@ -478,9 +484,19 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
bdrv_init();
atexit(bdrv_close_all);
+ if (fmt) {
+ drv = bdrv_find_format(fmt);
+ if (!drv) {
+ errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Unknown file format '%s'", fmt);
+ }
+ } else {
+ drv = NULL;
+ }
+
bs = bdrv_new("hda");
srcpath = argv[optind];
- if ((ret = bdrv_open(bs, srcpath, flags, NULL)) < 0) {
+ ret = bdrv_open(bs, srcpath, flags, drv);
+ if (ret < 0) {
errno = -ret;
err(EXIT_FAILURE, "Failed to bdrv_open '%s'", argv[optind]);
}
diff --git a/qemu-nbd.texi b/qemu-nbd.texi
index 44996cc..f56c68e 100644
--- a/tools/qemu-xen/qemu-nbd.texi
+++ b/tools/qemu-xen/qemu-nbd.texi
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ Export Qemu disk image using NBD protocol.
disconnect the specified device
@item -e, --shared=@var{num}
device can be shared by @var{num} clients (default @samp{1})
+@item -f, --format=@var{fmt}
+ force block driver for format @var{fmt} instead of auto-detecting
@item -t, --persistent
don't exit on the last connection
@item -v, --verbose

50
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA-49.patch
View file

@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
VT-d: don't permit SVT_NO_VERIFY entries for known device types
Only in cases where we don't know what to do we should leave the IRTE
blank (suppressing all validation), but we should always log a warning
in those cases (as being insecure).
This is CVE-2013-1952 / XSA-49.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
@@ -440,16 +440,15 @@ static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci
type = pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn);
switch ( type )
{
+ case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT:
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE:
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE:
- case DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE:
- break;
-
- case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT:
set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_SID_SQ, SQ_ALL_16, PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
break;
case DEV_TYPE_PCI:
+ case DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE:
+ /* case DEV_TYPE_PCI2PCIe_BRIDGE: */
ret = find_upstream_bridge(seg, &bus, &devfn, &secbus);
if ( ret == 0 ) /* integrated PCI device */
{
@@ -461,10 +460,15 @@ static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci
if ( pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn) == DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE )
set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_BUS, SQ_ALL_16,
(bus << 8) | pdev->bus);
- else if ( pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn) == DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE )
+ else
set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_SID_SQ, SQ_ALL_16,
PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
}
+ else
+ dprintk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX,
+ "d%d: no upstream bridge for %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
+ pdev->domain->domain_id,
+ seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
break;
default:

41
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA_49.patch
View file

@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
diff -ur xen-4.2.1.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c xen-4.2.1/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
--- xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c 2012-12-17 23:01:55.000000000 +0800
+++ xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c 2013-05-15 23:09:06.704546506 +0800
@@ -440,16 +440,17 @@
type = pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn);
switch ( type )
{
+ case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT:
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE:
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE:
- case DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE:
- break;
- case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT:
set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_SID_SQ, SQ_ALL_16, PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
break;
case DEV_TYPE_PCI:
+ case DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE:
+ /* case DEV_TYPE_PCI2PCIe_BRIDGE: */
+
ret = find_upstream_bridge(seg, &bus, &devfn, &secbus);
if ( ret == 0 ) /* integrated PCI device */
{
@@ -461,10 +462,15 @@
if ( pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn) == DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE )
set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_BUS, SQ_ALL_16,
(bus << 8) | pdev->bus);
- else if ( pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn) == DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE )
+ else
set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_BUS, SQ_ALL_16,
PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
}
+ else
+ dprintk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX,
+ "d%d: no upstream bridge for %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
+ pdev->domain->domain_id,
+ seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
break;
default:

50
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-2072-XSA-56.patch
View file

@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
libxc: limit cpu values when setting vcpu affinity
When support for pinning more than 64 cpus was added, check for cpu
out-of-range values was removed. This can lead to subsequent
out-of-bounds cpumap array accesses in case the cpu number is higher
than the actual count.
This patch returns the check.
This is CVE-2013-2072 / XSA-56
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
diff --git a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
index e220f68..e611b24 100644
--- a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
+++ b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@ static PyObject *pyxc_vcpu_setaffinity(XcObject *self,
int vcpu = 0, i;
xc_cpumap_t cpumap;
PyObject *cpulist = NULL;
+ int nr_cpus;
static char *kwd_list[] = { "domid", "vcpu", "cpumap", NULL };
@@ -235,6 +236,10 @@ static PyObject *pyxc_vcpu_setaffinity(XcObject *self,
&dom, &vcpu, &cpulist) )
return NULL;
+ nr_cpus = xc_get_max_cpus(self->xc_handle);
+ if ( nr_cpus == 0 )
+ return pyxc_error_to_exception(self->xc_handle);
+
cpumap = xc_cpumap_alloc(self->xc_handle);
if(cpumap == NULL)
return pyxc_error_to_exception(self->xc_handle);
@@ -244,6 +249,13 @@ static PyObject *pyxc_vcpu_setaffinity(XcObject *self,
for ( i = 0; i < PyList_Size(cpulist); i++ )
{
long cpu = PyInt_AsLong(PyList_GetItem(cpulist, i));
+ if ( cpu < 0 || cpu >= nr_cpus )
+ {
+ free(cpumap);
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ PyErr_SetFromErrno(xc_error_obj);
+ return NULL;
+ }
cpumap[cpu / 8] |= 1 << (cpu % 8);
}
}

417
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-1-XSA-55.patch
View file

@ -1,417 +0,0 @@
From 9737484becab4a25159f1e985700eaee89690d34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 01/23] libelf: abolish libelf-relocate.c
This file is not actually used. It's not built in Xen's instance of
libelf; in libxc's it's built but nothing in it is called. Do not
compile it in libxc, and delete it.
This reduces the amount of work we need to do in forthcoming patches
to libelf (particularly since as libelf-relocate.c is not used it is
probably full of bugs).
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
tools/libxc/Makefile | 2 +-
xen/common/libelf/libelf-relocate.c | 372 -----------------------------------
2 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 373 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 xen/common/libelf/libelf-relocate.c
diff --git a/tools/libxc/Makefile b/tools/libxc/Makefile
index ca38cbd..d8c6a60 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/Makefile
+++ b/tools/libxc/Makefile
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ vpath %.c ../../xen/common/libelf
CFLAGS += -I../../xen/common/libelf
GUEST_SRCS-y += libelf-tools.c libelf-loader.c
-GUEST_SRCS-y += libelf-dominfo.c libelf-relocate.c
+GUEST_SRCS-y += libelf-dominfo.c
# new domain builder
GUEST_SRCS-y += xc_dom_core.c xc_dom_boot.c
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-relocate.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-relocate.c
#deleted file mode 100644
index 7ef4b01..0000000
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-relocate.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,372 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * ELF relocation code (not used by xen kernel right now).
- *
- * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
- * License as published by the Free Software Foundation;
- * version 2.1 of the License.
- *
- * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
- * Lesser General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
- * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
- */
-
-#include "libelf-private.h"
-
-/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
-
-static const char *rel_names_i386[] = {
- "R_386_NONE",
- "R_386_32",
- "R_386_PC32",
- "R_386_GOT32",
- "R_386_PLT32",
- "R_386_COPY",
- "R_386_GLOB_DAT",
- "R_386_JMP_SLOT",
- "R_386_RELATIVE",
- "R_386_GOTOFF",
- "R_386_GOTPC",
- "R_386_32PLT",
- "R_386_TLS_TPOFF",
- "R_386_TLS_IE",
- "R_386_TLS_GOTIE",
- "R_386_TLS_LE",
- "R_386_TLS_GD",
- "R_386_TLS_LDM",
- "R_386_16",
- "R_386_PC16",
- "R_386_8",
- "R_386_PC8",
- "R_386_TLS_GD_32",
- "R_386_TLS_GD_PUSH",
- "R_386_TLS_GD_CALL",
- "R_386_TLS_GD_POP",
- "R_386_TLS_LDM_32",
- "R_386_TLS_LDM_PUSH",
- "R_386_TLS_LDM_CALL",
- "R_386_TLS_LDM_POP",
- "R_386_TLS_LDO_32",
- "R_386_TLS_IE_32",
- "R_386_TLS_LE_32",
- "R_386_TLS_DTPMOD32",
- "R_386_TLS_DTPOFF32",
- "R_386_TLS_TPOFF32",
-};
-
-static int elf_reloc_i386(struct elf_binary *elf, int type,
- uint64_t addr, uint64_t value)
-{
- void *ptr = elf_get_ptr(elf, addr);
- uint32_t *u32;
-
- switch ( type )
- {
- case 1 /* R_386_32 */ :
- u32 = ptr;
- *u32 += elf->reloc_offset;
- break;
- case 2 /* R_386_PC32 */ :
- /* nothing */
- break;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
-
-static const char *rel_names_x86_64[] = {
- "R_X86_64_NONE",
- "R_X86_64_64",
- "R_X86_64_PC32",
- "R_X86_64_GOT32",
- "R_X86_64_PLT32",
- "R_X86_64_COPY",
- "R_X86_64_GLOB_DAT",
- "R_X86_64_JUMP_SLOT",
- "R_X86_64_RELATIVE",
- "R_X86_64_GOTPCREL",
- "R_X86_64_32",
- "R_X86_64_32S",
- "R_X86_64_16",
- "R_X86_64_PC16",
- "R_X86_64_8",
- "R_X86_64_PC8",
- "R_X86_64_DTPMOD64",
- "R_X86_64_DTPOFF64",
- "R_X86_64_TPOFF64",
- "R_X86_64_TLSGD",
- "R_X86_64_TLSLD",
- "R_X86_64_DTPOFF32",
- "R_X86_64_GOTTPOFF",
- "R_X86_64_TPOFF32",
-};
-
-static int elf_reloc_x86_64(struct elf_binary *elf, int type,
- uint64_t addr, uint64_t value)
-{
- void *ptr = elf_get_ptr(elf, addr);
- uint64_t *u64;
- uint32_t *u32;
- int32_t *s32;
-
- switch ( type )
- {
- case 1 /* R_X86_64_64 */ :
- u64 = ptr;
- value += elf->reloc_offset;
- *u64 = value;
- break;
- case 2 /* R_X86_64_PC32 */ :
- u32 = ptr;
- *u32 = value - addr;
- if ( *u32 != (uint32_t)(value - addr) )
- {
- elf_err(elf, "R_X86_64_PC32 overflow: 0x%" PRIx32
- " != 0x%" PRIx32 "\n",
- *u32, (uint32_t) (value - addr));
- return -1;
- }
- break;
- case 10 /* R_X86_64_32 */ :
- u32 = ptr;
- value += elf->reloc_offset;
- *u32 = value;
- if ( *u32 != value )
- {
- elf_err(elf, "R_X86_64_32 overflow: 0x%" PRIx32
- " != 0x%" PRIx64 "\n",
- *u32, value);
- return -1;
- }
- break;
- case 11 /* R_X86_64_32S */ :
- s32 = ptr;
- value += elf->reloc_offset;
- *s32 = value;
- if ( *s32 != (int64_t) value )
- {
- elf_err(elf, "R_X86_64_32S overflow: 0x%" PRIx32
- " != 0x%" PRIx64 "\n",
- *s32, (int64_t) value);
- return -1;
- }
- break;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
-
-static struct relocs {
- const char **names;
- int count;
- int (*func) (struct elf_binary * elf, int type, uint64_t addr,
- uint64_t value);
-} relocs[] =
-/* *INDENT-OFF* */
-{
- [EM_386] = {
- .names = rel_names_i386,
- .count = sizeof(rel_names_i386) / sizeof(rel_names_i386[0]),
- .func = elf_reloc_i386,
- },
- [EM_X86_64] = {
- .names = rel_names_x86_64,
- .count = sizeof(rel_names_x86_64) / sizeof(rel_names_x86_64[0]),
- .func = elf_reloc_x86_64,
- }
-};
-/* *INDENT-ON* */
-
-/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
-
-static const char *rela_name(int machine, int type)
-{
- if ( machine > sizeof(relocs) / sizeof(relocs[0]) )
- return "unknown mach";
- if ( !relocs[machine].names )
- return "unknown mach";
- if ( type > relocs[machine].count )
- return "unknown rela";
- return relocs[machine].names[type];
-}
-
-static int elf_reloc_section(struct elf_binary *elf,
- const elf_shdr * rels,
- const elf_shdr * sect, const elf_shdr * syms)
-{
- const void *ptr, *end;
- const elf_shdr *shdr;
- const elf_rela *rela;
- const elf_rel *rel;
- const elf_sym *sym;
- uint64_t s_type;
- uint64_t r_offset;
- uint64_t r_info;
- uint64_t r_addend;
- int r_type, r_sym;
- size_t rsize;
- uint64_t shndx, sbase, addr, value;
- const char *sname;
- int machine;
-
- machine = elf_uval(elf, elf->ehdr, e_machine);
- if ( (machine >= (sizeof(relocs) / sizeof(relocs[0]))) ||
- (relocs[machine].func == NULL) )
- {
- elf_err(elf, "%s: can't handle machine %d\n",
- __FUNCTION__, machine);
- return -1;
- }
- if ( elf_swap(elf) )
- {
- elf_err(elf, "%s: non-native byte order, relocation not supported\n",
- __FUNCTION__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- s_type = elf_uval(elf, rels, sh_type);
- rsize = (SHT_REL == s_type) ? elf_size(elf, rel) : elf_size(elf, rela);
- ptr = elf_section_start(elf, rels);
- end = elf_section_end(elf, rels);
-
- for ( ; ptr < end; ptr += rsize )
- {
- switch ( s_type )
- {
- case SHT_REL:
- rel = ptr;
- r_offset = elf_uval(elf, rel, r_offset);
- r_info = elf_uval(elf, rel, r_info);
- r_addend = 0;
- break;
- case SHT_RELA:
- rela = ptr;
- r_offset = elf_uval(elf, rela, r_offset);
- r_info = elf_uval(elf, rela, r_info);
- r_addend = elf_uval(elf, rela, r_addend);
- break;
- default:
- /* can't happen */
- return -1;
- }
- if ( elf_64bit(elf) )
- {
- r_type = ELF64_R_TYPE(r_info);
- r_sym = ELF64_R_SYM(r_info);
- }
- else
- {
- r_type = ELF32_R_TYPE(r_info);
- r_sym = ELF32_R_SYM(r_info);
- }
-
- sym = elf_sym_by_index(elf, r_sym);
- shndx = elf_uval(elf, sym, st_shndx);
- switch ( shndx )
- {
- case SHN_UNDEF:
- sname = "*UNDEF*";
- sbase = 0;
- break;
- case SHN_COMMON:
- elf_err(elf, "%s: invalid section: %" PRId64 "\n",
- __FUNCTION__, shndx);
- return -1;
- case SHN_ABS:
- sname = "*ABS*";
- sbase = 0;
- break;
- default:
- shdr = elf_shdr_by_index(elf, shndx);
- if ( shdr == NULL )
- {
- elf_err(elf, "%s: invalid section: %" PRId64 "\n",
- __FUNCTION__, shndx);
- return -1;
- }
- sname = elf_section_name(elf, shdr);
- sbase = elf_uval(elf, shdr, sh_addr);
- }
-
- addr = r_offset;
- value = elf_uval(elf, sym, st_value);
- value += r_addend;
-
- if ( elf->log_callback && (elf->verbose > 1) )
- {
- uint64_t st_name = elf_uval(elf, sym, st_name);
- const char *name = st_name ? elf->sym_strtab + st_name : "*NONE*";
-
- elf_msg(elf,
- "%s: type %s [%d], off 0x%" PRIx64 ", add 0x%" PRIx64 ","
- " sym %s [0x%" PRIx64 "], sec %s [0x%" PRIx64 "]"
- " -> addr 0x%" PRIx64 " value 0x%" PRIx64 "\n",
- __FUNCTION__, rela_name(machine, r_type), r_type, r_offset,
- r_addend, name, elf_uval(elf, sym, st_value), sname, sbase,
- addr, value);
- }
-
- if ( relocs[machine].func(elf, r_type, addr, value) == -1 )
- {
- elf_err(elf, "%s: unknown/unsupported reloc type %s [%d]\n",
- __FUNCTION__, rela_name(machine, r_type), r_type);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-int elf_reloc(struct elf_binary *elf)
-{
- const elf_shdr *rels, *sect, *syms;
- uint64_t i, count, type;
-
- count = elf_shdr_count(elf);
- for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
- {
- rels = elf_shdr_by_index(elf, i);
- type = elf_uval(elf, rels, sh_type);
- if ( (type != SHT_REL) && (type != SHT_RELA) )
- continue;
-
- sect = elf_shdr_by_index(elf, elf_uval(elf, rels, sh_info));
- syms = elf_shdr_by_index(elf, elf_uval(elf, rels, sh_link));
- if ( NULL == sect || NULL == syms )
- continue;
-
- if ( !(elf_uval(elf, sect, sh_flags) & SHF_ALLOC) )
- {
- elf_msg(elf, "%s: relocations for %s, skipping\n",
- __FUNCTION__, elf_section_name(elf, sect));
- continue;
- }
-
- elf_msg(elf, "%s: relocations for %s @ 0x%" PRIx64 "\n",
- __FUNCTION__, elf_section_name(elf, sect),
- elf_uval(elf, sect, sh_addr));
- if ( elf_reloc_section(elf, rels, sect, syms) != 0 )
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Local variables:
- * mode: C
- * c-set-style: "BSD"
- * c-basic-offset: 4
- * tab-width: 4
- * indent-tabs-mode: nil
- * End:
- */
--
#1.7.2.5

371
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-12to13-XSA-55.patch
View file

@ -1,371 +0,0 @@
From d0790bdad7496e720416b2d4a04563c4c27e7b95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:17 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 12/23] libelf: Check pointer references in elf_is_elfbinary
elf_is_elfbinary didn't take a length parameter and could potentially
access out of range when provided with a very short image.
We only need to check the size is enough for the actual dereference in
elf_is_elfbinary; callers are just using it to check the magic number
and do their own checks (usually via the new elf_ptrval system) before
dereferencing other parts of the header.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
---
tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c | 2 +-
xen/arch/x86/bzimage.c | 4 ++--
xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c | 2 +-
xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c | 9 ++++++---
xen/include/xen/libelf.h | 4 +++-
5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
index b82a08c..ea45886 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int check_elf_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom, int verbose)
return -EINVAL;
}
- if ( !elf_is_elfbinary(dom->kernel_blob) )
+ if ( !elf_is_elfbinary(dom->kernel_blob, dom->kernel_size) )
{
if ( verbose )
xc_dom_panic(dom->xch,
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/bzimage.c b/xen/arch/x86/bzimage.c
index 5adc223..3600dca 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/bzimage.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/bzimage.c
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ unsigned long __init bzimage_headroom(char *image_start,
image_length = hdr->payload_length;
}
- if ( elf_is_elfbinary(image_start) )
+ if ( elf_is_elfbinary(image_start, image_length) )
return 0;
orig_image_len = image_length;
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ int __init bzimage_parse(char *image_base, char **image_start, unsigned long *im
*image_len = hdr->payload_length;
}
- if ( elf_is_elfbinary(*image_start) )
+ if ( elf_is_elfbinary(*image_start, *image_len) )
return 0;
BUG_ON(!(image_base < *image_start));
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
index a3310e7..f8be635 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ int elf_init(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *image_input, size_t size)
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr;
uint64_t i, count, section, offset;
- if ( !elf_is_elfbinary(image_input) )
+ if ( !elf_is_elfbinary(image_input, size) )
{
elf_err(elf, "%s: not an ELF binary\n", __FUNCTION__);
return -1;
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
index 46ca553..744027e 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
@@ -332,11 +332,14 @@ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) elf_note_next(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
-int elf_is_elfbinary(const void *image)
+int elf_is_elfbinary(const void *image_start, size_t image_size)
{
- const Elf32_Ehdr *ehdr = image;
+ const Elf32_Ehdr *ehdr = image_start;
- return IS_ELF(*ehdr); /* fixme unchecked */
+ if ( image_size < sizeof(*ehdr) )
+ return 0;
+
+ return IS_ELF(*ehdr);
}
int elf_phdr_is_loadable(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr)
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
index ddc3ed7..ac93858 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
@@ -350,7 +350,9 @@ uint64_t elf_note_numeric_array(struct elf_binary *, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note),
unsigned int unitsz, unsigned int idx);
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) elf_note_next(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note);
-int elf_is_elfbinary(const void *image);
+/* (Only) checks that the image has the right magic number. */
+int elf_is_elfbinary(const void *image_start, size_t image_size);
+
int elf_phdr_is_loadable(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr);
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
--
1.7.2.5
#From a965b8f80388603d439ae2b8ee7b9b018a079f90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
#From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
#Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:17 +0100
#Subject: [PATCH 13/23] libelf: Make all callers call elf_check_broken
#
#This arranges that if the new pointer reference error checking
#tripped, we actually get a message about it. In this patch these
#messages do not change the actual return values from the various
#functions: so pointer reference errors do not prevent loading. This
#is for fear that some existing kernels might cause the code to make
#these wild references, which would then break, which is not a good
#thing in a security patch.
#
#In xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c we have to introduce an "out" label and
#change all of the "return rc" beyond the relevant point into "goto
#out".
#
#Difference in the 4.2 series, compared to unstable:
#
#* tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c:setup_guest and
# xen/arch/arm/kernel.c:kernel_try_elf_prepare have different
# error handling in 4.2 to unstable; patch adjusted accordingly.
#
#This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
#
#Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
#
#xen-unstable version Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
#---
# tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
# tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c | 5 +++++
# tools/xcutils/readnotes.c | 3 +++
# xen/arch/arm/kernel.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
# xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
# 5 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
#
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
index ea45886..4fb4da2 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
@@ -276,6 +276,13 @@ static int xc_dom_load_elf_symtab(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
elf_store_field(elf, shdr, e32.sh_name, 0);
}
+ if ( elf_check_broken(&syms) )
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: symbols ELF broken: %s", __FUNCTION__,
+ elf_check_broken(&syms));
+ if ( elf_check_broken(elf) )
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: ELF broken: %s", __FUNCTION__,
+ elf_check_broken(elf));
+
if ( tables == 0 )
{
DOMPRINTF("%s: no symbol table present", __FUNCTION__);
@@ -312,19 +319,23 @@ static int xc_dom_parse_elf_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
{
xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INVALID_KERNEL, "%s: ELF image"
" has no shstrtab", __FUNCTION__);
- return -EINVAL;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
}
/* parse binary and get xen meta info */
elf_parse_binary(elf);
if ( (rc = elf_xen_parse(elf, &dom->parms)) != 0 )
- return rc;
+ {
+ goto out;
+ }
if ( elf_xen_feature_get(XENFEAT_dom0, dom->parms.f_required) )
{
xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INVALID_KERNEL, "%s: Kernel does not"
" support unprivileged (DomU) operation", __FUNCTION__);
- return -EINVAL;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
}
/* find kernel segment */
@@ -338,7 +349,13 @@ static int xc_dom_parse_elf_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
DOMPRINTF("%s: %s: 0x%" PRIx64 " -> 0x%" PRIx64 "",
__FUNCTION__, dom->guest_type,
dom->kernel_seg.vstart, dom->kernel_seg.vend);
- return 0;
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ if ( elf_check_broken(elf) )
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: ELF broken: %s", __FUNCTION__,
+ elf_check_broken(elf));
+
+ return rc;
}
static int xc_dom_load_elf_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c b/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c
index ccfd8b5..8165287 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c
@@ -403,11 +403,16 @@ static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch,
munmap(page0, PAGE_SIZE);
}
+ if ( elf_check_broken(&elf) )
+ ERROR("HVM ELF broken: %s", elf_check_broken(&elf));
+
free(page_array);
return 0;
error_out:
free(page_array);
+ if ( elf_check_broken(&elf) )
+ ERROR("HVM ELF broken, failing: %s", elf_check_broken(&elf));
return -1;
}
diff --git a/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c b/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c
index cfae994..d1f7a30 100644
--- a/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c
+++ b/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c
@@ -301,6 +301,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
printf("__xen_guest: %s\n",
elf_strfmt(&elf, elf_section_start(&elf, shdr)));
+ if (elf_check_broken(&elf))
+ printf("warning: broken ELF: %s\n", elf_check_broken(&elf));
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/kernel.c b/xen/arch/arm/kernel.c
index 2d56130..dec0519 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/kernel.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/kernel.c
@@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ static int kernel_try_elf_prepare(struct kernel_info *info)
{
int rc;
+ memset(&info->elf.elf, 0, sizeof(info->elf.elf));
+
info->kernel_order = get_order_from_bytes(KERNEL_FLASH_SIZE);
info->kernel_img = alloc_xenheap_pages(info->kernel_order, 0);
if ( info->kernel_img == NULL )
@@ -160,7 +162,7 @@ static int kernel_try_elf_prepare(struct kernel_info *info)
#endif
elf_parse_binary(&info->elf.elf);
if ( (rc = elf_xen_parse(&info->elf.elf, &info->elf.parms)) != 0 )
- return rc;
+ goto err;
/*
* TODO: can the ELF header be used to find the physical address
@@ -169,7 +171,18 @@ static int kernel_try_elf_prepare(struct kernel_info *info)
info->entry = info->elf.parms.virt_entry;
info->load = kernel_elf_load;
+ if ( elf_check_broken(&info->elf.elf) )
+ printk("Xen: warning: ELF kernel broken: %s\n",
+ elf_check_broken(&info->elf.elf));
+
return 0;
+
+err:
+ if ( elf_check_broken(&info->elf.elf) )
+ printk("Xen: ELF kernel broken: %s\n",
+ elf_check_broken(&info->elf.elf));
+
+ return rc;
}
int kernel_prepare(struct kernel_info *info)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
index a655b21..0dbec96 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
#endif
elf_parse_binary(&elf);
if ( (rc = elf_xen_parse(&elf, &parms)) != 0 )
- return rc;
+ goto out;
/* compatibility check */
compatible = 0;
@@ -413,14 +413,16 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
if ( !compatible )
{
printk("Mismatch between Xen and DOM0 kernel\n");
- return -EINVAL;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
}
if ( parms.elf_notes[XEN_ELFNOTE_SUPPORTED_FEATURES].type != XEN_ENT_NONE &&
!test_bit(XENFEAT_dom0, parms.f_supported) )
{
printk("Kernel does not support Dom0 operation\n");
- return -EINVAL;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
}
#if defined(__x86_64__)
@@ -734,7 +736,8 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
(v_end > HYPERVISOR_COMPAT_VIRT_START(d)) )
{
printk("DOM0 image overlaps with Xen private area.\n");
- return -EINVAL;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
}
if ( is_pv_32on64_domain(d) )
@@ -914,7 +917,7 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
if ( rc < 0 )
{
printk("Failed to load the kernel binary\n");
- return rc;
+ goto out;
}
bootstrap_map(NULL);
@@ -925,7 +928,8 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
{
write_ptbase(current);
printk("Invalid HYPERCALL_PAGE field in ELF notes.\n");
- return -1;
+ rc = -1;
+ goto out;
}
hypercall_page_initialise(
d, (void *)(unsigned long)parms.virt_hypercall);
@@ -1272,9 +1276,19 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
BUG_ON(rc != 0);
- iommu_dom0_init(dom0);
+ if ( elf_check_broken(&elf) )
+ printk(" Xen warning: dom0 kernel broken ELF: %s\n",
+ elf_check_broken(&elf));
+ iommu_dom0_init(dom0);
return 0;
+
+out:
+ if ( elf_check_broken(&elf) )
+ printk(" Xen dom0 kernel broken ELF: %s\n",
+ elf_check_broken(&elf));
+
+ return rc;
}
/*
--
1.7.2.5

252
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-14-XSA-55.patch
View file

@ -1,252 +0,0 @@
From 3fb6ccf2faccaf5e22e33a3155ccc72d732896d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:18 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 14/23] libelf: use C99 bool for booleans
We want to remove uses of "int" because signed integers have
undesirable undefined behaviours on overflow. Malicious compilers can
turn apparently-correct code into code with security vulnerabilities
etc.
In this patch we change all the booleans in libelf to C99 bool,
from <stdbool.h>.
For the one visible libelf boolean in libxc's public interface we
retain the use of int to avoid changing the ABI; libxc converts it to
a bool for consumption by libelf.
It is OK to change all values only ever used as booleans to _Bool
(bool) because conversion from any scalar type to a _Bool works the
same as the boolean test in if() or ?: and is always defined (C99
6.3.1.2). But we do need to check that all these variables really are
only ever used that way. (It is theoretically possible that the old
code truncated some 64-bit values to 32-bit ints which might become
zero depending on the value, which would mean a behavioural change in
this patch, but it seems implausible that treating 0x????????00000000
as false could have been intended.)
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
---
tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c | 8 ++++----
xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c | 2 +-
xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c | 4 ++--
xen/common/libelf/libelf-private.h | 2 +-
xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c | 10 +++++-----
xen/include/xen/libelf.h | 18 ++++++++++--------
6 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
index 4fb4da2..9ba64ae 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
static void log_callback(struct elf_binary *elf, void *caller_data,
- int iserr, const char *fmt, va_list al) {
+ bool iserr, const char *fmt, va_list al) {
xc_interface *xch = caller_data;
xc_reportv(xch,
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static void log_callback(struct elf_binary *elf, void *caller_data,
void xc_elf_set_logfile(xc_interface *xch, struct elf_binary *elf,
int verbose) {
- elf_set_log(elf, log_callback, xch, verbose);
+ elf_set_log(elf, log_callback, xch, verbose /* convert to bool */);
}
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static char *xc_dom_guest_type(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* parse elf binary */
-static int check_elf_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom, int verbose)
+static int check_elf_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom, bool verbose)
{
if ( dom->kernel_blob == NULL )
{
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static int xc_dom_probe_elf_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
}
static int xc_dom_load_elf_symtab(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
- struct elf_binary *elf, int load)
+ struct elf_binary *elf, bool load)
{
struct elf_binary syms;
ELF_HANDLE_DECL_NONCONST(elf_shdr) shdr; ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr2;
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c
index 98c80dc..12b6c2a 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int elf_xen_parse_note(struct elf_binary *elf,
/* *INDENT-OFF* */
static const struct {
char *name;
- int str;
+ bool str;
} note_desc[] = {
[XEN_ELFNOTE_ENTRY] = { "ENTRY", 0},
[XEN_ELFNOTE_HYPERCALL_PAGE] = { "HYPERCALL_PAGE", 0},
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
index f8be635..0dccd4d 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ int elf_init(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *image_input, size_t size)
}
#ifndef __XEN__
-void elf_call_log_callback(struct elf_binary *elf, int iserr,
+void elf_call_log_callback(struct elf_binary *elf, bool iserr,
const char *fmt,...) {
va_list al;
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ void elf_call_log_callback(struct elf_binary *elf, int iserr,
}
void elf_set_log(struct elf_binary *elf, elf_log_callback *log_callback,
- void *log_caller_data, int verbose)
+ void *log_caller_data, bool verbose)
{
elf->log_callback = log_callback;
elf->log_caller_data = log_caller_data;
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-private.h b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-private.h
index 280dfd1..277be04 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-private.h
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-private.h
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
#define elf_err(elf, fmt, args ... ) \
elf_call_log_callback(elf, 1, fmt , ## args );
-void elf_call_log_callback(struct elf_binary*, int iserr, const char *fmt,...);
+void elf_call_log_callback(struct elf_binary*, bool iserr, const char *fmt,...);
#define safe_strcpy(d,s) \
do { strncpy((d),(s),sizeof((d))-1); \
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
index 744027e..fa58f76 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ const char *elf_check_broken(const struct elf_binary *elf)
return elf->broken;
}
-static int elf_ptrval_in_range(elf_ptrval ptrval, uint64_t size,
+static bool elf_ptrval_in_range(elf_ptrval ptrval, uint64_t size,
const void *region, uint64_t regionsize)
/*
* Returns true if the putative memory area [ptrval,ptrval+size>
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static int elf_ptrval_in_range(elf_ptrval ptrval, uint64_t size,
return 1;
}
-int elf_access_ok(struct elf_binary * elf,
+bool elf_access_ok(struct elf_binary * elf,
uint64_t ptrval, size_t size)
{
if ( elf_ptrval_in_range(ptrval, size, elf->image_base, elf->size) )
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ uint64_t elf_access_unsigned(struct elf_binary * elf, elf_ptrval base,
uint64_t moreoffset, size_t size)
{
elf_ptrval ptrval = base + moreoffset;
- int need_swap = elf_swap(elf);
+ bool need_swap = elf_swap(elf);
const uint8_t *u8;
const uint16_t *u16;
const uint32_t *u32;
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) elf_note_next(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
-int elf_is_elfbinary(const void *image_start, size_t image_size)
+bool elf_is_elfbinary(const void *image_start, size_t image_size)
{
const Elf32_Ehdr *ehdr = image_start;
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ int elf_is_elfbinary(const void *image_start, size_t image_size)
return IS_ELF(*ehdr);
}
-int elf_phdr_is_loadable(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr)
+bool elf_phdr_is_loadable(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr)
{
uint64_t p_type = elf_uval(elf, phdr, p_type);
uint64_t p_flags = elf_uval(elf, phdr, p_flags);
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
index ac93858..951430f 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
#error define architectural endianness
#endif
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
#undef ELFSIZE
#include "elfstructs.h"
#ifdef __XEN__
@@ -42,7 +44,7 @@
struct elf_binary;
typedef void elf_log_callback(struct elf_binary*, void *caller_data,
- int iserr, const char *fmt, va_list al);
+ bool iserr, const char *fmt, va_list al);
#endif
@@ -237,7 +239,7 @@ struct elf_binary {
elf_log_callback *log_callback;
void *log_caller_data;
#endif
- int verbose;
+ bool verbose;
const char *broken;
};
@@ -301,8 +303,8 @@ void elf_memset_safe(struct elf_binary*, elf_ptrval dst, int c, size_t);
* outside permitted areas.
*/
-int elf_access_ok(struct elf_binary * elf,
- uint64_t ptrval, size_t size);
+bool elf_access_ok(struct elf_binary * elf,
+ uint64_t ptrval, size_t size);
#define elf_store_val(elf, type, ptr, val) \
({ \
@@ -351,9 +353,9 @@ uint64_t elf_note_numeric_array(struct elf_binary *, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note),
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) elf_note_next(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note);
/* (Only) checks that the image has the right magic number. */
-int elf_is_elfbinary(const void *image_start, size_t image_size);
+bool elf_is_elfbinary(const void *image_start, size_t image_size);
-int elf_phdr_is_loadable(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr);
+bool elf_phdr_is_loadable(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr);
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* xc_libelf_loader.c */
@@ -367,7 +369,7 @@ int elf_init(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *image, size_t size);
void elf_set_verbose(struct elf_binary *elf);
#else
void elf_set_log(struct elf_binary *elf, elf_log_callback*,
- void *log_caller_pointer, int verbose);
+ void *log_caller_pointer, bool verbose);
#endif
void elf_parse_binary(struct elf_binary *elf);
@@ -419,7 +421,7 @@ struct elf_dom_parms {
char xen_ver[16];
char loader[16];
int pae;
- int bsd_symtab;
+ bool bsd_symtab;
uint64_t virt_base;
uint64_t virt_entry;
uint64_t virt_hypercall;
--
1.7.2.5

409
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-16-XSA-55.patch
View file

@ -1,409 +0,0 @@
From 52d8cc2dd3bb3e0f6d51e00280da934e8d91653a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:18 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 16/23] libelf: check loops for running away
Ensure that libelf does not have any loops which can run away
indefinitely even if the input is bogus. (Grepped for \bfor, \bwhile
and \bgoto in libelf and xc_dom_*loader*.c.)
Changes needed:
* elf_note_next uses the note's unchecked alleged length, which might
wrap round. If it does, return ELF_MAX_PTRVAL (0xfff..fff) instead,
which will be beyond the end of the section and so terminate the
caller's loop. Also check that the returned psuedopointer is sane.
* In various loops over section and program headers, check that the
calculated header pointer is still within the image, and quit the
loop if it isn't.
* Some fixed limits to avoid potentially O(image_size^2) loops:
- maximum length of strings: 4K (longer ones ignored totally)
- maximum total number of ELF notes: 65536 (any more are ignored)
* Check that the total program contents (text, data) we copy or
initialise doesn't exceed twice the output image area size.
* Remove an entirely useless loop from elf_xen_parse (!)
* Replace a nested search loop in in xc_dom_load_elf_symtab in
xc_dom_elfloader.c by a precomputation of a bitmap of referenced
symtabs.
We have not changed loops which might, in principle, iterate over the
whole image - even if they might do so one byte at a time with a
nontrivial access check function in the middle.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
---
tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++-------
xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++------------
xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-
xen/include/xen/libelf.h | 13 ++++++++++
5 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
index 62a0d3b..c5014d2 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include "xg_private.h"
#include "xc_dom.h"
+#include "xc_bitops.h"
#define XEN_VER "xen-3.0"
@@ -120,6 +121,7 @@ static elf_errorstatus xc_dom_load_elf_symtab(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
ELF_PTRVAL_CHAR hdr;
size_t size;
unsigned h, count, type, i, tables = 0;
+ unsigned long *strtab_referenced = NULL;
if ( elf_swap(elf) )
{
@@ -220,22 +222,35 @@ static elf_errorstatus xc_dom_load_elf_symtab(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
symtab, maxaddr);
count = elf_shdr_count(&syms);
+ /* elf_shdr_count guarantees that count is reasonable */
+
+ strtab_referenced = xc_dom_malloc(dom, bitmap_size(count));
+ if ( strtab_referenced == NULL )
+ return -1;
+ bitmap_clear(strtab_referenced, count);
+ /* Note the symtabs @h linked to by any strtab @i. */
+ for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
+ {
+ shdr2 = elf_shdr_by_index(&syms, i);
+ if ( elf_uval(&syms, shdr2, sh_type) == SHT_SYMTAB )
+ {
+ h = elf_uval(&syms, shdr2, sh_link);
+ if (h < count)
+ set_bit(h, strtab_referenced);
+ }
+ }
+
for ( h = 0; h < count; h++ )
{
shdr = ELF_OBSOLETE_VOIDP_CAST elf_shdr_by_index(&syms, h);
+ if ( !elf_access_ok(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(shdr), 1) )
+ /* input has an insane section header count field */
+ break;
type = elf_uval(&syms, shdr, sh_type);
if ( type == SHT_STRTAB )
{
- /* Look for a strtab @i linked to symtab @h. */
- for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
- {
- shdr2 = elf_shdr_by_index(&syms, i);
- if ( (elf_uval(&syms, shdr2, sh_type) == SHT_SYMTAB) &&
- (elf_uval(&syms, shdr2, sh_link) == h) )
- break;
- }
/* Skip symtab @h if we found no corresponding strtab @i. */
- if ( i == count )
+ if ( !test_bit(h, strtab_referenced) )
{
if ( elf_64bit(&syms) )
elf_store_field(elf, shdr, e64.sh_offset, 0);
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c
index cdd0d31..25a10d7 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c
@@ -221,7 +221,8 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_xen_parse_note(struct elf_binary *elf,
static unsigned elf_xen_parse_notes(struct elf_binary *elf,
struct elf_dom_parms *parms,
ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID start,
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID end)
+ ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID end,
+ unsigned *total_note_count)
{
unsigned xen_elfnotes = 0;
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note;
@@ -233,6 +234,12 @@ static unsigned elf_xen_parse_notes(struct elf_binary *elf,
ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(note) < parms->elf_note_end;
note = elf_note_next(elf, note) )
{
+ if ( *total_note_count >= ELF_MAX_TOTAL_NOTE_COUNT )
+ {
+ elf_mark_broken(elf, "too many ELF notes");
+ break;
+ }
+ (*total_note_count)++;
note_name = elf_note_name(elf, note);
if ( note_name == NULL )
continue;
@@ -473,6 +480,7 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_xen_parse(struct elf_binary *elf,
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr;
unsigned xen_elfnotes = 0;
unsigned i, count, more_notes;
+ unsigned total_note_count = 0;
elf_memset_unchecked(parms, 0, sizeof(*parms));
parms->virt_base = UNSET_ADDR;
@@ -487,6 +495,9 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_xen_parse(struct elf_binary *elf,
for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
phdr = elf_phdr_by_index(elf, i);
+ if ( !elf_access_ok(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(phdr), 1) )
+ /* input has an insane program header count field */
+ break;
if ( elf_uval(elf, phdr, p_type) != PT_NOTE )
continue;
@@ -499,7 +510,8 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_xen_parse(struct elf_binary *elf,
more_notes = elf_xen_parse_notes(elf, parms,
elf_segment_start(elf, phdr),
- elf_segment_end(elf, phdr));
+ elf_segment_end(elf, phdr),
+ &total_note_count);
if ( more_notes == ELF_NOTE_INVALID )
return -1;
@@ -516,13 +528,17 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_xen_parse(struct elf_binary *elf,
for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
shdr = elf_shdr_by_index(elf, i);
+ if ( !elf_access_ok(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(shdr), 1) )
+ /* input has an insane section header count field */
+ break;
if ( elf_uval(elf, shdr, sh_type) != SHT_NOTE )
continue;
more_notes = elf_xen_parse_notes(elf, parms,
elf_section_start(elf, shdr),
- elf_section_end(elf, shdr));
+ elf_section_end(elf, shdr),
+ &total_note_count);
if ( more_notes == ELF_NOTE_INVALID )
return -1;
@@ -540,20 +556,15 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_xen_parse(struct elf_binary *elf,
*/
if ( xen_elfnotes == 0 )
{
- count = elf_shdr_count(elf);
- for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
+ shdr = elf_shdr_by_name(elf, "__xen_guest");
+ if ( ELF_HANDLE_VALID(shdr) )
{
- shdr = elf_shdr_by_name(elf, "__xen_guest");
- if ( ELF_HANDLE_VALID(shdr) )
- {
- parms->guest_info = elf_section_start(elf, shdr);
- parms->elf_note_start = ELF_INVALID_PTRVAL;
- parms->elf_note_end = ELF_INVALID_PTRVAL;
- elf_msg(elf, "%s: __xen_guest: \"%s\"\n", __FUNCTION__,
- elf_strfmt(elf, parms->guest_info));
- elf_xen_parse_guest_info(elf, parms);
- break;
- }
+ parms->guest_info = elf_section_start(elf, shdr);
+ parms->elf_note_start = ELF_INVALID_PTRVAL;
+ parms->elf_note_end = ELF_INVALID_PTRVAL;
+ elf_msg(elf, "%s: __xen_guest: \"%s\"\n", __FUNCTION__,
+ elf_strfmt(elf, parms->guest_info));
+ elf_xen_parse_guest_info(elf, parms);
}
}
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
index c3a9e51..06799af 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
@@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_init(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *image_input, size_t
for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
shdr = elf_shdr_by_index(elf, i);
+ if ( !elf_access_ok(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(shdr), 1) )
+ /* input has an insane section header count field */
+ break;
if ( elf_uval(elf, shdr, sh_type) != SHT_SYMTAB )
continue;
elf->sym_tab = shdr;
@@ -170,6 +173,9 @@ void elf_parse_bsdsyms(struct elf_binary *elf, uint64_t pstart)
for ( i = 0; i < elf_shdr_count(elf); i++ )
{
shdr = elf_shdr_by_index(elf, i);
+ if ( !elf_access_ok(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(shdr), 1) )
+ /* input has an insane section header count field */
+ break;
type = elf_uval(elf, shdr, sh_type);
if ( (type == SHT_STRTAB) || (type == SHT_SYMTAB) )
sz = elf_round_up(elf, sz + elf_uval(elf, shdr, sh_size));
@@ -224,6 +230,9 @@ do { \
for ( i = 0; i < elf_shdr_count(elf); i++ )
{
+ elf_ptrval old_shdr_p;
+ elf_ptrval new_shdr_p;
+
type = elf_uval(elf, shdr, sh_type);
if ( (type == SHT_STRTAB) || (type == SHT_SYMTAB) )
{
@@ -235,8 +244,16 @@ do { \
elf_hdr_elm(elf, shdr, sh_offset, maxva - symtab_addr);
maxva = ELF_OBSOLETE_VOIDP_CAST elf_round_up(elf, (unsigned long)maxva + sz);
}
- shdr = ELF_MAKE_HANDLE(elf_shdr, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(shdr) +
- (unsigned long)elf_uval(elf, elf->ehdr, e_shentsize));
+ old_shdr_p = ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(shdr);
+ new_shdr_p = old_shdr_p + elf_uval(elf, elf->ehdr, e_shentsize);
+ if ( new_shdr_p <= old_shdr_p ) /* wrapped or stuck */
+ {
+ elf_mark_broken(elf, "bad section header length");
+ break;
+ }
+ if ( !elf_access_ok(elf, new_shdr_p, 1) ) /* outside image */
+ break;
+ shdr = ELF_MAKE_HANDLE(elf_shdr, new_shdr_p);
}
/* Write down the actual sym size. */
@@ -256,6 +273,9 @@ void elf_parse_binary(struct elf_binary *elf)
for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
phdr = elf_phdr_by_index(elf, i);
+ if ( !elf_access_ok(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(phdr), 1) )
+ /* input has an insane program header count field */
+ break;
if ( !elf_phdr_is_loadable(elf, phdr) )
continue;
paddr = elf_uval(elf, phdr, p_paddr);
@@ -278,11 +298,20 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_load_binary(struct elf_binary *elf)
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr;
uint64_t i, count, paddr, offset, filesz, memsz;
ELF_PTRVAL_VOID dest;
+ /*
+ * Let bizarre ELFs write the output image up to twice; this
+ * calculation is just to ensure our copying loop is no worse than
+ * O(domain_size).
+ */
+ uint64_t remain_allow_copy = (uint64_t)elf->dest_size * 2;
count = elf_uval(elf, elf->ehdr, e_phnum);
for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
phdr = elf_phdr_by_index(elf, i);
+ if ( !elf_access_ok(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(phdr), 1) )
+ /* input has an insane program header count field */
+ break;
if ( !elf_phdr_is_loadable(elf, phdr) )
continue;
paddr = elf_uval(elf, phdr, p_paddr);
@@ -290,6 +319,20 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_load_binary(struct elf_binary *elf)
filesz = elf_uval(elf, phdr, p_filesz);
memsz = elf_uval(elf, phdr, p_memsz);
dest = elf_get_ptr(elf, paddr);
+
+ /*
+ * We need to check that the input image doesn't have us copy
+ * the whole image zillions of times, as that could lead to
+ * O(n^2) time behaviour and possible DoS by a malicous ELF.
+ */
+ if ( remain_allow_copy < memsz )
+ {
+ elf_mark_broken(elf, "program segments total to more"
+ " than the input image size");
+ break;
+ }
+ remain_allow_copy -= memsz;
+
elf_msg(elf, "%s: phdr %" PRIu64 " at 0x%"ELF_PRPTRVAL" -> 0x%"ELF_PRPTRVAL"\n",
__func__, i, dest, (ELF_PTRVAL_VOID)(dest + filesz));
if ( elf_load_image(elf, dest, ELF_IMAGE_BASE(elf) + offset, filesz, memsz) != 0 )
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
index 46d4ab1..4a83133 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
@@ -131,7 +131,16 @@ uint64_t elf_round_up(struct elf_binary *elf, uint64_t addr)
unsigned elf_shdr_count(struct elf_binary *elf)
{
- return elf_uval(elf, elf->ehdr, e_shnum);
+ unsigned count = elf_uval(elf, elf->ehdr, e_shnum);
+ uint64_t max = elf->size / sizeof(Elf32_Shdr);
+ if (max > ~(unsigned)0)
+ max = ~(unsigned)0; /* Xen doesn't have limits.h :-/ */
+ if (count > max)
+ {
+ elf_mark_broken(elf, "far too many section headers");
+ count = max;
+ }
+ return count;
}
unsigned elf_phdr_count(struct elf_binary *elf)
@@ -149,6 +158,9 @@ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) elf_shdr_by_name(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *n
for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
shdr = elf_shdr_by_index(elf, i);
+ if ( !elf_access_ok(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(shdr), 1) )
+ /* input has an insane section header count field */
+ break;
sname = elf_section_name(elf, shdr);
if ( sname && !strcmp(sname, name) )
return shdr;
@@ -204,6 +216,11 @@ const char *elf_strval(struct elf_binary *elf, elf_ptrval start)
if ( !elf_access_unsigned(elf, start, length, 1) )
/* ok */
return ELF_UNSAFE_PTR(start);
+ if ( length >= ELF_MAX_STRING_LENGTH )
+ {
+ elf_mark_broken(elf, "excessively long string");
+ return NULL;
+ }
}
}
@@ -327,7 +344,14 @@ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) elf_note_next(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(
unsigned namesz = (elf_uval(elf, note, namesz) + 3) & ~3;
unsigned descsz = (elf_uval(elf, note, descsz) + 3) & ~3;
- return ELF_MAKE_HANDLE(elf_note, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(note) + elf_size(elf, note) + namesz + descsz);
+ elf_ptrval ptrval = ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(note)
+ + elf_size(elf, note) + namesz + descsz;
+
+ if ( ( ptrval <= ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(note) || /* wrapped or stuck */
+ !elf_access_ok(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(note), 1) ) )
+ ptrval = ELF_MAX_PTRVAL; /* terminate caller's loop */
+
+ return ELF_MAKE_HANDLE(elf_note, ptrval);
}
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
index 87e126a..f95fe88 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ typedef void elf_log_callback(struct elf_binary*, void *caller_data,
#endif
+#define ELF_MAX_STRING_LENGTH 4096
+#define ELF_MAX_TOTAL_NOTE_COUNT 65536
+
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* Macros for accessing the input image and output area. */
@@ -353,6 +356,16 @@ ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_note_desc(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_
uint64_t elf_note_numeric(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note);
uint64_t elf_note_numeric_array(struct elf_binary *, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note),
unsigned int unitsz, unsigned int idx);
+
+/*
+ * If you use elf_note_next in a loop, you must put a nontrivial upper
+ * bound on the returned value as part of your loop condition. In
+ * some cases elf_note_next will substitute ELF_PTRVAL_MAX as return
+ * value to indicate that the iteration isn't going well (for example,
+ * the putative "next" value would be earlier in memory). In this
+ * case the caller's loop must terminate. Checking against the
+ * end of the notes segment with a strict inequality is sufficient.
+ */
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) elf_note_next(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note);
/* (Only) checks that the image has the right magic number. */
--
1.7.2.5

406
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-17-XSA-55.patch
View file

@ -1,406 +0,0 @@
From 3baaa4ffcd3e7dd6227f9bdf817f90e5b75aeda2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 17/23] libelf: abolish obsolete macros
Abolish ELF_PTRVAL_[CONST_]{CHAR,VOID}; change uses to elf_ptrval.
Abolish ELF_HANDLE_DECL_NONCONST; change uses to ELF_HANDLE_DECL.
Abolish ELF_OBSOLETE_VOIDP_CAST; simply remove all uses.
No functional change. (Verified by diffing assembler output.)
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
v2: New patch.
---
tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c | 8 +++---
tools/xcutils/readnotes.c | 2 +-
xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c | 6 ++--
xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c | 24 +++++++++---------
xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c | 24 +++++++++---------
xen/include/xen/libelf.h | 48 +++++++++---------------------------
6 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
index c5014d2..9fc4b94 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
@@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ static elf_errorstatus xc_dom_load_elf_symtab(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
struct elf_binary *elf, bool load)
{
struct elf_binary syms;
- ELF_HANDLE_DECL_NONCONST(elf_shdr) shdr; ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr2;
+ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr; ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr2;
xen_vaddr_t symtab, maxaddr;
- ELF_PTRVAL_CHAR hdr;
+ elf_ptrval hdr;
size_t size;
unsigned h, count, type, i, tables = 0;
unsigned long *strtab_referenced = NULL;
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static elf_errorstatus xc_dom_load_elf_symtab(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
for ( h = 0; h < count; h++ )
{
- shdr = ELF_OBSOLETE_VOIDP_CAST elf_shdr_by_index(&syms, h);
+ shdr = elf_shdr_by_index(&syms, h);
if ( !elf_access_ok(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(shdr), 1) )
/* input has an insane section header count field */
break;
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ static elf_errorstatus xc_dom_load_elf_symtab(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
if ( load )
{
shdr2 = elf_shdr_by_index(elf, h);
- elf_memcpy_safe(elf, ELF_OBSOLETE_VOIDP_CAST elf_section_start(&syms, shdr),
+ elf_memcpy_safe(elf, elf_section_start(&syms, shdr),
elf_section_start(elf, shdr2),
size);
}
diff --git a/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c b/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c
index 2ca7732..5fa445e 100644
--- a/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c
+++ b/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static void print_l1_mfn_valid_note(const char *prefix, struct elf_binary *elf,
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note)
{
unsigned descsz = elf_uval(elf, note, descsz);
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID desc = elf_note_desc(elf, note);
+ elf_ptrval desc = elf_note_desc(elf, note);
/* XXX should be able to cope with a list of values. */
switch ( descsz / 2 )
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c
index 25a10d7..412ea70 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c
@@ -220,8 +220,8 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_xen_parse_note(struct elf_binary *elf,
static unsigned elf_xen_parse_notes(struct elf_binary *elf,
struct elf_dom_parms *parms,
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID start,
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID end,
+ elf_ptrval start,
+ elf_ptrval end,
unsigned *total_note_count)
{
unsigned xen_elfnotes = 0;
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static unsigned elf_xen_parse_notes(struct elf_binary *elf,
elf_errorstatus elf_xen_parse_guest_info(struct elf_binary *elf,
struct elf_dom_parms *parms)
{
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_CHAR h;
+ elf_ptrval h;
unsigned char name[32], value[128];
unsigned len;
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
index 06799af..e2e75af 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ void elf_set_log(struct elf_binary *elf, elf_log_callback *log_callback,
}
static elf_errorstatus elf_load_image(struct elf_binary *elf,
- ELF_PTRVAL_VOID dst, ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID src,
+ elf_ptrval dst, elf_ptrval src,
uint64_t filesz, uint64_t memsz)
{
elf_memcpy_safe(elf, dst, src, filesz);
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ void elf_set_verbose(struct elf_binary *elf)
elf->verbose = 1;
}
-static elf_errorstatus elf_load_image(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_PTRVAL_VOID dst, ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID src, uint64_t filesz, uint64_t memsz)
+static elf_errorstatus elf_load_image(struct elf_binary *elf, elf_ptrval dst, elf_ptrval src, uint64_t filesz, uint64_t memsz)
{
elf_errorstatus rc;
if ( filesz > ULONG_MAX || memsz > ULONG_MAX )
@@ -187,12 +187,12 @@ void elf_parse_bsdsyms(struct elf_binary *elf, uint64_t pstart)
static void elf_load_bsdsyms(struct elf_binary *elf)
{
- ELF_HANDLE_DECL_NONCONST(elf_ehdr) sym_ehdr;
+ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_ehdr) sym_ehdr;
unsigned long sz;
- ELF_PTRVAL_VOID maxva;
- ELF_PTRVAL_VOID symbase;
- ELF_PTRVAL_VOID symtab_addr;
- ELF_HANDLE_DECL_NONCONST(elf_shdr) shdr;
+ elf_ptrval maxva;
+ elf_ptrval symbase;
+ elf_ptrval symtab_addr;
+ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr;
unsigned i, type;
if ( !elf->bsd_symtab_pstart )
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ do { \
elf_memcpy_safe(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(shdr),
ELF_IMAGE_BASE(elf) + elf_uval(elf, elf->ehdr, e_shoff),
sz);
- maxva = ELF_OBSOLETE_VOIDP_CAST elf_round_up(elf, (unsigned long)maxva + sz);
+ maxva = elf_round_up(elf, (unsigned long)maxva + sz);
for ( i = 0; i < elf_shdr_count(elf); i++ )
{
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ do { \
elf_memcpy_safe(elf, maxva, elf_section_start(elf, shdr), sz);
/* Mangled to be based on ELF header location. */
elf_hdr_elm(elf, shdr, sh_offset, maxva - symtab_addr);
- maxva = ELF_OBSOLETE_VOIDP_CAST elf_round_up(elf, (unsigned long)maxva + sz);
+ maxva = elf_round_up(elf, (unsigned long)maxva + sz);
}
old_shdr_p = ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(shdr);
new_shdr_p = old_shdr_p + elf_uval(elf, elf->ehdr, e_shentsize);
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_load_binary(struct elf_binary *elf)
{
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr;
uint64_t i, count, paddr, offset, filesz, memsz;
- ELF_PTRVAL_VOID dest;
+ elf_ptrval dest;
/*
* Let bizarre ELFs write the output image up to twice; this
* calculation is just to ensure our copying loop is no worse than
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_load_binary(struct elf_binary *elf)
remain_allow_copy -= memsz;
elf_msg(elf, "%s: phdr %" PRIu64 " at 0x%"ELF_PRPTRVAL" -> 0x%"ELF_PRPTRVAL"\n",
- __func__, i, dest, (ELF_PTRVAL_VOID)(dest + filesz));
+ __func__, i, dest, (elf_ptrval)(dest + filesz));
if ( elf_load_image(elf, dest, ELF_IMAGE_BASE(elf) + offset, filesz, memsz) != 0 )
return -1;
}
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_load_binary(struct elf_binary *elf)
return 0;
}
-ELF_PTRVAL_VOID elf_get_ptr(struct elf_binary *elf, unsigned long addr)
+elf_ptrval elf_get_ptr(struct elf_binary *elf, unsigned long addr)
{
return ELF_REALPTR2PTRVAL(elf->dest_base) + addr - elf->pstart;
}
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
index 4a83133..e202249 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) elf_shdr_by_name(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *n
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) elf_shdr_by_index(struct elf_binary *elf, unsigned index)
{
uint64_t count = elf_shdr_count(elf);
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID ptr;
+ elf_ptrval ptr;
if ( index >= count )
return ELF_INVALID_HANDLE(elf_shdr);
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) elf_shdr_by_index(struct elf_binary *elf, unsigned ind
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) elf_phdr_by_index(struct elf_binary *elf, unsigned index)
{
uint64_t count = elf_uval(elf, elf->ehdr, e_phnum);
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID ptr;
+ elf_ptrval ptr;
if ( index >= count )
return ELF_INVALID_HANDLE(elf_phdr);
@@ -233,24 +233,24 @@ const char *elf_strfmt(struct elf_binary *elf, elf_ptrval start)
return str;
}
-ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_section_start(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr)
+elf_ptrval elf_section_start(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr)
{
return ELF_IMAGE_BASE(elf) + elf_uval(elf, shdr, sh_offset);
}
-ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_section_end(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr)
+elf_ptrval elf_section_end(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr)
{
return ELF_IMAGE_BASE(elf)
+ elf_uval(elf, shdr, sh_offset) + elf_uval(elf, shdr, sh_size);
}
-ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_segment_start(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr)
+elf_ptrval elf_segment_start(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr)
{
return ELF_IMAGE_BASE(elf)
+ elf_uval(elf, phdr, p_offset);
}
-ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_segment_end(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr)
+elf_ptrval elf_segment_end(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr)
{
return ELF_IMAGE_BASE(elf)
+ elf_uval(elf, phdr, p_offset) + elf_uval(elf, phdr, p_filesz);
@@ -258,8 +258,8 @@ ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_segment_end(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(el
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_sym) elf_sym_by_name(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *symbol)
{
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID ptr = elf_section_start(elf, elf->sym_tab);
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID end = elf_section_end(elf, elf->sym_tab);
+ elf_ptrval ptr = elf_section_start(elf, elf->sym_tab);
+ elf_ptrval end = elf_section_end(elf, elf->sym_tab);
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_sym) sym;
uint64_t info, name;
const char *sym_name;
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_sym) elf_sym_by_name(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *sym
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_sym) elf_sym_by_index(struct elf_binary *elf, unsigned index)
{
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID ptr = elf_section_start(elf, elf->sym_tab);
+ elf_ptrval ptr = elf_section_start(elf, elf->sym_tab);
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_sym) sym;
sym = ELF_MAKE_HANDLE(elf_sym, ptr + index * elf_size(elf, sym));
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ const char *elf_note_name(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note
return elf_strval(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(note) + elf_size(elf, note));
}
-ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_note_desc(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note)
+elf_ptrval elf_note_desc(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note)
{
unsigned namesz = (elf_uval(elf, note, namesz) + 3) & ~3;
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_note_desc(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_
uint64_t elf_note_numeric(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note)
{
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID desc = elf_note_desc(elf, note);
+ elf_ptrval desc = elf_note_desc(elf, note);
unsigned descsz = elf_uval(elf, note, descsz);
switch (descsz)
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ uint64_t elf_note_numeric(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note
uint64_t elf_note_numeric_array(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note,
unsigned int unitsz, unsigned int idx)
{
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID desc = elf_note_desc(elf, note);
+ elf_ptrval desc = elf_note_desc(elf, note);
unsigned descsz = elf_uval(elf, note, descsz);
if ( descsz % unitsz || idx >= descsz / unitsz )
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
index f95fe88..174f8da 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
@@ -61,13 +61,8 @@ typedef void elf_log_callback(struct elf_binary*, void *caller_data,
/*
* We abstract away the pointerness of these pointers, replacing
* various void*, char* and struct* with the following:
- * PTRVAL A pointer to a byte; one can do pointer arithmetic
+ * elf_ptrval A pointer to a byte; one can do pointer arithmetic
* on this.
- * This replaces variables which were char*,void*
- * and their const versions, so we provide four
- * different obsolete declaration macros:
- * ELF_PTRVAL_{,CONST}{VOID,CHAR}
- * New code can simply use the elf_ptrval typedef.
* HANDLE A pointer to a struct. There is one of these types
* for each pointer type - that is, for each "structname".
* In the arguments to the various HANDLE macros, structname
@@ -76,8 +71,6 @@ typedef void elf_log_callback(struct elf_binary*, void *caller_data,
* pointers. In the current code attempts to do so will
* compile, but in the next patch this will become a
* compile error.
- * We also provide a second declaration macro for
- * pointers which were to const; this is obsolete.
*/
typedef uintptr_t elf_ptrval;
@@ -85,15 +78,9 @@ typedef uintptr_t elf_ptrval;
#define ELF_REALPTR2PTRVAL(realpointer) ((elf_ptrval)(realpointer))
/* Converts an actual C pointer into a PTRVAL */
-#define ELF_HANDLE_DECL_NONCONST(structname) structname##_handle /*obsolete*/
#define ELF_HANDLE_DECL(structname) structname##_handle
/* Provides a type declaration for a HANDLE. */
-#define ELF_PTRVAL_VOID elf_ptrval /*obsolete*/
-#define ELF_PTRVAL_CHAR elf_ptrval /*obsolete*/
-#define ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_ptrval /*obsolete*/
-#define ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_CHAR elf_ptrval /*obsolete*/
-
#ifdef __XEN__
# define ELF_PRPTRVAL "lu"
/*
@@ -124,17 +111,6 @@ typedef uintptr_t elf_ptrval;
#define ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(handleval) ((handleval).ptrval)
/* Converts a HANDLE to a PTRVAL. */
-#define ELF_OBSOLETE_VOIDP_CAST /*empty*/
- /*
- * In some places the old code used to need to
- * - cast away const (the existing code uses const a fair
- * bit but actually sometimes wants to write to its input)
- * from a PTRVAL.
- * - convert an integer representing a pointer to a PTRVAL
- * Nowadays all of these re uintptr_ts so there is no const problem
- * and no need for any casting.
- */
-
#define ELF_UNSAFE_PTR(ptrval) ((void*)(elf_ptrval)(ptrval))
/*
* Turns a PTRVAL into an actual C pointer. Before this is done
@@ -212,7 +188,7 @@ struct elf_binary {
char data;
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_ehdr) ehdr;
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_CHAR sec_strtab;
+ elf_ptrval sec_strtab;
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) sym_tab;
uint64_t sym_strtab;
@@ -290,7 +266,7 @@ struct elf_binary {
* str should be a HANDLE.
*/
-uint64_t elf_access_unsigned(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID ptr,
+uint64_t elf_access_unsigned(struct elf_binary *elf, elf_ptrval ptr,
uint64_t offset, size_t size);
/* Reads a field at arbitrary offset and alignemnt */
@@ -342,17 +318,17 @@ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) elf_shdr_by_index(struct elf_binary *elf, unsigned ind
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) elf_phdr_by_index(struct elf_binary *elf, unsigned index);
const char *elf_section_name(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr); /* might return NULL if inputs are invalid */
-ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_section_start(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr);
-ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_section_end(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr);
+elf_ptrval elf_section_start(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr);
+elf_ptrval elf_section_end(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr);
-ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_segment_start(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr);
-ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_segment_end(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr);
+elf_ptrval elf_segment_start(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr);
+elf_ptrval elf_segment_end(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr);
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_sym) elf_sym_by_name(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *symbol);
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_sym) elf_sym_by_index(struct elf_binary *elf, unsigned index);
const char *elf_note_name(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note); /* may return NULL */
-ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_note_desc(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note);
+elf_ptrval elf_note_desc(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note);
uint64_t elf_note_numeric(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note);
uint64_t elf_note_numeric_array(struct elf_binary *, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note),
unsigned int unitsz, unsigned int idx);
@@ -391,7 +367,7 @@ void elf_set_log(struct elf_binary *elf, elf_log_callback*,
void elf_parse_binary(struct elf_binary *elf);
elf_errorstatus elf_load_binary(struct elf_binary *elf);
-ELF_PTRVAL_VOID elf_get_ptr(struct elf_binary *elf, unsigned long addr);
+elf_ptrval elf_get_ptr(struct elf_binary *elf, unsigned long addr);
uint64_t elf_lookup_addr(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *symbol);
void elf_parse_bsdsyms(struct elf_binary *elf, uint64_t pstart); /* private */
@@ -426,9 +402,9 @@ struct xen_elfnote {
struct elf_dom_parms {
/* raw */
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_CHAR guest_info;
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_note_start;
- ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_note_end;
+ elf_ptrval guest_info;
+ elf_ptrval elf_note_start;
+ elf_ptrval elf_note_end;
struct xen_elfnote elf_notes[XEN_ELFNOTE_MAX + 1];
/* parsed */
--
1.7.2.5

450
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-18to19-XSA-55.patch
View file

@ -1,450 +0,0 @@
From b06e277b1fc08c7da3befeb3ac3950e1d941585d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 18/23] libxc: Add range checking to xc_dom_binloader
This is a simple binary image loader with its own metadata format.
However, it is too careless with image-supplied values.
Add the following checks:
* That the image is bigger than the metadata table; otherwise the
pointer arithmetic to calculate the metadata table location may
yield undefined and dangerous values.
* When clamping the end of the region to search, that we do not
calculate pointers beyond the end of the image. The C
specification does not permit this and compilers are becoming ever
more determined to miscompile code when they can "prove" various
falsehoods based on assertions from the C spec.
* That the supplied image is big enough for the text we are allegedly
copying from it. Otherwise we might have a read overrun and copy
the results (perhaps a lot of secret data) into the guest.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
---
tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c
index bde93f7..8596a28 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c
@@ -123,10 +123,13 @@ static struct xen_bin_image_table *find_table(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
uint32_t *probe_ptr;
uint32_t *probe_end;
+ if ( dom->kernel_size < sizeof(*table) )
+ return NULL;
probe_ptr = dom->kernel_blob;
- probe_end = dom->kernel_blob + dom->kernel_size - sizeof(*table);
- if ( (void*)probe_end > (dom->kernel_blob + 8192) )
+ if ( dom->kernel_size > (8192 + sizeof(*table)) )
probe_end = dom->kernel_blob + 8192;
+ else
+ probe_end = dom->kernel_blob + dom->kernel_size - sizeof(*table);
for ( table = NULL; probe_ptr < probe_end; probe_ptr++ )
{
@@ -282,6 +285,14 @@ static int xc_dom_load_bin_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if ( image_size < skip ||
+ image_size - skip < text_size )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: image is too small for declared text size",
+ __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
memcpy(dest, image + skip, text_size);
memset(dest + text_size, 0, bss_size);
--
1.7.2.5
#From 77c0829fa751f052f7b8ec08287aef6e7ba97bc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
#From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
#Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:19 +0100
#Subject: [PATCH 19/23] libxc: check failure of xc_dom_*_to_ptr, xc_map_foreign_range
#
#The return values from xc_dom_*_to_ptr and xc_map_foreign_range are
#sometimes dereferenced, or subjected to pointer arithmetic, without
#checking whether the relevant function failed and returned NULL.
#
#Add an appropriate error check at every call site.
#
#Changes in the 4.2 backport of this series:
#* Fix tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c:setup_pgtables_x86_32.
#* Fix tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c:start_info_ia64.
#* Fix tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_dom_fwloader.c:xc_dom_load_fw_kernel.
#
#This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
#
#Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
#---
# tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_dom_fwloader.c | 2 +
# tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c | 6 +++
# tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c | 6 +++
# tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c | 13 +++++++
# tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c | 6 +++
# tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c | 27 +++++++++++++++
# tools/libxc/xc_offline_page.c | 5 +++
# 8 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
#
diff --git a/tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_dom_fwloader.c b/tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_dom_fwloader.c
index cdf3333..dbd3349 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_dom_fwloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_dom_fwloader.c
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ static int xc_dom_load_fw_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
unsigned long i;
dest = xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom, dom->kernel_seg.vstart);
+ if ( dest == NULL )
+ return -1;
memcpy(dest, dom->kernel_blob, FW_SIZE);
/* Synchronize cache. */
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c
index 8596a28..553b366 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c
@@ -277,6 +277,12 @@ static int xc_dom_load_bin_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
DOMPRINTF(" bss_size: 0x%" PRIx32 "", bss_size);
dest = xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom, dom->kernel_seg.vstart, &dest_size);
+ if ( dest == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom, dom->kernel_seg.vstart)"
+ " => NULL", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
if ( dest_size < text_size ||
dest_size - text_size < bss_size )
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
index 8913e41..a54ddae 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
@@ -868,6 +868,12 @@ int xc_dom_build_image(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
ramdisklen) != 0 )
goto err;
ramdiskmap = xc_dom_seg_to_ptr(dom, &dom->ramdisk_seg);
+ if ( ramdiskmap == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: xc_dom_seg_to_ptr(dom, &dom->ramdisk_seg) => NULL",
+ __FUNCTION__);
+ goto err;
+ }
if ( unziplen )
{
if ( xc_dom_do_gunzip(dom->xch,
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
index 9fc4b94..61b5798 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
@@ -139,6 +139,12 @@ static elf_errorstatus xc_dom_load_elf_symtab(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
return 0;
size = dom->kernel_seg.vend - dom->bsd_symtab_start;
hdr_ptr = xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom, dom->bsd_symtab_start, &allow_size);
+ if ( hdr_ptr == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s/load: xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom,dom->bsd_symtab_start"
+ " => NULL", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -1;
+ }
elf->caller_xdest_base = hdr_ptr;
elf->caller_xdest_size = allow_size;
hdr = ELF_REALPTR2PTRVAL(hdr_ptr);
@@ -384,7 +390,14 @@ static elf_errorstatus xc_dom_load_elf_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
xen_pfn_t pages;
elf->dest_base = xc_dom_seg_to_ptr_pages(dom, &dom->kernel_seg, &pages);
+ if ( elf->dest_base == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom,dom->kernel_seg)"
+ " => NULL", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -1;
+ }
elf->dest_size = pages * XC_DOM_PAGE_SIZE(dom);
+
rc = elf_load_binary(elf);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c
index dcd1523..7c0eff1 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c
@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ int start_info_ia64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
DOMPRINTF_CALLED(dom->xch);
+ if ( start_info == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr failed on start_info", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -1; /* our caller throws away our return value :-/ */
+ }
+
memset(start_info, 0, sizeof(*start_info));
sprintf(start_info->magic, dom->guest_type);
start_info->flags = dom->flags;
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
index 0cf1687..75d6b83 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
@@ -144,6 +144,9 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
xen_vaddr_t addr;
xen_pfn_t pgpfn;
+ if ( l2tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
+
for ( addr = dom->parms.virt_base; addr < dom->virt_pgtab_end;
addr += PAGE_SIZE_X86 )
{
@@ -151,6 +154,8 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
{
/* get L1 tab, make L2 entry */
l1tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l1pfn, 1);
+ if ( l1tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
l2off = l2_table_offset_i386(addr);
l2tab[l2off] =
pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l1pfn)) | L2_PROT;
@@ -169,6 +174,11 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
l1tab = NULL;
}
return 0;
+
+pfn_error:
+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ "%s: xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr failed", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
/*
@@ -219,6 +229,12 @@ static xen_pfn_t move_l3_below_4G(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
goto out;
l3tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l3pfn, 1);
+ if ( l3tab == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l3pfn, 1) => NULL",
+ __FUNCTION__);
+ return l3mfn; /* our one call site will call xc_dom_panic and fail */
+ }
memset(l3tab, 0, XC_DOM_PAGE_SIZE(dom));
DOMPRINTF("%s: successfully relocated L3 below 4G. "
@@ -262,6 +278,8 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32_pae(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
}
l3tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l3pfn, 1);
+ if ( l3tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
for ( addr = dom->parms.virt_base; addr < dom->virt_pgtab_end;
addr += PAGE_SIZE_X86 )
@@ -270,6 +288,8 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32_pae(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
{
/* get L2 tab, make L3 entry */
l2tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l2pfn, 1);
+ if ( l2tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
l3off = l3_table_offset_pae(addr);
l3tab[l3off] =
pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l2pfn)) | L3_PROT;
@@ -280,6 +300,8 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32_pae(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
{
/* get L1 tab, make L2 entry */
l1tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l1pfn, 1);
+ if ( l1tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
l2off = l2_table_offset_pae(addr);
l2tab[l2off] =
pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l1pfn)) | L2_PROT;
@@ -306,6 +328,11 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32_pae(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
l3tab[3] = pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l2pfn)) | L3_PROT;
}
return 0;
+
+pfn_error:
+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ "%s: xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr failed", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
#undef L1_PROT
@@ -344,6 +371,9 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
uint64_t addr;
xen_pfn_t pgpfn;
+ if ( l4tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
+
for ( addr = dom->parms.virt_base; addr < dom->virt_pgtab_end;
addr += PAGE_SIZE_X86 )
{
@@ -351,6 +381,8 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
{
/* get L3 tab, make L4 entry */
l3tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l3pfn, 1);
+ if ( l3tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
l4off = l4_table_offset_x86_64(addr);
l4tab[l4off] =
pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l3pfn)) | L4_PROT;
@@ -361,6 +393,8 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
{
/* get L2 tab, make L3 entry */
l2tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l2pfn, 1);
+ if ( l2tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
l3off = l3_table_offset_x86_64(addr);
l3tab[l3off] =
pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l2pfn)) | L3_PROT;
@@ -373,6 +407,8 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
{
/* get L1 tab, make L2 entry */
l1tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l1pfn, 1);
+ if ( l1tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
l2off = l2_table_offset_x86_64(addr);
l2tab[l2off] =
pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l1pfn)) | L2_PROT;
@@ -393,6 +429,11 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
l1tab = NULL;
}
return 0;
+
+pfn_error:
+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ "%s: xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr failed", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
#undef L1_PROT
@@ -410,6 +451,8 @@ static int alloc_magic_pages(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
if ( xc_dom_alloc_segment(dom, &dom->p2m_seg, "phys2mach", 0, p2m_size) )
return -1;
dom->p2m_guest = xc_dom_seg_to_ptr(dom, &dom->p2m_seg);
+ if ( dom->p2m_guest == NULL )
+ return -1;
/* allocate special pages */
dom->start_info_pfn = xc_dom_alloc_page(dom, "start info");
@@ -434,6 +477,12 @@ static int start_info_x86_32(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
DOMPRINTF_CALLED(dom->xch);
+ if ( start_info == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr failed on start_info", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -1; /* our caller throws away our return value :-/ */
+ }
+
memset(start_info, 0, sizeof(*start_info));
strncpy(start_info->magic, dom->guest_type, sizeof(start_info->magic));
start_info->magic[sizeof(start_info->magic) - 1] = '\0';
@@ -474,6 +523,12 @@ static int start_info_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
DOMPRINTF_CALLED(dom->xch);
+ if ( start_info == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr failed on start_info", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -1; /* our caller throws away our return value :-/ */
+ }
+
memset(start_info, 0, sizeof(*start_info));
strncpy(start_info->magic, dom->guest_type, sizeof(start_info->magic));
start_info->magic[sizeof(start_info->magic) - 1] = '\0';
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c b/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c
index b4c0b10..3994f8f 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c
@@ -1556,6 +1556,12 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom,
mfn = ctx->p2m[pfn];
buf = xc_map_foreign_range(xch, dom, PAGE_SIZE,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, mfn);
+ if ( buf == NULL )
+ {
+ ERROR("xc_map_foreign_range for generation id"
+ " buffer failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
generationid = *(unsigned long long *)(buf + offset);
*(unsigned long long *)(buf + offset) = generationid + 1;
@@ -1713,6 +1719,11 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom,
l3tab = (uint64_t *)
xc_map_foreign_range(xch, dom, PAGE_SIZE,
PROT_READ, ctx->p2m[i]);
+ if ( l3tab == NULL )
+ {
+ PERROR("xc_map_foreign_range failed (for l3tab)");
+ goto out;
+ }
for ( j = 0; j < 4; j++ )
l3ptes[j] = l3tab[j];
@@ -1739,6 +1750,11 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom,
l3tab = (uint64_t *)
xc_map_foreign_range(xch, dom, PAGE_SIZE,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, ctx->p2m[i]);
+ if ( l3tab == NULL )
+ {
+ PERROR("xc_map_foreign_range failed (for l3tab, 2nd)");
+ goto out;
+ }
for ( j = 0; j < 4; j++ )
l3tab[j] = l3ptes[j];
@@ -1909,6 +1925,12 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom,
SET_FIELD(ctxt, user_regs.edx, mfn);
start_info = xc_map_foreign_range(
xch, dom, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, mfn);
+ if ( start_info == NULL )
+ {
+ PERROR("xc_map_foreign_range failed (for start_info)");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
SET_FIELD(start_info, nr_pages, dinfo->p2m_size);
SET_FIELD(start_info, shared_info, shared_info_frame<<PAGE_SHIFT);
SET_FIELD(start_info, flags, 0);
@@ -2056,6 +2078,11 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom,
/* Restore contents of shared-info page. No checking needed. */
new_shared_info = xc_map_foreign_range(
xch, dom, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_WRITE, shared_info_frame);
+ if ( new_shared_info == NULL )
+ {
+ PERROR("xc_map_foreign_range failed (for new_shared_info)");
+ goto out;
+ }
/* restore saved vcpu_info and arch specific info */
MEMCPY_FIELD(new_shared_info, old_shared_info, vcpu_info);
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_offline_page.c b/tools/libxc/xc_offline_page.c
index 089a361..36b9812 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_offline_page.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_offline_page.c
@@ -714,6 +714,11 @@ int xc_exchange_page(xc_interface *xch, int domid, xen_pfn_t mfn)
new_p = xc_map_foreign_range(xch, domid, PAGE_SIZE,
PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, new_mfn);
+ if ( new_p == NULL )
+ {
+ ERROR("failed to map new_p for copy, guest may be broken?");
+ goto failed;
+ }
memcpy(new_p, backup, PAGE_SIZE);
munmap(new_p, PAGE_SIZE);
mops.arg1.mfn = new_mfn;
--
1.7.2.5

56
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-2-XSA-55.patch
View file

@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
From a672da4b2d58ef12be9d7407160e9fb43cac75d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:16 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 02/23] libxc: introduce xc_dom_seg_to_ptr_pages
Provide a version of xc_dom_seg_to_ptr which returns the number of
guest pages it has actually mapped. This is useful for callers who
want to do range checking; we will use this later in this series.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
---
tools/libxc/xc_dom.h | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
1 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h b/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
index 6a72aa9..9af2195 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
@@ -278,14 +278,27 @@ void *xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(struct xc_dom_image *dom, xen_pfn_t first,
void xc_dom_unmap_one(struct xc_dom_image *dom, xen_pfn_t pfn);
void xc_dom_unmap_all(struct xc_dom_image *dom);
-static inline void *xc_dom_seg_to_ptr(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
- struct xc_dom_seg *seg)
+static inline void *xc_dom_seg_to_ptr_pages(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
+ struct xc_dom_seg *seg,
+ xen_pfn_t *pages_out)
{
xen_vaddr_t segsize = seg->vend - seg->vstart;
unsigned int page_size = XC_DOM_PAGE_SIZE(dom);
xen_pfn_t pages = (segsize + page_size - 1) / page_size;
+ void *retval;
+
+ retval = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, seg->pfn, pages);
+
+ *pages_out = retval ? pages : 0;
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static inline void *xc_dom_seg_to_ptr(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
+ struct xc_dom_seg *seg)
+{
+ xen_pfn_t dummy;
- return xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, seg->pfn, pages);
+ return xc_dom_seg_to_ptr_pages(dom, seg, &dummy);
}
static inline void *xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
--
1.7.2.5

381
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-20to23-XSA-55.patch
View file

@ -1,381 +0,0 @@
From 8dc90d163650ce8aa36ae0b46debab83cc61edb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 20/23] libxc: check return values from malloc
A sufficiently malformed input to libxc (such as a malformed input ELF
or other guest-controlled data) might cause one of libxc's malloc() to
fail. In this case we need to make sure we don't dereference or do
pointer arithmetic on the result.
Search for all occurrences of \b(m|c|re)alloc in libxc, and all
functions which call them, and add appropriate error checking where
missing.
This includes the functions xc_dom_malloc*, which now print a message
when they fail so that callers don't have to do so.
The function xc_cpuid_to_str wasn't provided with a sane return value
and has a pretty strange API, which now becomes a little stranger.
There are no in-tree callers.
Changes in the Xen 4.2 version of this series:
* No need to fix code relating to ARM.
* No need to fix code relating to superpage support.
* Additionally fix `dom->p2m_host = xc_dom_malloc...' in xc_dom_ia64.c.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
---
tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c | 13 +++++++++++++
tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c | 2 ++
tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c | 6 ++++++
tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c | 3 +++
tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c | 5 +++++
tools/libxc/xc_linux_osdep.c | 4 ++++
tools/libxc/xc_private.c | 2 ++
tools/libxc/xenctrl.h | 2 +-
9 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c b/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
index 0882ce6..da435ce 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
@@ -589,6 +589,8 @@ static int xc_cpuid_do_domctl(
static char *alloc_str(void)
{
char *s = malloc(33);
+ if ( s == NULL )
+ return s;
memset(s, 0, 33);
return s;
}
@@ -600,6 +602,8 @@ void xc_cpuid_to_str(const unsigned int *regs, char **strs)
for ( i = 0; i < 4; i++ )
{
strs[i] = alloc_str();
+ if ( strs[i] == NULL )
+ continue;
for ( j = 0; j < 32; j++ )
strs[i][j] = !!((regs[i] & (1U << (31 - j)))) ? '1' : '0';
}
@@ -680,7 +684,7 @@ int xc_cpuid_check(
const char **config,
char **config_transformed)
{
- int i, j;
+ int i, j, rc;
unsigned int regs[4];
memset(config_transformed, 0, 4 * sizeof(*config_transformed));
@@ -692,6 +696,11 @@ int xc_cpuid_check(
if ( config[i] == NULL )
continue;
config_transformed[i] = alloc_str();
+ if ( config_transformed[i] == NULL )
+ {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto fail_rc;
+ }
for ( j = 0; j < 32; j++ )
{
unsigned char val = !!((regs[i] & (1U << (31 - j))));
@@ -708,12 +717,14 @@ int xc_cpuid_check(
return 0;
fail:
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ fail_rc:
for ( i = 0; i < 4; i++ )
{
free(config_transformed[i]);
config_transformed[i] = NULL;
}
- return -EPERM;
+ return rc;
}
/*
@@ -758,6 +769,11 @@ int xc_cpuid_set(
}
config_transformed[i] = alloc_str();
+ if ( config_transformed[i] == NULL )
+ {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto fail;
+ }
for ( j = 0; j < 32; j++ )
{
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
index a54ddae..3cbf9f7 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
@@ -120,9 +120,17 @@ void *xc_dom_malloc(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t size)
{
struct xc_dom_mem *block;
+ if ( size > SIZE_MAX - sizeof(*block) )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: unreasonable allocation size", __FUNCTION__);
+ return NULL;
+ }
block = malloc(sizeof(*block) + size);
if ( block == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: allocation failed", __FUNCTION__);
return NULL;
+ }
memset(block, 0, sizeof(*block) + size);
block->next = dom->memblocks;
dom->memblocks = block;
@@ -138,7 +146,10 @@ void *xc_dom_malloc_page_aligned(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t size)
block = malloc(sizeof(*block));
if ( block == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: allocation failed", __FUNCTION__);
return NULL;
+ }
memset(block, 0, sizeof(*block));
block->mmap_len = size;
block->mmap_ptr = mmap(NULL, block->mmap_len,
@@ -146,6 +157,7 @@ void *xc_dom_malloc_page_aligned(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t size)
-1, 0);
if ( block->mmap_ptr == MAP_FAILED )
{
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: mmap failed", __FUNCTION__);
free(block);
return NULL;
}
@@ -202,6 +214,7 @@ void *xc_dom_malloc_filemap(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
close(fd);
if ( block != NULL )
free(block);
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: failed (on file `%s')", __FUNCTION__, filename);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
index 61b5798..be58276 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
@@ -329,6 +329,8 @@ static elf_errorstatus xc_dom_parse_elf_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
return rc;
elf = xc_dom_malloc(dom, sizeof(*elf));
+ if ( elf == NULL )
+ return -1;
dom->private_loader = elf;
rc = elf_init(elf, dom->kernel_blob, dom->kernel_size);
xc_elf_set_logfile(dom->xch, elf, 1);
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c
index 7c0eff1..076821c 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c
@@ -188,6 +188,12 @@ int arch_setup_meminit(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
/* setup initial p2m */
dom->p2m_host = xc_dom_malloc(dom, sizeof(xen_pfn_t) * nbr);
+ if ( dom->p2m_host == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: xc_dom_malloc failed for p2m_host",
+ __FUNCTION__);
+ return -1;
+ }
for ( pfn = 0; pfn < nbr; pfn++ )
dom->p2m_host[pfn] = start + pfn;
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
index 75d6b83..448d9a1 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
@@ -780,6 +780,9 @@ int arch_setup_meminit(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
}
dom->p2m_host = xc_dom_malloc(dom, sizeof(xen_pfn_t) * dom->total_pages);
+ if ( dom->p2m_host == NULL )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if ( dom->superpages )
{
int count = dom->total_pages >> SUPERPAGE_PFN_SHIFT;
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c b/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c
index 3994f8f..f9ed6b2 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c
@@ -1180,6 +1180,11 @@ static int apply_batch(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t dom, struct restore_ctx *ctx,
/* Map relevant mfns */
pfn_err = calloc(j, sizeof(*pfn_err));
+ if ( pfn_err == NULL )
+ {
+ PERROR("allocation for pfn_err failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
region_base = xc_map_foreign_bulk(
xch, dom, PROT_WRITE, region_mfn, pfn_err, j);
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_linux_osdep.c b/tools/libxc/xc_linux_osdep.c
index 787e742..98e041c 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_linux_osdep.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_linux_osdep.c
@@ -378,6 +378,8 @@ static void *linux_privcmd_map_foreign_range(xc_interface *xch, xc_osdep_handle
num = (size + XC_PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> XC_PAGE_SHIFT;
arr = calloc(num, sizeof(xen_pfn_t));
+ if ( arr == NULL )
+ return NULL;
for ( i = 0; i < num; i++ )
arr[i] = mfn + i;
@@ -402,6 +404,8 @@ static void *linux_privcmd_map_foreign_ranges(xc_interface *xch, xc_osdep_handle
num_per_entry = chunksize >> XC_PAGE_SHIFT;
num = num_per_entry * nentries;
arr = calloc(num, sizeof(xen_pfn_t));
+ if ( arr == NULL )
+ return NULL;
for ( i = 0; i < nentries; i++ )
for ( j = 0; j < num_per_entry; j++ )
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_private.c b/tools/libxc/xc_private.c
index 3e03a91..848ceed 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_private.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_private.c
@@ -771,6 +771,8 @@ const char *xc_strerror(xc_interface *xch, int errcode)
errbuf = pthread_getspecific(errbuf_pkey);
if (errbuf == NULL) {
errbuf = malloc(XS_BUFSIZE);
+ if ( errbuf == NULL )
+ return "(failed to allocate errbuf)";
pthread_setspecific(errbuf_pkey, errbuf);
}
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/xenctrl.h
index b7741ca..8952048 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xenctrl.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/xenctrl.h
@@ -1778,7 +1778,7 @@ int xc_cpuid_set(xc_interface *xch,
int xc_cpuid_apply_policy(xc_interface *xch,
domid_t domid);
void xc_cpuid_to_str(const unsigned int *regs,
- char **strs);
+ char **strs); /* some strs[] may be NULL if ENOMEM */
int xc_mca_op(xc_interface *xch, struct xen_mc *mc);
#endif
--
1.7.2.5
#From 052a689aa526ca51fd70528d4b0f83dfb2de99c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
#From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
#Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:19 +0100
#Subject: [PATCH 21/23] libxc: range checks in xc_dom_p2m_host and _guest
#
#These functions take guest pfns and look them up in the p2m. They did
#no range checking.
#
#However, some callers, notably xc_dom_boot.c:setup_hypercall_page want
#to pass untrusted guest-supplied value(s). It is most convenient to
#detect this here and return INVALID_MFN.
#
#This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
#
#Changes from Xen 4.2 version of this patch:
#* 4.2 lacks dom->rambase_pfn, so don't add/subtract/check it.
#
#Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
#---
# tools/libxc/xc_dom.h | 4 ++++
# 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
#
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h b/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
index 0161459..d801f66 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
@@ -331,6 +331,8 @@ static inline xen_pfn_t xc_dom_p2m_host(struct xc_dom_image *dom, xen_pfn_t pfn)
{
if (dom->shadow_enabled)
return pfn;
+ if (pfn >= dom->total_pages)
+ return INVALID_MFN;
return dom->p2m_host[pfn];
}
@@ -339,6 +341,8 @@ static inline xen_pfn_t xc_dom_p2m_guest(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
{
if (xc_dom_feature_translated(dom))
return pfn;
+ if (pfn >= dom->total_pages)
+ return INVALID_MFN;
return dom->p2m_host[pfn];
}
--
1.7.2.5
#From 2a548e22915535ac13694eb38222903bca7245e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
#From: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
#Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:19 +0100
#Subject: [PATCH 22/23] libxc: check blob size before proceeding in xc_dom_check_gzip
#
#This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
#
#Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
#---
# tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c | 5 +++++
# 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
#
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
index 3cbf9f7..f8d1b08 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
@@ -284,6 +284,11 @@ size_t xc_dom_check_gzip(xc_interface *xch, void *blob, size_t ziplen)
unsigned char *gzlen;
size_t unziplen;
+ if ( ziplen < 6 )
+ /* Too small. We need (i.e. the subsequent code relies on)
+ * 2 bytes for the magic number plus 4 bytes length. */
+ return 0;
+
if ( strncmp(blob, "\037\213", 2) )
/* not gzipped */
return 0;
--
1.7.2.5
#From d21d36e84354c04638b60a739a5f7c3d9f8adaf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
#From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
#Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:19 +0100
#Subject: [PATCH 23/23] libxc: Better range check in xc_dom_alloc_segment
#
#If seg->pfn is too large, the arithmetic in the range check might
#overflow, defeating the range check.
#
#This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
#
#Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
#Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
#---
# tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c | 3 ++-
# 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
#
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
index f8d1b08..e79e38d 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
@@ -509,7 +509,8 @@ int xc_dom_alloc_segment(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
seg->vstart = start;
seg->pfn = (seg->vstart - dom->parms.virt_base) / page_size;
- if ( pages > dom->total_pages || /* double test avoids overflow probs */
+ if ( pages > dom->total_pages || /* multiple test avoids overflow probs */
+ seg->pfn > dom->total_pages ||
pages > dom->total_pages - seg->pfn)
{
xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
--
1.7.2.5

156
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-3-XSA-55.patch
View file

@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
From 8c738fa5c1f3cfcd935b6191b3526f7ac8b2a5bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:16 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 03/23] libxc: Fix range checking in xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr etc.
* Ensure that xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr (when called with count==0) does not
return a previously-allocated block which is entirely before the
requested pfn (!)
* Provide a version of xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr, xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr_retcount,
which provides the length of the mapped region via an out parameter.
* Change xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr to always provide the length of the
mapped region and change the call site in xc_dom_binloader.c to
check it. The call site in xc_dom_load_elf_symtab will be corrected
in a forthcoming patch, and for now ignores the returned length.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
---
tools/libxc/xc_dom.h | 16 +++++++++++++---
tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c | 11 ++++++++++-
tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c | 13 +++++++++++++
tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c | 3 ++-
4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h b/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
index 9af2195..9f8037e 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
@@ -275,6 +275,8 @@ int xc_dom_alloc_segment(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
void *xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(struct xc_dom_image *dom, xen_pfn_t first,
xen_pfn_t count);
+void *xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr_retcount(struct xc_dom_image *dom, xen_pfn_t first,
+ xen_pfn_t count, xen_pfn_t *count_out);
void xc_dom_unmap_one(struct xc_dom_image *dom, xen_pfn_t pfn);
void xc_dom_unmap_all(struct xc_dom_image *dom);
@@ -302,13 +304,21 @@ static inline void *xc_dom_seg_to_ptr(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
}
static inline void *xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
- xen_vaddr_t vaddr)
+ xen_vaddr_t vaddr,
+ size_t *safe_region_out)
{
unsigned int page_size = XC_DOM_PAGE_SIZE(dom);
xen_pfn_t page = (vaddr - dom->parms.virt_base) / page_size;
unsigned int offset = (vaddr - dom->parms.virt_base) % page_size;
- void *ptr = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, page, 0);
- return (ptr ? (ptr + offset) : NULL);
+ xen_pfn_t safe_region_count;
+ void *ptr;
+
+ *safe_region_out = 0;
+ ptr = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr_retcount(dom, page, 0, &safe_region_count);
+ if ( ptr == NULL )
+ return ptr;
+ *safe_region_out = (safe_region_count << XC_DOM_PAGE_SHIFT(dom)) - offset;
+ return ptr;
}
static inline int xc_dom_feature_translated(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c
index 769e97d..bde93f7 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c
@@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ static int xc_dom_load_bin_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
char *image = dom->kernel_blob;
char *dest;
size_t image_size = dom->kernel_size;
+ size_t dest_size;
uint32_t start_addr;
uint32_t load_end_addr;
uint32_t bss_end_addr;
@@ -272,7 +273,15 @@ static int xc_dom_load_bin_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
DOMPRINTF(" text_size: 0x%" PRIx32 "", text_size);
DOMPRINTF(" bss_size: 0x%" PRIx32 "", bss_size);
- dest = xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom, dom->kernel_seg.vstart);
+ dest = xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom, dom->kernel_seg.vstart, &dest_size);
+
+ if ( dest_size < text_size ||
+ dest_size - text_size < bss_size )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: mapped region is too small for image", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
memcpy(dest, image + skip, text_size);
memset(dest + text_size, 0, bss_size);
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
index 2a01d7c..8913e41 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
@@ -351,10 +351,19 @@ int xc_dom_try_gunzip(struct xc_dom_image *dom, void **blob, size_t * size)
void *xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(struct xc_dom_image *dom, xen_pfn_t pfn,
xen_pfn_t count)
{
+ xen_pfn_t count_out_dummy;
+ return xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr_retcount(dom, pfn, count, &count_out_dummy);
+}
+
+void *xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr_retcount(struct xc_dom_image *dom, xen_pfn_t pfn,
+ xen_pfn_t count, xen_pfn_t *count_out)
+{
struct xc_dom_phys *phys;
unsigned int page_shift = XC_DOM_PAGE_SHIFT(dom);
char *mode = "unset";
+ *count_out = 0;
+
if ( pfn > dom->total_pages || /* multiple checks to avoid overflows */
count > dom->total_pages ||
pfn > dom->total_pages - count )
@@ -384,6 +393,7 @@ void *xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(struct xc_dom_image *dom, xen_pfn_t pfn,
phys->count);
return NULL;
}
+ *count_out = count;
}
else
{
@@ -391,6 +401,9 @@ void *xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(struct xc_dom_image *dom, xen_pfn_t pfn,
just hand out a pointer to it */
if ( pfn < phys->first )
continue;
+ if ( pfn >= phys->first + phys->count )
+ continue;
+ *count_out = phys->count - (pfn - phys->first);
}
return phys->ptr + ((pfn - phys->first) << page_shift);
}
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
index 2e69559..031b5b6 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
@@ -130,10 +130,11 @@ static int xc_dom_load_elf_symtab(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
if ( load )
{
+ size_t allow_size; /* will be used in a forthcoming XSA-55 patch */
if ( !dom->bsd_symtab_start )
return 0;
size = dom->kernel_seg.vend - dom->bsd_symtab_start;
- hdr = xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom, dom->bsd_symtab_start);
+ hdr = xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom, dom->bsd_symtab_start, &allow_size);
*(int *)hdr = size - sizeof(int);
}
else
--
1.7.2.5

55
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-4-XSA-55.patch
View file

@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
From 035634047d10c678cbb8801c4263747bdaf4e5b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:16 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 04/23] libelf: add `struct elf_binary*' parameter to elf_load_image
The meat of this function is going to need a copy of the elf pointer,
in forthcoming patches.
No functional change in this patch.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
---
xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c | 8 +++++---
1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
index ab58b8b..0559d88 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
@@ -108,7 +108,8 @@ void elf_set_log(struct elf_binary *elf, elf_log_callback *log_callback,
elf->verbose = verbose;
}
-static int elf_load_image(void *dst, const void *src, uint64_t filesz, uint64_t memsz)
+static int elf_load_image(struct elf_binary *elf,
+ void *dst, const void *src, uint64_t filesz, uint64_t memsz)
{
memcpy(dst, src, filesz);
memset(dst + filesz, 0, memsz - filesz);
@@ -122,7 +123,8 @@ void elf_set_verbose(struct elf_binary *elf)
elf->verbose = 1;
}
-static int elf_load_image(void *dst, const void *src, uint64_t filesz, uint64_t memsz)
+static int elf_load_image(struct elf_binary *elf,
+ void *dst, const void *src, uint64_t filesz, uint64_t memsz)
{
int rc;
if ( filesz > ULONG_MAX || memsz > ULONG_MAX )
@@ -279,7 +281,7 @@ int elf_load_binary(struct elf_binary *elf)
dest = elf_get_ptr(elf, paddr);
elf_msg(elf, "%s: phdr %" PRIu64 " at 0x%p -> 0x%p\n",
__func__, i, dest, dest + filesz);
- if ( elf_load_image(dest, elf->image + offset, filesz, memsz) != 0 )
+ if ( elf_load_image(elf, dest, elf->image + offset, filesz, memsz) != 0 )
return -1;
}
--
1.7.2.5

174
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-5to7-XSA-55.patch
View file

@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
From 83ec905922b496e1a5756e3a88405eb6c2c6ba88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:16 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 05/23] libelf: abolish elf_sval and elf_access_signed
These are not used anywhere.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c | 28 ----------------------------
xen/include/xen/libelf.h | 11 -----------
2 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
index cb97908..2f54142 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
@@ -48,34 +48,6 @@ uint64_t elf_access_unsigned(struct elf_binary * elf, const void *ptr,
}
}
-int64_t elf_access_signed(struct elf_binary *elf, const void *ptr,
- uint64_t offset, size_t size)
-{
- int need_swap = elf_swap(elf);
- const int8_t *s8;
- const int16_t *s16;
- const int32_t *s32;
- const int64_t *s64;
-
- switch ( size )
- {
- case 1:
- s8 = ptr + offset;
- return *s8;
- case 2:
- s16 = ptr + offset;
- return need_swap ? bswap_16(*s16) : *s16;
- case 4:
- s32 = ptr + offset;
- return need_swap ? bswap_32(*s32) : *s32;
- case 8:
- s64 = ptr + offset;
- return need_swap ? bswap_64(*s64) : *s64;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
uint64_t elf_round_up(struct elf_binary *elf, uint64_t addr)
{
int elf_round = (elf_64bit(elf) ? 8 : 4) - 1;
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
index e8f6508..38e490c 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
@@ -136,23 +136,12 @@ struct elf_binary {
offsetof(typeof(*(str)),e32.elem), \
sizeof((str)->e32.elem)))
-#define elf_sval(elf, str, elem) \
- ((ELFCLASS64 == (elf)->class) \
- ? elf_access_signed((elf), (str), \
- offsetof(typeof(*(str)),e64.elem), \
- sizeof((str)->e64.elem)) \
- : elf_access_signed((elf), (str), \
- offsetof(typeof(*(str)),e32.elem), \
- sizeof((str)->e32.elem)))
-
#define elf_size(elf, str) \
((ELFCLASS64 == (elf)->class) \
? sizeof((str)->e64) : sizeof((str)->e32))
uint64_t elf_access_unsigned(struct elf_binary *elf, const void *ptr,
uint64_t offset, size_t size);
-int64_t elf_access_signed(struct elf_binary *elf, const void *ptr,
- uint64_t offset, size_t size);
uint64_t elf_round_up(struct elf_binary *elf, uint64_t addr);
--
1.7.2.5
#From 682a04488e7b3bd6c3448ab60599566eb7c6177a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
#From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
#Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:16 +0100
#Subject: [PATCH 06/23] libelf: move include of <asm/guest_access.h> to top of file
#
#libelf-loader.c #includes <asm/guest_access.h>, when being compiled
#for Xen. Currently it does this in the middle of the file.
#
#Move this #include to the top of the file, before libelf-private.h.
#This is necessary because in forthcoming patches we will introduce
#private #defines of memcpy etc. which would interfere with definitions
#in headers #included from guest_access.h.
#
#No semantic or functional change in this patch.
#
#This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
#
#Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
#Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
#Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
#---
# xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c | 5 ++++-
# 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
#
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
index 0559d88..ec0706b 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
*/
+#ifdef __XEN__
+#include <asm/guest_access.h>
+#endif
+
#include "libelf-private.h"
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
@@ -116,7 +120,6 @@ static int elf_load_image(struct elf_binary *elf,
return 0;
}
#else
-#include <asm/guest_access.h>
void elf_set_verbose(struct elf_binary *elf)
{
--
1.7.2.5
#From de9089b449d2508b1ba05590905c7ebaee00c8c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
#From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
#Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:16 +0100
#Subject: [PATCH 07/23] libelf/xc_dom_load_elf_symtab: Do not use "syms" uninitialised
#
#xc_dom_load_elf_symtab (with load==0) calls elf_round_up, but it
#mistakenly used the uninitialised variable "syms" when calculating
#dom->bsd_symtab_start. This should be a reference to "elf".
#
#This change might have the effect of rounding the value differently.
#Previously if the uninitialised value (a single byte on the stack) was
#ELFCLASS64 (ie, 2), the alignment would be to 8 bytes, otherwise to 4.
#
#However, the value is calculated from dom->kernel_seg.vend so this
#could only make a difference if that value wasn't already aligned to 8
#bytes.
#
#This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
#
#Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
#Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
#---
# tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c | 2 +-
# 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
#
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
index 031b5b6..e82f6e9 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static int xc_dom_load_elf_symtab(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
hdr = xc_dom_malloc(dom, size);
if ( hdr == NULL )
return 0;
- dom->bsd_symtab_start = elf_round_up(&syms, dom->kernel_seg.vend);
+ dom->bsd_symtab_start = elf_round_up(elf, dom->kernel_seg.vend);
}
memcpy(hdr + sizeof(int),
--
1.7.2.5

252
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-6-XSA-55.patch
View file

@ -1,252 +0,0 @@
From 3fb6ccf2faccaf5e22e33a3155ccc72d732896d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:18 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 14/23] libelf: use C99 bool for booleans
We want to remove uses of "int" because signed integers have
undesirable undefined behaviours on overflow. Malicious compilers can
turn apparently-correct code into code with security vulnerabilities
etc.
In this patch we change all the booleans in libelf to C99 bool,
from <stdbool.h>.
For the one visible libelf boolean in libxc's public interface we
retain the use of int to avoid changing the ABI; libxc converts it to
a bool for consumption by libelf.
It is OK to change all values only ever used as booleans to _Bool
(bool) because conversion from any scalar type to a _Bool works the
same as the boolean test in if() or ?: and is always defined (C99
6.3.1.2). But we do need to check that all these variables really are
only ever used that way. (It is theoretically possible that the old
code truncated some 64-bit values to 32-bit ints which might become
zero depending on the value, which would mean a behavioural change in
this patch, but it seems implausible that treating 0x????????00000000
as false could have been intended.)
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
---
tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c | 8 ++++----
xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c | 2 +-
xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c | 4 ++--
xen/common/libelf/libelf-private.h | 2 +-
xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c | 10 +++++-----
xen/include/xen/libelf.h | 18 ++++++++++--------
6 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
index 4fb4da2..9ba64ae 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
static void log_callback(struct elf_binary *elf, void *caller_data,
- int iserr, const char *fmt, va_list al) {
+ bool iserr, const char *fmt, va_list al) {
xc_interface *xch = caller_data;
xc_reportv(xch,
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static void log_callback(struct elf_binary *elf, void *caller_data,
void xc_elf_set_logfile(xc_interface *xch, struct elf_binary *elf,
int verbose) {
- elf_set_log(elf, log_callback, xch, verbose);
+ elf_set_log(elf, log_callback, xch, verbose /* convert to bool */);
}
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static char *xc_dom_guest_type(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* parse elf binary */
-static int check_elf_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom, int verbose)
+static int check_elf_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom, bool verbose)
{
if ( dom->kernel_blob == NULL )
{
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static int xc_dom_probe_elf_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
}
static int xc_dom_load_elf_symtab(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
- struct elf_binary *elf, int load)
+ struct elf_binary *elf, bool load)
{
struct elf_binary syms;
ELF_HANDLE_DECL_NONCONST(elf_shdr) shdr; ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr2;
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c
index 98c80dc..12b6c2a 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int elf_xen_parse_note(struct elf_binary *elf,
/* *INDENT-OFF* */
static const struct {
char *name;
- int str;
+ bool str;
} note_desc[] = {
[XEN_ELFNOTE_ENTRY] = { "ENTRY", 0},
[XEN_ELFNOTE_HYPERCALL_PAGE] = { "HYPERCALL_PAGE", 0},
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
index f8be635..0dccd4d 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ int elf_init(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *image_input, size_t size)
}
#ifndef __XEN__
-void elf_call_log_callback(struct elf_binary *elf, int iserr,
+void elf_call_log_callback(struct elf_binary *elf, bool iserr,
const char *fmt,...) {
va_list al;
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ void elf_call_log_callback(struct elf_binary *elf, int iserr,
}
void elf_set_log(struct elf_binary *elf, elf_log_callback *log_callback,
- void *log_caller_data, int verbose)
+ void *log_caller_data, bool verbose)
{
elf->log_callback = log_callback;
elf->log_caller_data = log_caller_data;
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-private.h b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-private.h
index 280dfd1..277be04 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-private.h
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-private.h
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
#define elf_err(elf, fmt, args ... ) \
elf_call_log_callback(elf, 1, fmt , ## args );
-void elf_call_log_callback(struct elf_binary*, int iserr, const char *fmt,...);
+void elf_call_log_callback(struct elf_binary*, bool iserr, const char *fmt,...);
#define safe_strcpy(d,s) \
do { strncpy((d),(s),sizeof((d))-1); \
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
index 744027e..fa58f76 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ const char *elf_check_broken(const struct elf_binary *elf)
return elf->broken;
}
-static int elf_ptrval_in_range(elf_ptrval ptrval, uint64_t size,
+static bool elf_ptrval_in_range(elf_ptrval ptrval, uint64_t size,
const void *region, uint64_t regionsize)
/*
* Returns true if the putative memory area [ptrval,ptrval+size>
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static int elf_ptrval_in_range(elf_ptrval ptrval, uint64_t size,
return 1;
}
-int elf_access_ok(struct elf_binary * elf,
+bool elf_access_ok(struct elf_binary * elf,
uint64_t ptrval, size_t size)
{
if ( elf_ptrval_in_range(ptrval, size, elf->image_base, elf->size) )
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ uint64_t elf_access_unsigned(struct elf_binary * elf, elf_ptrval base,
uint64_t moreoffset, size_t size)
{
elf_ptrval ptrval = base + moreoffset;
- int need_swap = elf_swap(elf);
+ bool need_swap = elf_swap(elf);
const uint8_t *u8;
const uint16_t *u16;
const uint32_t *u32;
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) elf_note_next(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
-int elf_is_elfbinary(const void *image_start, size_t image_size)
+bool elf_is_elfbinary(const void *image_start, size_t image_size)
{
const Elf32_Ehdr *ehdr = image_start;
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ int elf_is_elfbinary(const void *image_start, size_t image_size)
return IS_ELF(*ehdr);
}
-int elf_phdr_is_loadable(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr)
+bool elf_phdr_is_loadable(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr)
{
uint64_t p_type = elf_uval(elf, phdr, p_type);
uint64_t p_flags = elf_uval(elf, phdr, p_flags);
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
index ac93858..951430f 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
#error define architectural endianness
#endif
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
#undef ELFSIZE
#include "elfstructs.h"
#ifdef __XEN__
@@ -42,7 +44,7 @@
struct elf_binary;
typedef void elf_log_callback(struct elf_binary*, void *caller_data,
- int iserr, const char *fmt, va_list al);
+ bool iserr, const char *fmt, va_list al);
#endif
@@ -237,7 +239,7 @@ struct elf_binary {
elf_log_callback *log_callback;
void *log_caller_data;
#endif
- int verbose;
+ bool verbose;
const char *broken;
};
@@ -301,8 +303,8 @@ void elf_memset_safe(struct elf_binary*, elf_ptrval dst, int c, size_t);
* outside permitted areas.
*/
-int elf_access_ok(struct elf_binary * elf,
- uint64_t ptrval, size_t size);
+bool elf_access_ok(struct elf_binary * elf,
+ uint64_t ptrval, size_t size);
#define elf_store_val(elf, type, ptr, val) \
({ \
@@ -351,9 +353,9 @@ uint64_t elf_note_numeric_array(struct elf_binary *, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note),
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) elf_note_next(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note);
/* (Only) checks that the image has the right magic number. */
-int elf_is_elfbinary(const void *image_start, size_t image_size);
+bool elf_is_elfbinary(const void *image_start, size_t image_size);
-int elf_phdr_is_loadable(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr);
+bool elf_phdr_is_loadable(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr);
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* xc_libelf_loader.c */
@@ -367,7 +369,7 @@ int elf_init(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *image, size_t size);
void elf_set_verbose(struct elf_binary *elf);
#else
void elf_set_log(struct elf_binary *elf, elf_log_callback*,
- void *log_caller_pointer, int verbose);
+ void *log_caller_pointer, bool verbose);
#endif
void elf_parse_binary(struct elf_binary *elf);
@@ -419,7 +421,7 @@ struct elf_dom_parms {
char xen_ver[16];
char loader[16];
int pae;
- int bsd_symtab;
+ bool bsd_symtab;
uint64_t virt_base;
uint64_t virt_entry;
uint64_t virt_hypercall;
--
1.7.2.5

382
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-7-XSA-55.patch
View file

@ -1,382 +0,0 @@
From 77c0829fa751f052f7b8ec08287aef6e7ba97bc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 19/23] libxc: check failure of xc_dom_*_to_ptr, xc_map_foreign_range
The return values from xc_dom_*_to_ptr and xc_map_foreign_range are
sometimes dereferenced, or subjected to pointer arithmetic, without
checking whether the relevant function failed and returned NULL.
Add an appropriate error check at every call site.
Changes in the 4.2 backport of this series:
* Fix tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c:setup_pgtables_x86_32.
* Fix tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c:start_info_ia64.
* Fix tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_dom_fwloader.c:xc_dom_load_fw_kernel.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
---
tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_dom_fwloader.c | 2 +
tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c | 6 +++
tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c | 6 +++
tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c | 13 +++++++
tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c | 6 +++
tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c | 27 +++++++++++++++
tools/libxc/xc_offline_page.c | 5 +++
8 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_dom_fwloader.c b/tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_dom_fwloader.c
index cdf3333..dbd3349 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_dom_fwloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_dom_fwloader.c
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ static int xc_dom_load_fw_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
unsigned long i;
dest = xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom, dom->kernel_seg.vstart);
+ if ( dest == NULL )
+ return -1;
memcpy(dest, dom->kernel_blob, FW_SIZE);
/* Synchronize cache. */
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c
index 8596a28..553b366 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_binloader.c
@@ -277,6 +277,12 @@ static int xc_dom_load_bin_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
DOMPRINTF(" bss_size: 0x%" PRIx32 "", bss_size);
dest = xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom, dom->kernel_seg.vstart, &dest_size);
+ if ( dest == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom, dom->kernel_seg.vstart)"
+ " => NULL", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
if ( dest_size < text_size ||
dest_size - text_size < bss_size )
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
index 8913e41..a54ddae 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
@@ -868,6 +868,12 @@ int xc_dom_build_image(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
ramdisklen) != 0 )
goto err;
ramdiskmap = xc_dom_seg_to_ptr(dom, &dom->ramdisk_seg);
+ if ( ramdiskmap == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: xc_dom_seg_to_ptr(dom, &dom->ramdisk_seg) => NULL",
+ __FUNCTION__);
+ goto err;
+ }
if ( unziplen )
{
if ( xc_dom_do_gunzip(dom->xch,
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
index 9fc4b94..61b5798 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
@@ -139,6 +139,12 @@ static elf_errorstatus xc_dom_load_elf_symtab(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
return 0;
size = dom->kernel_seg.vend - dom->bsd_symtab_start;
hdr_ptr = xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom, dom->bsd_symtab_start, &allow_size);
+ if ( hdr_ptr == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s/load: xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom,dom->bsd_symtab_start"
+ " => NULL", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -1;
+ }
elf->caller_xdest_base = hdr_ptr;
elf->caller_xdest_size = allow_size;
hdr = ELF_REALPTR2PTRVAL(hdr_ptr);
@@ -384,7 +390,14 @@ static elf_errorstatus xc_dom_load_elf_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
xen_pfn_t pages;
elf->dest_base = xc_dom_seg_to_ptr_pages(dom, &dom->kernel_seg, &pages);
+ if ( elf->dest_base == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: xc_dom_vaddr_to_ptr(dom,dom->kernel_seg)"
+ " => NULL", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -1;
+ }
elf->dest_size = pages * XC_DOM_PAGE_SIZE(dom);
+
rc = elf_load_binary(elf);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c
index dcd1523..7c0eff1 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_ia64.c
@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ int start_info_ia64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
DOMPRINTF_CALLED(dom->xch);
+ if ( start_info == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr failed on start_info", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -1; /* our caller throws away our return value :-/ */
+ }
+
memset(start_info, 0, sizeof(*start_info));
sprintf(start_info->magic, dom->guest_type);
start_info->flags = dom->flags;
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
index 0cf1687..75d6b83 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
@@ -144,6 +144,9 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
xen_vaddr_t addr;
xen_pfn_t pgpfn;
+ if ( l2tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
+
for ( addr = dom->parms.virt_base; addr < dom->virt_pgtab_end;
addr += PAGE_SIZE_X86 )
{
@@ -151,6 +154,8 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
{
/* get L1 tab, make L2 entry */
l1tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l1pfn, 1);
+ if ( l1tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
l2off = l2_table_offset_i386(addr);
l2tab[l2off] =
pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l1pfn)) | L2_PROT;
@@ -169,6 +174,11 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
l1tab = NULL;
}
return 0;
+
+pfn_error:
+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ "%s: xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr failed", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
/*
@@ -219,6 +229,12 @@ static xen_pfn_t move_l3_below_4G(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
goto out;
l3tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l3pfn, 1);
+ if ( l3tab == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l3pfn, 1) => NULL",
+ __FUNCTION__);
+ return l3mfn; /* our one call site will call xc_dom_panic and fail */
+ }
memset(l3tab, 0, XC_DOM_PAGE_SIZE(dom));
DOMPRINTF("%s: successfully relocated L3 below 4G. "
@@ -262,6 +278,8 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32_pae(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
}
l3tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l3pfn, 1);
+ if ( l3tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
for ( addr = dom->parms.virt_base; addr < dom->virt_pgtab_end;
addr += PAGE_SIZE_X86 )
@@ -270,6 +288,8 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32_pae(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
{
/* get L2 tab, make L3 entry */
l2tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l2pfn, 1);
+ if ( l2tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
l3off = l3_table_offset_pae(addr);
l3tab[l3off] =
pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l2pfn)) | L3_PROT;
@@ -280,6 +300,8 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32_pae(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
{
/* get L1 tab, make L2 entry */
l1tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l1pfn, 1);
+ if ( l1tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
l2off = l2_table_offset_pae(addr);
l2tab[l2off] =
pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l1pfn)) | L2_PROT;
@@ -306,6 +328,11 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32_pae(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
l3tab[3] = pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l2pfn)) | L3_PROT;
}
return 0;
+
+pfn_error:
+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ "%s: xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr failed", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
#undef L1_PROT
@@ -344,6 +371,9 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
uint64_t addr;
xen_pfn_t pgpfn;
+ if ( l4tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
+
for ( addr = dom->parms.virt_base; addr < dom->virt_pgtab_end;
addr += PAGE_SIZE_X86 )
{
@@ -351,6 +381,8 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
{
/* get L3 tab, make L4 entry */
l3tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l3pfn, 1);
+ if ( l3tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
l4off = l4_table_offset_x86_64(addr);
l4tab[l4off] =
pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l3pfn)) | L4_PROT;
@@ -361,6 +393,8 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
{
/* get L2 tab, make L3 entry */
l2tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l2pfn, 1);
+ if ( l2tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
l3off = l3_table_offset_x86_64(addr);
l3tab[l3off] =
pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l2pfn)) | L3_PROT;
@@ -373,6 +407,8 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
{
/* get L1 tab, make L2 entry */
l1tab = xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr(dom, l1pfn, 1);
+ if ( l1tab == NULL )
+ goto pfn_error;
l2off = l2_table_offset_x86_64(addr);
l2tab[l2off] =
pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l1pfn)) | L2_PROT;
@@ -393,6 +429,11 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
l1tab = NULL;
}
return 0;
+
+pfn_error:
+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ "%s: xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr failed", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
#undef L1_PROT
@@ -410,6 +451,8 @@ static int alloc_magic_pages(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
if ( xc_dom_alloc_segment(dom, &dom->p2m_seg, "phys2mach", 0, p2m_size) )
return -1;
dom->p2m_guest = xc_dom_seg_to_ptr(dom, &dom->p2m_seg);
+ if ( dom->p2m_guest == NULL )
+ return -1;
/* allocate special pages */
dom->start_info_pfn = xc_dom_alloc_page(dom, "start info");
@@ -434,6 +477,12 @@ static int start_info_x86_32(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
DOMPRINTF_CALLED(dom->xch);
+ if ( start_info == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr failed on start_info", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -1; /* our caller throws away our return value :-/ */
+ }
+
memset(start_info, 0, sizeof(*start_info));
strncpy(start_info->magic, dom->guest_type, sizeof(start_info->magic));
start_info->magic[sizeof(start_info->magic) - 1] = '\0';
@@ -474,6 +523,12 @@ static int start_info_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
DOMPRINTF_CALLED(dom->xch);
+ if ( start_info == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr failed on start_info", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -1; /* our caller throws away our return value :-/ */
+ }
+
memset(start_info, 0, sizeof(*start_info));
strncpy(start_info->magic, dom->guest_type, sizeof(start_info->magic));
start_info->magic[sizeof(start_info->magic) - 1] = '\0';
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c b/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c
index b4c0b10..3994f8f 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c
@@ -1556,6 +1556,12 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom,
mfn = ctx->p2m[pfn];
buf = xc_map_foreign_range(xch, dom, PAGE_SIZE,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, mfn);
+ if ( buf == NULL )
+ {
+ ERROR("xc_map_foreign_range for generation id"
+ " buffer failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
generationid = *(unsigned long long *)(buf + offset);
*(unsigned long long *)(buf + offset) = generationid + 1;
@@ -1713,6 +1719,11 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom,
l3tab = (uint64_t *)
xc_map_foreign_range(xch, dom, PAGE_SIZE,
PROT_READ, ctx->p2m[i]);
+ if ( l3tab == NULL )
+ {
+ PERROR("xc_map_foreign_range failed (for l3tab)");
+ goto out;
+ }
for ( j = 0; j < 4; j++ )
l3ptes[j] = l3tab[j];
@@ -1739,6 +1750,11 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom,
l3tab = (uint64_t *)
xc_map_foreign_range(xch, dom, PAGE_SIZE,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, ctx->p2m[i]);
+ if ( l3tab == NULL )
+ {
+ PERROR("xc_map_foreign_range failed (for l3tab, 2nd)");
+ goto out;
+ }
for ( j = 0; j < 4; j++ )
l3tab[j] = l3ptes[j];
@@ -1909,6 +1925,12 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom,
SET_FIELD(ctxt, user_regs.edx, mfn);
start_info = xc_map_foreign_range(
xch, dom, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, mfn);
+ if ( start_info == NULL )
+ {
+ PERROR("xc_map_foreign_range failed (for start_info)");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
SET_FIELD(start_info, nr_pages, dinfo->p2m_size);
SET_FIELD(start_info, shared_info, shared_info_frame<<PAGE_SHIFT);
SET_FIELD(start_info, flags, 0);
@@ -2056,6 +2078,11 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom,
/* Restore contents of shared-info page. No checking needed. */
new_shared_info = xc_map_foreign_range(
xch, dom, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_WRITE, shared_info_frame);
+ if ( new_shared_info == NULL )
+ {
+ PERROR("xc_map_foreign_range failed (for new_shared_info)");
+ goto out;
+ }
/* restore saved vcpu_info and arch specific info */
MEMCPY_FIELD(new_shared_info, old_shared_info, vcpu_info);
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_offline_page.c b/tools/libxc/xc_offline_page.c
index 089a361..36b9812 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_offline_page.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_offline_page.c
@@ -714,6 +714,11 @@ int xc_exchange_page(xc_interface *xch, int domid, xen_pfn_t mfn)
new_p = xc_map_foreign_range(xch, domid, PAGE_SIZE,
PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, new_mfn);
+ if ( new_p == NULL )
+ {
+ ERROR("failed to map new_p for copy, guest may be broken?");
+ goto failed;
+ }
memcpy(new_p, backup, PAGE_SIZE);
munmap(new_p, PAGE_SIZE);
mops.arg1.mfn = new_mfn;
--
1.7.2.5

261
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-9to10-XSA-55.patch
View file

@ -1,261 +0,0 @@
From 59f66d58180832af6b99a9e4489031b5c2f627ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:17 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 09/23] tools/xcutils/readnotes: adjust print_l1_mfn_valid_note
Use the new PTRVAL macros and elf_access_unsigned in
print_l1_mfn_valid_note.
No functional change unless the input is wrong, or we are reading a
file for a different endianness.
Separated out from the previous patch because this change does produce
a difference in the generated code.
This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
tools/xcutils/readnotes.c | 11 ++++++-----
1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c b/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c
index 2af047d..7ff2530 100644
--- a/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c
+++ b/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c
@@ -77,22 +77,23 @@ static void print_numeric_note(const char *prefix, struct elf_binary *elf,
}
static void print_l1_mfn_valid_note(const char *prefix, struct elf_binary *elf,
- const elf_note *note)
+ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note)
{
int descsz = elf_uval(elf, note, descsz);
- const uint32_t *desc32 = elf_note_desc(elf, note);
- const uint64_t *desc64 = elf_note_desc(elf, note);
+ ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID desc = elf_note_desc(elf, note);
/* XXX should be able to cope with a list of values. */
switch ( descsz / 2 )
{
case 8:
printf("%s: mask=%#"PRIx64" value=%#"PRIx64"\n", prefix,
- desc64[0], desc64[1]);
+ elf_access_unsigned(elf, desc, 0, 8),
+ elf_access_unsigned(elf, desc, 8, 8));
break;
case 4:
printf("%s: mask=%#"PRIx32" value=%#"PRIx32"\n", prefix,
- desc32[0],desc32[1]);
+ (uint32_t)elf_access_unsigned(elf, desc, 0, 4),
+ (uint32_t)elf_access_unsigned(elf, desc, 4, 4));
break;
}
--
1.7.2.5
#From db14d5bd9b6508adfcd2b910f454fae12fa4ba00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
#From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
#Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:17 +0100
#Subject: [PATCH 10/23] libelf: check nul-terminated strings properly
#
#It is not safe to simply take pointers into the ELF and use them as C
#pointers. They might not be properly nul-terminated (and the pointers
#might be wild).
#
#So we are going to introduce a new function elf_strval for safely
#getting strings. This will check that the addresses are in range and
#that there is a proper nul-terminated string. Of course it might
#discover that there isn't. In that case, it will be made to fail.
#This means that elf_note_name might fail, too.
#
#For the benefit of call sites which are just going to pass the value
#to a printf-like function, we provide elf_strfmt which returns
#"(invalid)" on failure rather than NULL.
#
#In this patch we introduce dummy definitions of these functions. We
#introduce calls to elf_strval and elf_strfmt everywhere, and update
#all the call sites with appropriate error checking.
#
#There is not yet any semantic change, since before this patch all the
#places where we introduce elf_strval dereferenced the value anyway, so
#it mustn't have been NULL.
#
#In future patches, when elf_strval is made able return NULL, when it
#does so it will mark the elf "broken" so that an appropriate
#diagnostic can be printed.
#
#This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
#
#Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
#Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
#Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
#---
# tools/xcutils/readnotes.c | 11 ++++++++---
# xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c | 13 ++++++++++---
# xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c | 10 +++++++---
# xen/include/xen/libelf.h | 7 +++++--
# 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
#
diff --git a/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c b/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c
index 7ff2530..cfae994 100644
--- a/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c
+++ b/tools/xcutils/readnotes.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ struct setup_header {
static void print_string_note(const char *prefix, struct elf_binary *elf,
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note)
{
- printf("%s: %s\n", prefix, (char*)elf_note_desc(elf, note));
+ printf("%s: %s\n", prefix, elf_strfmt(elf, elf_note_desc(elf, note)));
}
static void print_numeric_note(const char *prefix, struct elf_binary *elf,
@@ -103,10 +103,14 @@ static int print_notes(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) start,
{
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note;
int notes_found = 0;
+ const char *this_note_name;
for ( note = start; ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(note) < ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(end); note = elf_note_next(elf, note) )
{
- if (0 != strcmp(elf_note_name(elf, note), "Xen"))
+ this_note_name = elf_note_name(elf, note);
+ if (NULL == this_note_name)
+ continue;
+ if (0 != strcmp(this_note_name, "Xen"))
continue;
notes_found++;
@@ -294,7 +298,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
shdr = elf_shdr_by_name(&elf, "__xen_guest");
if (ELF_HANDLE_VALID(shdr))
- printf("__xen_guest: %s\n", (char*)elf_section_start(&elf, shdr));
+ printf("__xen_guest: %s\n",
+ elf_strfmt(&elf, elf_section_start(&elf, shdr)));
return 0;
}
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c
index 7140d59..b217f8f 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-dominfo.c
@@ -137,7 +137,10 @@ int elf_xen_parse_note(struct elf_binary *elf,
if ( note_desc[type].str )
{
- str = elf_note_desc(elf, note);
+ str = elf_strval(elf, elf_note_desc(elf, note));
+ if (str == NULL)
+ /* elf_strval will mark elf broken if it fails so no need to log */
+ return 0;
elf_msg(elf, "%s: %s = \"%s\"\n", __FUNCTION__,
note_desc[type].name, str);
parms->elf_notes[type].type = XEN_ENT_STR;
@@ -220,6 +223,7 @@ static int elf_xen_parse_notes(struct elf_binary *elf,
{
int xen_elfnotes = 0;
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note;
+ const char *note_name;
parms->elf_note_start = start;
parms->elf_note_end = end;
@@ -227,7 +231,10 @@ static int elf_xen_parse_notes(struct elf_binary *elf,
ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(note) < parms->elf_note_end;
note = elf_note_next(elf, note) )
{
- if ( strcmp(elf_note_name(elf, note), "Xen") )
+ note_name = elf_note_name(elf, note);
+ if ( note_name == NULL )
+ continue;
+ if ( strcmp(note_name, "Xen") )
continue;
if ( elf_xen_parse_note(elf, parms, note) )
return -1;
@@ -541,7 +548,7 @@ int elf_xen_parse(struct elf_binary *elf,
parms->elf_note_start = ELF_INVALID_PTRVAL;
parms->elf_note_end = ELF_INVALID_PTRVAL;
elf_msg(elf, "%s: __xen_guest: \"%s\"\n", __FUNCTION__,
- parms->guest_info);
+ elf_strfmt(elf, parms->guest_info));
elf_xen_parse_guest_info(elf, parms);
break;
}
diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
index f1fd886..3a0cde1 100644
--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
+++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ const char *elf_section_name(struct elf_binary *elf,
if ( ELF_PTRVAL_INVALID(elf->sec_strtab) )
return "unknown";
- return elf->sec_strtab + elf_uval(elf, shdr, sh_name);
+ return elf_strval(elf, elf->sec_strtab + elf_uval(elf, shdr, sh_name));
}
ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_section_start(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr)
@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_sym) elf_sym_by_name(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *sym
ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID end = elf_section_end(elf, elf->sym_tab);
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_sym) sym;
uint64_t info, name;
+ const char *sym_name;
for ( ; ptr < end; ptr += elf_size(elf, sym) )
{
@@ -159,7 +160,10 @@ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_sym) elf_sym_by_name(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *sym
name = elf_uval(elf, sym, st_name);
if ( ELF32_ST_BIND(info) != STB_GLOBAL )
continue;
- if ( strcmp(elf->sym_strtab + name, symbol) )
+ sym_name = elf_strval(elf, elf->sym_strtab + name);
+ if ( sym_name == NULL ) /* out of range, oops */
+ return ELF_INVALID_HANDLE(elf_sym);
+ if ( strcmp(sym_name, symbol) )
continue;
return sym;
}
@@ -177,7 +181,7 @@ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_sym) elf_sym_by_index(struct elf_binary *elf, int index)
const char *elf_note_name(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note)
{
- return ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(note) + elf_size(elf, note);
+ return elf_strval(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(note) + elf_size(elf, note));
}
ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_note_desc(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note)
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
index cefd3d3..af5b5c5 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
@@ -252,6 +252,9 @@ uint64_t elf_access_unsigned(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID ptr,
uint64_t elf_round_up(struct elf_binary *elf, uint64_t addr);
+#define elf_strval(elf,x) ((const char*)(x)) /* may return NULL in the future */
+#define elf_strfmt(elf,x) ((const char*)(x)) /* will return (invalid) instead */
+
#define elf_memcpy_safe(elf, dst, src, sz) memcpy((dst),(src),(sz))
#define elf_memset_safe(elf, dst, c, sz) memset((dst),(c),(sz))
/*
@@ -279,7 +282,7 @@ ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) elf_shdr_by_name(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *n
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) elf_shdr_by_index(struct elf_binary *elf, int index);
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) elf_phdr_by_index(struct elf_binary *elf, int index);
-const char *elf_section_name(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr);
+const char *elf_section_name(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr); /* might return NULL if inputs are invalid */
ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_section_start(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr);
ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_section_end(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_shdr) shdr);
@@ -289,7 +292,7 @@ ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_segment_end(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(el
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_sym) elf_sym_by_name(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *symbol);
ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_sym) elf_sym_by_index(struct elf_binary *elf, int index);
-const char *elf_note_name(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note);
+const char *elf_note_name(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note); /* may return NULL */
ELF_PTRVAL_CONST_VOID elf_note_desc(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note);
uint64_t elf_note_numeric(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note) note);
uint64_t elf_note_numeric_array(struct elf_binary *, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_note),
--
1.7.2.5

334
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-4.2-CVE-XSA-57.patch
View file

@ -1,334 +0,0 @@
libxl: Restrict permissions on PV console device xenstore nodes
Matthew Daley has observed that the PV console protocol places sensitive host
state into a guest writeable xenstore locations, this includes:
- The pty used to communicate between the console backend daemon and its
client, allowing the guest administrator to read and write arbitrary host
files.
- The output file, allowing the guest administrator to write arbitrary host
files or to target arbitrary qemu chardevs which include sockets, udp, ptr,
pipes etc (see -chardev in qemu(1) for a more complete list).
- The maximum buffer size, allowing the guest administrator to consume more
resources than the host administrator has configured.
- The backend to use (qemu vs xenconsoled), potentially allowing the guest
administrator to confuse host software.
So we arrange to make the sensitive keys in the xenstore frontend directory
read only for the guest. This is safe since the xenstore permissions model,
unlike POSIX directory permissions, does not allow the guest to remove and
recreate a node if it has write access to the containing directory.
There are a few associated wrinkles:
- The primary PV console is "special". It's xenstore node is not under the
usual /devices/ subtree and it does not use the customary xenstore state
machine protocol. Unfortunately its directory is used for other things,
including the vnc-port node, which we do not want the guest to be able to
write to. Rather than trying to track down all the possible secondary uses
of this directory just make it r/o to the guest. All newly created
subdirectories inherit these permissions and so are now safe by default.
- The other serial consoles do use the customary xenstore state machine and
therefore need write access to at least the "protocol" and "state" nodes,
however they may also want to use arbitrary "feature-foo" nodes (although
I'm not aware of any) and therefore we cannot simply lock down the entire
frontend directory. Instead we add support to libxl__device_generic_add for
frontend keys which are explicitly read only and use that to lock down the
sensitive keys.
- Minios' console frontend wants to write the "type" node, which it has no
business doing since this is a host/toolstack level decision. This fails
now that the node has become read only to the PV guest. Since the toolstack
already writes this node just remove the attempt to set it.
This is CVE-XXXX-XXX / XSA-57
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Conflicts:
tools/libxl/libxl.c (no vtpm, free front_ro on error in
libxl__device_console_add)
diff --git a/extras/mini-os/console/xenbus.c b/extras/mini-os/console/xenbus.c
index 77de82a..e65baf7 100644
--- a/extras/mini-os/console/xenbus.c
+++ b/extras/mini-os/console/xenbus.c
@@ -122,12 +122,6 @@ again:
goto abort_transaction;
}
- err = xenbus_printf(xbt, nodename, "type", "%s", "ioemu");
- if (err) {
- message = "writing type";
- goto abort_transaction;
- }
-
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/state", nodename);
err = xenbus_switch_state(xbt, path, XenbusStateConnected);
if (err) {
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl.c b/tools/libxl/libxl.c
index a6e9601..32d788a 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl.c
@@ -1920,8 +1920,9 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc *egc, uint32_t domid,
flexarray_append(front, disk->is_cdrom ? "cdrom" : "disk");
libxl__device_generic_add(gc, t, device,
- libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, back, back->count),
- libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, front, front->count));
+ libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, back, back->count),
+ libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, front, front->count),
+ NULL);
rc = libxl__xs_transaction_commit(gc, &t);
if (!rc) break;
@@ -2633,8 +2634,9 @@ void libxl__device_nic_add(libxl__egc *egc, uint32_t domid,
flexarray_append(front, libxl__sprintf(gc,
LIBXL_MAC_FMT, LIBXL_MAC_BYTES(nic->mac)));
libxl__device_generic_add(gc, XBT_NULL, device,
- libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, back, back->count),
- libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, front, front->count));
+ libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, back, back->count),
+ libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, front, front->count),
+ NULL);
aodev->dev = device;
aodev->action = DEVICE_CONNECT;
@@ -2830,7 +2832,7 @@ int libxl__device_console_add(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
libxl__device_console *console,
libxl__domain_build_state *state)
{
- flexarray_t *front;
+ flexarray_t *front, *ro_front;
flexarray_t *back;
libxl__device device;
int rc;
@@ -2845,6 +2847,11 @@ int libxl__device_console_add(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
rc = ERROR_NOMEM;
goto out;
}
+ ro_front = flexarray_make(16, 1);
+ if (!ro_front) {
+ rc = ERROR_NOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
back = flexarray_make(16, 1);
if (!back) {
rc = ERROR_NOMEM;
@@ -2871,21 +2878,24 @@ int libxl__device_console_add(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
flexarray_append(front, "backend-id");
flexarray_append(front, libxl__sprintf(gc, "%d", console->backend_domid));
- flexarray_append(front, "limit");
- flexarray_append(front, libxl__sprintf(gc, "%d", LIBXL_XENCONSOLE_LIMIT));
- flexarray_append(front, "type");
+
+ flexarray_append(ro_front, "limit");
+ flexarray_append(ro_front, libxl__sprintf(gc, "%d", LIBXL_XENCONSOLE_LIMIT));
+ flexarray_append(ro_front, "type");
if (console->consback == LIBXL__CONSOLE_BACKEND_XENCONSOLED)
- flexarray_append(front, "xenconsoled");
+ flexarray_append(ro_front, "xenconsoled");
else
- flexarray_append(front, "ioemu");
- flexarray_append(front, "output");
- flexarray_append(front, console->output);
+ flexarray_append(ro_front, "ioemu");
+ flexarray_append(ro_front, "output");
+ flexarray_append(ro_front, console->output);
+ flexarray_append(ro_front, "tty");
+ flexarray_append(ro_front, "");
if (state) {
- flexarray_append(front, "port");
- flexarray_append(front, libxl__sprintf(gc, "%"PRIu32, state->console_port));
- flexarray_append(front, "ring-ref");
- flexarray_append(front, libxl__sprintf(gc, "%lu", state->console_mfn));
+ flexarray_append(ro_front, "port");
+ flexarray_append(ro_front, libxl__sprintf(gc, "%"PRIu32, state->console_port));
+ flexarray_append(ro_front, "ring-ref");
+ flexarray_append(ro_front, libxl__sprintf(gc, "%lu", state->console_mfn));
} else {
flexarray_append(front, "state");
flexarray_append(front, libxl__sprintf(gc, "%d", 1));
@@ -2894,11 +2904,13 @@ int libxl__device_console_add(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
}
libxl__device_generic_add(gc, XBT_NULL, &device,
- libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, back, back->count),
- libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, front, front->count));
+ libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, back, back->count),
+ libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, front, front->count),
+ libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, ro_front, ro_front->count));
rc = 0;
out_free:
flexarray_free(back);
+ flexarray_free(ro_front);
flexarray_free(front);
out:
return rc;
@@ -2982,8 +2994,9 @@ int libxl__device_vkb_add(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
flexarray_append(front, libxl__sprintf(gc, "%d", 1));
libxl__device_generic_add(gc, XBT_NULL, &device,
- libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, back, back->count),
- libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, front, front->count));
+ libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, back, back->count),
+ libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, front, front->count),
+ NULL);
rc = 0;
out_free:
flexarray_free(back);
@@ -3096,8 +3109,9 @@ int libxl__device_vfb_add(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, libxl_device_vfb *vfb)
flexarray_append_pair(front, "state", libxl__sprintf(gc, "%d", 1));
libxl__device_generic_add(gc, XBT_NULL, &device,
- libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, back, back->count),
- libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, front, front->count));
+ libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, back, back->count),
+ libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, front, front->count),
+ NULL);
rc = 0;
out_free:
flexarray_free(front);
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_device.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_device.c
index c3283f1..1c04a21 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_device.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_device.c
@@ -84,11 +84,12 @@ out:
}
int libxl__device_generic_add(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t t,
- libxl__device *device, char **bents, char **fents)
+ libxl__device *device, char **bents, char **fents, char **ro_fents)
{
libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
char *frontend_path, *backend_path;
struct xs_permissions frontend_perms[2];
+ struct xs_permissions ro_frontend_perms[2];
struct xs_permissions backend_perms[2];
int create_transaction = t == XBT_NULL;
@@ -100,22 +101,37 @@ int libxl__device_generic_add(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t t,
frontend_perms[1].id = device->backend_domid;
frontend_perms[1].perms = XS_PERM_READ;
- backend_perms[0].id = device->backend_domid;
- backend_perms[0].perms = XS_PERM_NONE;
- backend_perms[1].id = device->domid;
- backend_perms[1].perms = XS_PERM_READ;
+ ro_frontend_perms[0].id = backend_perms[0].id = device->backend_domid;
+ ro_frontend_perms[0].perms = backend_perms[0].perms = XS_PERM_NONE;
+ ro_frontend_perms[1].id = backend_perms[1].id = device->domid;
+ ro_frontend_perms[1].perms = backend_perms[1].perms = XS_PERM_READ;
retry_transaction:
if (create_transaction)
t = xs_transaction_start(ctx->xsh);
/* FIXME: read frontend_path and check state before removing stuff */
- if (fents) {
+ if (fents || ro_fents) {
xs_rm(ctx->xsh, t, frontend_path);
xs_mkdir(ctx->xsh, t, frontend_path);
- xs_set_permissions(ctx->xsh, t, frontend_path, frontend_perms, ARRAY_SIZE(frontend_perms));
+ /* Console 0 is a special case. It doesn't use the regular PV
+ * state machine but also the frontend directory has
+ * historically contained other information, such as the
+ * vnc-port, which we don't want the guest fiddling with.
+ */
+ if (device->kind == LIBXL__DEVICE_KIND_CONSOLE && device->devid == 0)
+ xs_set_permissions(ctx->xsh, t, frontend_path,
+ ro_frontend_perms, ARRAY_SIZE(ro_frontend_perms));
+ else
+ xs_set_permissions(ctx->xsh, t, frontend_path,
+ frontend_perms, ARRAY_SIZE(frontend_perms));
xs_write(ctx->xsh, t, libxl__sprintf(gc, "%s/backend", frontend_path), backend_path, strlen(backend_path));
- libxl__xs_writev(gc, t, frontend_path, fents);
+ if (fents)
+ libxl__xs_writev_perms(gc, t, frontend_path, fents,
+ frontend_perms, ARRAY_SIZE(frontend_perms));
+ if (ro_fents)
+ libxl__xs_writev_perms(gc, t, frontend_path, ro_fents,
+ ro_frontend_perms, ARRAY_SIZE(ro_frontend_perms));
}
if (bents) {
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h b/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
index 13fa509..ae96a74 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
@@ -516,6 +516,11 @@ _hidden char **libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(libxl__gc *gc, flexarray_t *array, int
/* treats kvs as pairs of keys and values and writes each to dir. */
_hidden int libxl__xs_writev(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t t,
const char *dir, char **kvs);
+/* as writev but also sets the permissions on each path */
+_hidden int libxl__xs_writev_perms(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t t,
+ const char *dir, char *kvs[],
+ struct xs_permissions *perms,
+ unsigned int num_perms);
/* _atonce creates a transaction and writes all keys at once */
_hidden int libxl__xs_writev_atonce(libxl__gc *gc,
const char *dir, char **kvs);
@@ -930,7 +935,7 @@ _hidden int libxl__device_console_add(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
libxl__domain_build_state *state);
_hidden int libxl__device_generic_add(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t t,
- libxl__device *device, char **bents, char **fents);
+ libxl__device *device, char **bents, char **fents, char **ro_fents);
_hidden char *libxl__device_backend_path(libxl__gc *gc, libxl__device *device);
_hidden char *libxl__device_frontend_path(libxl__gc *gc, libxl__device *device);
_hidden int libxl__parse_backend_path(libxl__gc *gc, const char *path,
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
index 48986f3..d373b4d 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
@@ -106,7 +106,8 @@ int libxl__create_pci_backend(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
libxl__device_generic_add(gc, XBT_NULL, &device,
libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, back, back->count),
- libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, front, front->count));
+ libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(gc, front, front->count),
+ NULL);
out:
if (back)
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c
index 52af484..d7eaa66 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c
@@ -41,8 +41,10 @@ char **libxl__xs_kvs_of_flexarray(libxl__gc *gc, flexarray_t *array, int length)
return kvs;
}
-int libxl__xs_writev(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t t,
- const char *dir, char *kvs[])
+int libxl__xs_writev_perms(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t t,
+ const char *dir, char *kvs[],
+ struct xs_permissions *perms,
+ unsigned int num_perms)
{
libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
char *path;
@@ -56,11 +58,19 @@ int libxl__xs_writev(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t t,
if (path && kvs[i + 1]) {
int length = strlen(kvs[i + 1]);
xs_write(ctx->xsh, t, path, kvs[i + 1], length);
+ if (perms)
+ xs_set_permissions(ctx->xsh, t, path, perms, num_perms);
}
}
return 0;
}
+int libxl__xs_writev(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t t,
+ const char *dir, char *kvs[])
+{
+ return libxl__xs_writev_perms(gc, t, dir, kvs, NULL, 0);
+}
+
int libxl__xs_writev_atonce(libxl__gc *gc,
const char *dir, char *kvs[])
{

69
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-tools-4-CVE-2013-4369-XSA-68.patch
View file

@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
libxl: fix vif rate parsing
strtok can return NULL here. We don't need to use strtok anyway, so just
use a simple strchr method.
Coverity-ID: 1055642
This is CVE-2013-4369 / XSA-68
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Fix type. Add test case
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff --git a/tools/libxl/check-xl-vif-parse b/tools/libxl/check-xl-vif-parse
index 0473182..02c6dba 100755
--- a/tools/libxl/check-xl-vif-parse
+++ b/tools/libxl/check-xl-vif-parse
@@ -206,4 +206,8 @@ expected </dev/null
one $e rate=4294967295GB/s@5us
one $e rate=4296MB/s@4294s
+# test include of single '@'
+expected </dev/null
+one $e rate=@
+
complete
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxlu_vif.c b/tools/libxl/libxlu_vif.c
index 3b3de0f..0665e62 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxlu_vif.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxlu_vif.c
@@ -95,23 +95,30 @@ int xlu_vif_parse_rate(XLU_Config *cfg, const char *rate, libxl_device_nic *nic)
uint64_t bytes_per_sec = 0;
uint64_t bytes_per_interval = 0;
uint32_t interval_usecs = 50000UL; /* Default to 50ms */
- char *ratetok, *tmprate;
+ char *p, *tmprate;
int rc = 0;
tmprate = strdup(rate);
+ if (tmprate == NULL) {
+ rc = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ p = strchr(tmprate, '@');
+ if (p != NULL)
+ *p++ = 0;
+
if (!strcmp(tmprate,"")) {
xlu__vif_err(cfg, "no rate specified", rate);
rc = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- ratetok = strtok(tmprate, "@");
- rc = vif_parse_rate_bytes_per_sec(cfg, ratetok, &bytes_per_sec);
+ rc = vif_parse_rate_bytes_per_sec(cfg, tmprate, &bytes_per_sec);
if (rc) goto out;
- ratetok = strtok(NULL, "@");
- if (ratetok != NULL) {
- rc = vif_parse_rate_interval_usecs(cfg, ratetok, &interval_usecs);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ rc = vif_parse_rate_interval_usecs(cfg, p, &interval_usecs);
if (rc) goto out;
}

34
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-tools-4-CVE-2013-4370-XSA-69.patch
View file

@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
From 067c122873c67bd1d9620f8340f9c9c209135388 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 23:12:45 +1200
Subject: [PATCH] tools/ocaml: fix erroneous free of cpumap in
stub_xc_vcpu_getaffinity
Not sure how it got there...
Coverity-ID: 1056196
This is CVE-2013-4370 / XSA-69
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c b/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c
index df756ad..f5cf0ed 100644
--- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c
+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl_stubs.c
@@ -461,8 +461,6 @@ CAMLprim value stub_xc_vcpu_getaffinity(value xch, value domid,
retval = xc_vcpu_getaffinity(_H(xch), _D(domid),
Int_val(vcpu), c_cpumap);
- free(c_cpumap);
-
if (retval < 0) {
free(c_cpumap);
failwith_xc(_H(xch));
--
1.7.10.4

34
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-tools-4-CVE-2013-4371-XSA-70.patch
View file

@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
From 94db3e1cb356a0d2de1753888ceb0eb767404ec4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 22:18:46 +1200
Subject: [PATCH] libxl: fix out-of-memory error handling in
libxl_list_cpupool
...otherwise it will return freed memory. All the current users of this
function check already for a NULL return, so use that.
Coverity-ID: 1056194
This is CVE-2013-4371 / XSA-70
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
tools/libxl/libxl.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl.c b/tools/libxl/libxl.c
index 0879f23..17653ef 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl.c
@@ -651,6 +651,7 @@ libxl_cpupoolinfo * libxl_list_cpupool(libxl_ctx *ctx, int *nb_pool_out)
if (!tmp) {
LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "allocating cpupool info");
libxl_cpupoolinfo_list_free(ptr, i);
+ ptr = NULL;
goto out;
}
ptr = tmp;
--
1.7.10.4

74
app-emulation/xen-tools/files/xen-tools-4-CVE-2013-4416-XSA-72.patch
View file

@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
tools: xenstored: if the reply is too big then send E2BIG error
This fixes the issue for both C and ocaml xenstored, however only the ocaml
xenstored is vulnerable in its default configuration.
Adding a new error appears to be safe, since bit libxenstore and the Linux
driver at least treat an unknown error code as EINVAL.
This is XSA-72
Original ocaml patch by Jerome Maloberti <jerome.maloberti@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Sanders <thomas.sanders@citrix.com>
diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml
index 273fe4d..47695f8 100644
--- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml
+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ exception End_of_file
open Stdext
+let xenstore_payload_max = 4096 (* xen/include/public/io/xs_wire.h *)
+
type watch = {
con: t;
token: string;
@@ -112,8 +114,15 @@ let restrict con domid =
let set_target con target_domid =
con.perm <- Perms.Connection.set_target (get_perm con) ~perms:[Perms.READ; Perms.WRITE] target_domid
+let is_backend_mmap con = match con.xb.Xenbus.Xb.backend with
+ | Xenbus.Xb.Xenmmap _ -> true
+ | _ -> false
+
let send_reply con tid rid ty data =
- Xenbus.Xb.queue con.xb (Xenbus.Xb.Packet.create tid rid ty data)
+ if (String.length data) > xenstore_payload_max && (is_backend_mmap con) then
+ Xenbus.Xb.queue con.xb (Xenbus.Xb.Packet.create tid rid Xenbus.Xb.Op.Error "E2BIG\000")
+ else
+ Xenbus.Xb.queue con.xb (Xenbus.Xb.Packet.create tid rid ty data)
let send_error con tid rid err = send_reply con tid rid Xenbus.Xb.Op.Error (err ^ "\000")
let send_ack con tid rid ty = send_reply con tid rid ty "OK\000"
diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
index 0f8ba64..ccfdaa3 100644
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
@@ -629,6 +629,11 @@ void send_reply(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type,
{
struct buffered_data *bdata;
+ if ( len > XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX ) {
+ send_error(conn, E2BIG);
+ return;
+ }
+
/* Message is a child of the connection context for auto-cleanup. */
bdata = new_buffer(conn);
bdata->buffer = talloc_array(bdata, char, len);
diff --git a/xen/include/public/io/xs_wire.h b/xen/include/public/io/xs_wire.h
index 99d24e3..585f0c8 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/io/xs_wire.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/io/xs_wire.h
@@ -83,7 +83,8 @@ __attribute__((unused))
XSD_ERROR(EROFS),
XSD_ERROR(EBUSY),
XSD_ERROR(EAGAIN),
- XSD_ERROR(EISCONN)
+ XSD_ERROR(EISCONN),
+ XSD_ERROR(E2BIG)
};
#endif

373
app-emulation/xen-tools/xen-tools-4.2.2-r3.ebuild
View file

@ -1,373 +0,0 @@
# Copyright 1999-2013 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen-tools/xen-tools-4.2.2-r3.ebuild,v 1.8 2013/11/09 08:14:57 mgorny Exp $
EAPI=5
PYTHON_COMPAT=( python{2_6,2_7} )
PYTHON_REQ_USE='xml,threads'
IPXE_TARBALL_URL="http://dev.gentoo.org/~idella4/tarballs/ipxe.tar.gz"
XEN_SEABIOS_URL="http://dev.gentoo.org/~idella4/tarballs/seabios-0-20121121.tar.bz2"
XSAPATCHES="http://dev.gentoo.org/~idella4/"
if [[ $PV == *9999 ]]; then
KEYWORDS=""
REPO="xen-unstable.hg"
EHG_REPO_URI="http://xenbits.xensource.com/${REPO}"
S="${WORKDIR}/${REPO}"
live_eclass="mercurial"
else
KEYWORDS="amd64 x86"
SRC_URI="http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz
$IPXE_TARBALL_URL
$XEN_SEABIOS_URL
$XSAPATCHES/patches/XSA-55patches.tar.gz"
S="${WORKDIR}/xen-${PV}"
fi
inherit bash-completion-r1 eutils flag-o-matic multilib python-single-r1 toolchain-funcs udev ${live_eclass}
DESCRIPTION="Xend daemon and tools"
HOMEPAGE="http://xen.org/"
DOCS=( README docs/README.xen-bugtool )
LICENSE="GPL-2"
SLOT="0"
IUSE="api custom-cflags debug doc flask hvm qemu pygrub screen static-libs xend"
REQUIRED_USE="hvm? ( qemu )
${PYTHON_REQUIRED_USE}"
DEPEND="dev-libs/lzo:2
dev-libs/yajl
dev-libs/libgcrypt
dev-python/lxml[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
dev-python/pypam[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
sys-libs/zlib
sys-power/iasl
dev-ml/findlib
hvm? ( media-libs/libsdl )
api? ( dev-libs/libxml2
net-misc/curl )
${PYTHON_DEPS}
pygrub? ( ${PYTHON_DEPS//${PYTHON_REQ_USE}/ncurses} )
sys-devel/bin86
sys-devel/dev86
dev-lang/perl
app-misc/pax-utils
doc? (
app-doc/doxygen
dev-tex/latex2html[png,gif]
media-gfx/transfig
media-gfx/graphviz
dev-tex/xcolor
dev-texlive/texlive-latexextra
virtual/latex-base
dev-tex/latexmk
dev-texlive/texlive-latex
dev-texlive/texlive-pictures
dev-texlive/texlive-latexrecommended
)
hvm? ( x11-proto/xproto )"
RDEPEND="sys-apps/iproute2
net-misc/bridge-utils
screen? (
app-misc/screen
app-admin/logrotate
)
virtual/udev"
# hvmloader is used to bootstrap a fully virtualized kernel
# Approved by QA team in bug #144032
QA_WX_LOAD="usr/lib/xen/boot/hvmloader"
RESTRICT="test"
pkg_setup() {
python-single-r1_pkg_setup
export "CONFIG_LOMOUNT=y"
if has_version dev-libs/libgcrypt; then
export "CONFIG_GCRYPT=y"
fi
if use qemu; then
export "CONFIG_IOEMU=y"
else
export "CONFIG_IOEMU=n"
fi
if ! use x86 && ! has x86 $(get_all_abis) && use hvm; then
eerror "HVM (VT-x and AMD-v) cannot be built on this system. An x86 or"
eerror "an amd64 multilib profile is required. Remove the hvm use flag"
eerror "to build xen-tools on your current profile."
die "USE=hvm is unsupported on this system."
fi
if [[ -z ${XEN_TARGET_ARCH} ]] ; then
if use x86 && use amd64; then
die "Confusion! Both x86 and amd64 are set in your use flags!"
elif use x86; then
export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32"
elif use amd64 ; then
export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_64"
else
die "Unsupported architecture!"
fi
fi
use api && export "LIBXENAPI_BINDINGS=y"
use flask && export "FLASK_ENABLE=y"
}
src_prepare() {
# Drop .config, fixes to gcc-4.6
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch
# Xend
if ! use xend; then
sed -e 's:xm xen-bugtool xen-python-path xend:xen-bugtool xen-python-path:' \
-i tools/misc/Makefile || die "Disabling xend failed"
sed -e 's:^XEND_INITD:#XEND_INITD:' \
-i tools/examples/Makefile || die "Disabling xend failed"
fi
# if the user *really* wants to use their own custom-cflags, let them
if use custom-cflags; then
einfo "User wants their own CFLAGS - removing defaults"
# try and remove all the default cflags
find "${S}" \( -name Makefile -o -name Rules.mk -o -name Config.mk \) \
-exec sed \
-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O3\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-march=i686\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-fomit-frame-pointer\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-g3*\s\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2 \3/' \
-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O2\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-i {} + || die "failed to re-set custom-cflags"
fi
if ! use pygrub; then
sed -e '/^SUBDIRS-$(PYTHON_TOOLS) += pygrub$/d' -i tools/Makefile || die
fi
# Disable hvm support on systems that don't support x86_32 binaries.
if ! use hvm; then
sed -e '/^CONFIG_IOEMU := y$/d' -i config/*.mk || die
sed -e '/SUBDIRS-$(CONFIG_X86) += firmware/d' -i tools/Makefile || die
fi
# Don't bother with qemu, only needed for fully virtualised guests
if ! use qemu; then
sed -e "/^CONFIG_IOEMU := y$/d" -i config/*.mk || die
sed -e "s:install-tools\: tools/ioemu-dir:install-tools\: :g" -i Makefile || die
fi
# Fix texi2html build error with new texi2html, qemu.doc.html
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4-docfix.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4-qemu-xen-doc.patch
# Fix network broadcast on bridged networks
epatch "${FILESDIR}/${PN}-3.4.0-network-bridge-broadcast.patch"
# Prevent the downloading of ipxe, seabios
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4.2.0-anti-download.patch
cp "${DISTDIR}"/ipxe.tar.gz tools/firmware/etherboot/ || die
mv ../seabios-dir-remote tools/firmware/ || die
pushd tools/firmware/ > /dev/null
ln -s seabios-dir-remote seabios-dir || die
popd > /dev/null
# Fix bridge by idella4, bug #362575
epatch "${FILESDIR}/${PN}-4.1.1-bridge.patch"
# Don't build ipxe with pie on hardened, Bug #360805
if gcc-specs-pie; then
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/ipxe-nopie.patch
fi
# Prevent double stripping of files at install
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4.2.0-nostrip.patch
# fix jobserver in Makefile
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4.2.0-jserver.patch
# add missing header
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-ulong.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.2-xen_disk_leak.patch
# Set dom0-min-mem to kb; Bug #472982
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4.2-configsxp.patch
#Security patches, currently valid
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-CVE-2012-6075-XSA-41.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-CVE-2013-1922-XSA-48.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA-49.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-1-XSA-55.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-2-XSA-55.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-3-XSA-55.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-4-XSA-55.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-5to7-XSA-55.patch \
"${WORKDIR}"/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-8-XSA-55.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-9to10-XSA-55.patch \
"${WORKDIR}"/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-11-XSA-55.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-12to13-XSA-55.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-14-XSA-55.patch \
"${WORKDIR}"/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-15-XSA-55.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-16-XSA-55.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-17-XSA-55.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-18to19-XSA-55.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-20to23-XSA-55.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-CVE-2013-2072-XSA-56.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-XSA-57.patch
# Bug 472438
sed -e 's:^BASH_COMPLETION_DIR ?= $(CONFIG_DIR)/bash_completion.d:BASH_COMPLETION_DIR ?= $(SHARE_DIR)/bash-completion:' \
-i Config.mk || die
epatch_user
}
src_compile() {
export VARTEXFONTS="${T}/fonts"
local myopt
use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
use custom-cflags || unset CFLAGS
if test-flag-CC -fno-strict-overflow; then
append-flags -fno-strict-overflow
fi
unset LDFLAGS
unset CFLAGS
emake CC="$(tc-getCC)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" -C tools ${myopt}
use doc && emake -C docs txt html
emake -C docs man-pages
}
src_install() {
# Override auto-detection in the build system, bug #382573
export INITD_DIR=/tmp/init.d
export CONFIG_LEAF_DIR=../tmp/default
# Let the build system compile installed Python modules.
local PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE
export PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE
emake DESTDIR="${ED}" DOCDIR="/usr/share/doc/${PF}" \
XEN_PYTHON_NATIVE_INSTALL=y install-tools
# Fix the remaining Python shebangs.
python_fix_shebang "${ED}"
# Remove RedHat-specific stuff
rm -rf "${ED}"tmp || die
# uncomment lines in xl.conf
sed -e 's:^#autoballoon=1:autoballoon=1:' \
-e 's:^#lockfile="/var/lock/xl":lockfile="/var/lock/xl":' \
-e 's:^#vifscript="vif-bridge":vifscript="vif-bridge":' \
-i tools/examples/xl.conf || die
# Reset bash completion dir; Bug 472438
mv "${D}"bash-completion "${D}"usr/share/ || die
if use doc; then
emake DESTDIR="${D}" DOCDIR="/usr/share/doc/${PF}" install-docs
dohtml -r docs/
docinto pdf
dodoc ${DOCS[@]}
[ -d "${D}"/usr/share/doc/xen ] && mv "${D}"/usr/share/doc/xen/* "${D}"/usr/share/doc/${PF}/html
fi
rm -rf "${D}"/usr/share/doc/xen/
doman docs/man?/*
if use xend; then
newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/xend.initd-r2 xend || die "Couldn't install xen.initd"
fi
newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/xendomains.confd xendomains
newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/xenstored.confd xenstored
newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/xenconsoled.confd xenconsoled
newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/xendomains.initd-r2 xendomains
newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/xenstored.initd xenstored
newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/xenconsoled.initd xenconsoled
if use screen; then
cat "${FILESDIR}"/xendomains-screen.confd >> "${ED}"/etc/conf.d/xendomains || die
cp "${FILESDIR}"/xen-consoles.logrotate "${ED}"/etc/xen/ || die
keepdir /var/log/xen-consoles
fi
if [[ "${ARCH}" == 'amd64' ]] && use qemu; then
mkdir -p "${D}"usr/$(get_libdir)/xen/bin || die
mv "${D}"usr/lib/xen/bin/qemu* "${D}"usr/$(get_libdir)/xen/bin/ || die
fi
# For -static-libs wrt Bug 384355
if ! use static-libs; then
rm -f "${ED}"usr/$(get_libdir)/*.a "${ED}"usr/$(get_libdir)/ocaml/*/*.a
fi
# xend expects these to exist
keepdir /var/run/xenstored /var/lib/xenstored /var/xen/dump /var/lib/xen /var/log/xen
# for xendomains
keepdir /etc/xen/auto
# Temp QA workaround
dodir "$(udev_get_udevdir)"
mv "${ED}"/etc/udev/* "${ED}/$(udev_get_udevdir)"
rm -rf "${ED}"/etc/udev
# Remove files failing QA AFTER emake installs them, avoiding seeking absent files
find "${ED}" \( -name openbios-sparc32 -o -name openbios-sparc64 \
-o -name openbios-ppc -o -name palcode-clipper \) -delete || die
}
pkg_postinst() {
elog "Official Xen Guide and the offical wiki page:"
elog "http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/xen-guide.xml"
elog "http://wiki.xen.org/wiki/Main_Page"
if [[ "$(scanelf -s __guard -q "${PYTHON}")" ]] ; then
echo
ewarn "xend may not work when python is built with stack smashing protection (ssp)."
ewarn "If 'xm create' fails with '<ProtocolError for /RPC2: -1 >', see bug #141866"
ewarn "This problem may be resolved as of Xen 3.0.4, if not post in the bug."
fi
# TODO: we need to have the current Python slot here.
if ! has_version "dev-lang/python[ncurses]"; then
echo
ewarn "NB: Your dev-lang/python is built without USE=ncurses."
ewarn "Please rebuild python with USE=ncurses to make use of xenmon.py."
fi
if has_version "sys-apps/iproute2[minimal]"; then
echo
ewarn "Your sys-apps/iproute2 is built with USE=minimal. Networking"
ewarn "will not work until you rebuild iproute2 without USE=minimal."
fi
if ! use hvm; then
echo
elog "HVM (VT-x and AMD-V) support has been disabled. If you need hvm"
elog "support enable the hvm use flag."
elog "An x86 or amd64 multilib system is required to build HVM support."
echo
elog "The qemu use flag has been removed and replaced with hvm."
fi
if use xend; then
echo
elog "xend capability has been enabled and installed"
fi
if grep -qsF XENSV= "${ROOT}/etc/conf.d/xend"; then
echo
elog "xensv is broken upstream (Gentoo bug #142011)."
elog "Please remove '${ROOT%/}/etc/conf.d/xend', as it is no longer needed."
fi
}

414
app-emulation/xen-tools/xen-tools-4.2.2-r7.ebuild
View file

@ -1,414 +0,0 @@
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen-tools/xen-tools-4.2.2-r7.ebuild,v 1.1 2014/02/13 07:59:09 dlan Exp $
EAPI=5
PYTHON_COMPAT=( python{2_6,2_7} )
PYTHON_REQ_USE='xml,threads'
IPXE_TARBALL_URL="http://dev.gentoo.org/~idella4/tarballs/ipxe.tar.gz"
XEN_SEABIOS_URL="http://dev.gentoo.org/~idella4/tarballs/seabios-0-20121121.tar.bz2"
XSAPATCHES="http://dev.gentoo.org/~idella4/"
if [[ $PV == *9999 ]]; then
KEYWORDS=""
REPO="xen-unstable.hg"
EHG_REPO_URI="http://xenbits.xensource.com/${REPO}"
S="${WORKDIR}/${REPO}"
live_eclass="mercurial"
else
KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~x86"
SRC_URI="http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz
$IPXE_TARBALL_URL
$XEN_SEABIOS_URL
$XSAPATCHES/patches/XSA-55patches.tar.gz"
S="${WORKDIR}/xen-${PV}"
fi
inherit bash-completion-r1 eutils flag-o-matic multilib python-single-r1 toolchain-funcs udev ${live_eclass}
DESCRIPTION="Xend daemon and tools"
HOMEPAGE="http://xen.org/"
DOCS=( README docs/README.xen-bugtool )
LICENSE="GPL-2"
SLOT="0"
IUSE="api custom-cflags debug doc flask hvm qemu ocaml pygrub screen static-libs xend"
REQUIRED_USE="hvm? ( qemu )
${PYTHON_REQUIRED_USE}"
DEPEND="dev-libs/lzo:2
dev-libs/glib:2
dev-libs/yajl
dev-libs/libgcrypt
dev-python/lxml[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
dev-python/pypam[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
sys-libs/zlib
sys-power/iasl
dev-ml/findlib
hvm? ( media-libs/libsdl )
${PYTHON_DEPS}
api? ( dev-libs/libxml2
net-misc/curl )
${PYTHON_DEPS}
pygrub? ( ${PYTHON_DEPS//${PYTHON_REQ_USE}/ncurses} )
sys-devel/bin86
sys-devel/dev86
dev-lang/perl
app-misc/pax-utils
doc? (
app-doc/doxygen
dev-tex/latex2html[png,gif]
media-gfx/transfig
media-gfx/graphviz
dev-tex/xcolor
dev-texlive/texlive-latexextra
virtual/latex-base
dev-tex/latexmk
dev-texlive/texlive-latex
dev-texlive/texlive-pictures
dev-texlive/texlive-latexrecommended
)
hvm? ( x11-proto/xproto
!net-libs/libiscsi )"
RDEPEND="sys-apps/iproute2
net-misc/bridge-utils
ocaml? ( >=dev-lang/ocaml-4 )
screen? (
app-misc/screen
app-admin/logrotate
)
virtual/udev"
# hvmloader is used to bootstrap a fully virtualized kernel
# Approved by QA team in bug #144032
QA_WX_LOAD="usr/lib/xen/boot/hvmloader"
RESTRICT="test"
XSA_PATCHES=(
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-CVE-2012-6075-XSA-41.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-CVE-2013-1922-XSA-48.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA-49.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-1-XSA-55.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-2-XSA-55.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-3-XSA-55.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-4-XSA-55.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-5to7-XSA-55.patch
"${WORKDIR}"/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-8-XSA-55.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-9to10-XSA-55.patch
"${WORKDIR}"/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-11-XSA-55.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-12to13-XSA-55.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-14-XSA-55.patch
"${WORKDIR}"/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-15-XSA-55.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-16-XSA-55.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-17-XSA-55.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-18to19-XSA-55.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-20to23-XSA-55.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-CVE-2013-2072-XSA-56.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4.2-CVE-XSA-57.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4-CVE-2013-4369-XSA-68.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4-CVE-2013-4370-XSA-69.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4-CVE-2013-4371-XSA-70.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4-CVE-2013-4416-XSA-72.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4-CVE-XSA-86.patch #bug #500530
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4-CVE-2014-1950-XSA-88.patch #bug #501080
)
pkg_setup() {
python-single-r1_pkg_setup
export "CONFIG_LOMOUNT=y"
if has_version dev-libs/libgcrypt; then
export "CONFIG_GCRYPT=y"
fi
if use qemu; then
export "CONFIG_IOEMU=y"
else
export "CONFIG_IOEMU=n"
fi
if ! use x86 && ! has x86 $(get_all_abis) && use hvm; then
eerror "HVM (VT-x and AMD-v) cannot be built on this system. An x86 or"
eerror "an amd64 multilib profile is required. Remove the hvm use flag"
eerror "to build xen-tools on your current profile."
die "USE=hvm is unsupported on this system."
fi
if [[ -z ${XEN_TARGET_ARCH} ]] ; then
if use x86 && use amd64; then
die "Confusion! Both x86 and amd64 are set in your use flags!"
elif use x86; then
export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32"
elif use amd64 ; then
export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_64"
else
die "Unsupported architecture!"
fi
fi
use api && export "LIBXENAPI_BINDINGS=y"
use flask && export "FLASK_ENABLE=y"
}
src_prepare() {
# Drop .config, fixes to gcc-4.6
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch
# Xend
if ! use xend; then
sed -e 's:xm xen-bugtool xen-python-path xend:xen-bugtool xen-python-path:' \
-i tools/misc/Makefile || die "Disabling xend failed"
sed -e 's:^XEND_INITD:#XEND_INITD:' \
-i tools/examples/Makefile || die "Disabling xend failed"
fi
# if the user *really* wants to use their own custom-cflags, let them
if use custom-cflags; then
einfo "User wants their own CFLAGS - removing defaults"
# try and remove all the default cflags
find "${S}" \( -name Makefile -o -name Rules.mk -o -name Config.mk \) \
-exec sed \
-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O3\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-march=i686\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-fomit-frame-pointer\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-g3*\s\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2 \3/' \
-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O2\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-i {} + || die "failed to re-set custom-cflags"
fi
if ! use pygrub; then
sed -e '/^SUBDIRS-$(PYTHON_TOOLS) += pygrub$/d' -i tools/Makefile || die
fi
# Disable hvm support on systems that don't support x86_32 binaries.
if ! use hvm; then
sed -e '/^CONFIG_IOEMU := y$/d' -i config/*.mk || die
sed -e '/SUBDIRS-$(CONFIG_X86) += firmware/d' -i tools/Makefile || die
fi
# Don't bother with qemu, only needed for fully virtualised guests
if ! use qemu; then
sed -e "/^CONFIG_IOEMU := y$/d" -i config/*.mk || die
sed -e "s:install-tools\: tools/ioemu-dir:install-tools\: :g" -i Makefile || die
fi
# Fix texi2html build error with new texi2html, qemu.doc.html
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4-docfix.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4-qemu-xen-doc.patch
# Fix network broadcast on bridged networks
epatch "${FILESDIR}/${PN}-3.4.0-network-bridge-broadcast.patch"
# Prevent the downloading of ipxe, seabios
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4.2.0-anti-download.patch
cp "${DISTDIR}"/ipxe.tar.gz tools/firmware/etherboot/ || die
mv ../seabios-dir-remote tools/firmware/ || die
pushd tools/firmware/ > /dev/null
ln -s seabios-dir-remote seabios-dir || die
popd > /dev/null
# Fix bridge by idella4, bug #362575
epatch "${FILESDIR}/${PN}-4.1.1-bridge.patch"
# Don't build ipxe with pie on hardened, Bug #360805
if gcc-specs-pie; then
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/ipxe-nopie.patch
fi
# Prevent double stripping of files at install
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4.2.0-nostrip.patch
# fix jobserver in Makefile
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4.2.0-jserver.patch
# add missing header
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-ulong.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.2-xen_disk_leak.patch
# Set dom0-min-mem to kb; Bug #472982
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4.2-configsxp.patch
# Bug 463840
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-install.patch
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-rt-link.patch
[[ ${XSA_PATCHES[@]} ]] && epatch "${XSA_PATCHES[@]}"
# Bug 472438
sed -e 's:^BASH_COMPLETION_DIR ?= $(CONFIG_DIR)/bash_completion.d:BASH_COMPLETION_DIR ?= $(SHARE_DIR)/bash-completion:' \
-i Config.mk || die
# Bug 445986
sed -e 's:$(MAKE) PYTHON=$(PYTHON) subdirs-$@:LC_ALL=C "$(MAKE)" PYTHON=$(PYTHON) subdirs-$@:' -i tools/firmware/Makefile || die
# Bug 379537
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/fix-gold-ld.patch
# fix QA warning, create /var/run/, /var/lock dynamically
sed -i -e "/\$(INSTALL_DIR) \$(DESTDIR)\$(XEN_RUN_DIR)/d" \
tools/libxl/Makefile || die
sed -i -e "/\/var\/run\//d" \
tools/xenstore/Makefile \
tools/pygrub/Makefile || die
sed -i -e "/\/var\/lock\/subsys/d" \
tools/Makefile || die
# xencommons, Bug #492332, sed lighter weight than patching
sed -e 's:\$QEMU_XEN -xen-domid:test -e "\$QEMU_XEN" \&\& &:' \
-i tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/xencommons || die
epatch_user
}
src_compile() {
export VARTEXFONTS="${T}/fonts"
local myopt
use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
use custom-cflags || unset CFLAGS
if test-flag-CC -fno-strict-overflow; then
append-flags -fno-strict-overflow
fi
unset LDFLAGS
unset CFLAGS
emake V=1 CC="$(tc-getCC)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" AR="$(tc-getAR)" RANLIB="$(tc-getRANLIB)" -C tools ${myopt}
use doc && emake -C docs txt html
emake -C docs man-pages
}
src_install() {
# Override auto-detection in the build system, bug #382573
export INITD_DIR=/tmp/init.d
export CONFIG_LEAF_DIR=../tmp/default
# Let the build system compile installed Python modules.
local PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE
export PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE
emake DESTDIR="${ED}" DOCDIR="/usr/share/doc/${PF}" install-tools \
XEN_PYTHON_NATIVE_INSTALL=y install-tools
# Fix the remaining Python shebangs.
python_fix_shebang "${ED}"
# Remove RedHat-specific stuff
rm -rf "${D}"tmp || die
# uncomment lines in xl.conf
sed -e 's:^#autoballoon=1:autoballoon=1:' \
-e 's:^#lockfile="/var/lock/xl":lockfile="/var/lock/xl":' \
-e 's:^#vifscript="vif-bridge":vifscript="vif-bridge":' \
-i tools/examples/xl.conf || die
# Reset bash completion dir; Bug 472438
mv "${D}"bash-completion "${D}"usr/share/ || die
if use doc; then
emake DESTDIR="${D}" DOCDIR="/usr/share/doc/${PF}" install-docs
dohtml -r docs/
docinto pdf
dodoc ${DOCS[@]}
[ -d "${D}"/usr/share/doc/xen ] && mv "${D}"/usr/share/doc/xen/* "${D}"/usr/share/doc/${PF}/html
fi
rm -rf "${D}"/usr/share/doc/xen/
doman docs/man?/*
if use xend; then
newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/xend.initd-r2 xend || die "Couldn't install xen.initd"
fi
newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/xendomains.confd xendomains
newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/xenstored.confd xenstored
newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/xenconsoled.confd xenconsoled
newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/xendomains.initd-r2 xendomains
newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/xenstored.initd xenstored
newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/xenconsoled.initd xenconsoled
newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/xencommons.initd xencommons
newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/xencommons.confd xencommons
if use screen; then
cat "${FILESDIR}"/xendomains-screen.confd >> "${ED}"/etc/conf.d/xendomains || die
cp "${FILESDIR}"/xen-consoles.logrotate "${ED}"/etc/xen/ || die
keepdir /var/log/xen-consoles
fi
if [[ "${ARCH}" == 'amd64' ]] && use qemu; then
mkdir -p "${D}"usr/$(get_libdir)/xen/bin || die
mv "${D}"usr/lib/xen/bin/qemu* "${D}"usr/$(get_libdir)/xen/bin/ || die
fi
# For -static-libs wrt Bug 384355
if ! use static-libs; then
rm -f "${D}"usr/$(get_libdir)/*.a "${D}"usr/$(get_libdir)/ocaml/*/*.a
fi
# xend expects these to exist
keepdir /var/run/xenstored /var/lib/xenstored /var/xen/dump /var/lib/xen /var/log/xen
# for xendomains
keepdir /etc/xen/auto
# Temp QA workaround
dodir "$(udev_get_udevdir)"
mv "${D}"/etc/udev/* "${D}/$(udev_get_udevdir)"
rm -rf "${D}"/etc/udev
# Remove files failing QA AFTER emake installs them, avoiding seeking absent files
find "${D}" \( -name openbios-sparc32 -o -name openbios-sparc64 \
-o -name openbios-ppc -o -name palcode-clipper \) -delete || die
}
pkg_postinst() {
elog "Official Xen Guide and the offical wiki page:"
elog "http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/xen-gu"${D}"usr/ide.xml"
elog "http://wiki.xen.org/wiki/Main_Page"
elog ""
elog "Recommended to utilise the xencommons script to config sytem at boot."
elog "Add by use of rc-update on completion of the install"
if [[ "$(scanelf -s __guard -q "${PYTHON}")" ]] ; then
echo
ewarn "xend may not work when python is built with stack smashing protection (ssp)."
ewarn "If 'xm create' fails with '<ProtocolError for /RPC2: -1 >', see bug #141866"
ewarn "This problem may be resolved as of Xen 3.0.4, if not post in the bug."
fi
# TODO: we need to have the current Python slot here.
if ! has_version "dev-lang/python[ncurses]"; then
echo
ewarn "NB: Your dev-lang/python is built without USE=ncurses."
ewarn "Please rebuild python with USE=ncurses to make use of xenmon.py."
fi
if has_version "sys-apps/iproute2[minimal]"; then
echo
ewarn "Your sys-apps/iproute2 is built with USE=minimal. Networking"
ewarn "will not work until you rebuild iproute2 without USE=minimal."
fi
if ! use hvm; then
echo
elog "HVM (VT-x and AMD-V) support has been disabled. If you need hvm"
elog "support enable the hvm use flag."
elog "An x86 or amd64 multilib system is required to build HVM support."
fi
if use xend; then
echo
elog "xend capability has been enabled and installed"
fi
if grep -qsF XENSV= "${ROOT}/etc/conf.d/xend"; then
echo
elog "xensv is broken upstream (Gentoo bug #142011)."
elog "Please remove '${ROOT%/}/etc/conf.d/xend', as it is no longer needed."
fi
}

7
app-emulation/xen-tools/xen-tools-4.2.3-r1.ebuild
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen-tools/xen-tools-4.2.3-r1.ebuild,v 1.3 2014/02/20 10:24:16 ago Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen-tools/xen-tools-4.2.3-r1.ebuild,v 1.5 2014/02/21 04:49:13 idella4 Exp $
EAPI=5
@ -19,12 +19,12 @@ else
GENTOO_VER=
[[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]] && \
UPSTRAM_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P/-tools/}-upstream-patches-${UPSTREAM_VER}.tar.xz"
UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P/-tools/}-upstream-patches-${UPSTREAM_VER}.tar.xz"
[[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]] && \
GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P/-tools/}-gentoo-patches-${GENTOO_VER}.tar.xz"
SRC_URI="http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz
${UPSTRAM_PATCHSET_URI}
${UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI}
${GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI}"
S="${WORKDIR}/xen-${PV}"
fi
@ -233,7 +233,6 @@ src_prepare() {
# Bug 445986
sed -e 's:$(MAKE) PYTHON=$(PYTHON) subdirs-$@:LC_ALL=C "$(MAKE)" PYTHON=$(PYTHON) subdirs-$@:' -i tools/firmware/Makefile || die
# fix QA warning, create /var/run/, /var/lock dynamically
sed -i -e "/\$(INSTALL_DIR) \$(DESTDIR)\$(XEN_RUN_DIR)/d" \
tools/libxl/Makefile || die

406
app-emulation/xen-tools/xen-tools-4.2.3.ebuild
View file

@ -1,406 +0,0 @@
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen-tools/xen-tools-4.2.3.ebuild,v 1.1 2014/02/14 10:17:46 dlan Exp $
EAPI=5
PYTHON_COMPAT=( python{2_6,2_7} )
PYTHON_REQ_USE='xml,threads'
IPXE_TARBALL_URL="http://dev.gentoo.org/~idella4/tarballs/ipxe.tar.gz"
XEN_SEABIOS_URL="http://dev.gentoo.org/~idella4/tarballs/seabios-0-20121121.tar.bz2"
XSAPATCHES="http://dev.gentoo.org/~idella4/"
if [[ $PV == *9999 ]]; then
KEYWORDS=""
REPO="xen-unstable.hg"
EHG_REPO_URI="http://xenbits.xensource.com/${REPO}"
S="${WORKDIR}/${REPO}"
live_eclass="mercurial"
else
KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~x86"
UPSTREAM_VER=0
GENTOO_VER=
[[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]] && \
UPSTRAM_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P/-tools/}-upstream-patches-${UPSTREAM_VER}.tar.xz"
[[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]] && \
GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P/-tools/}-gentoo-patches-${GENTOO_VER}.tar.xz"
SRC_URI="http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz
$IPXE_TARBALL_URL
$XEN_SEABIOS_URL
${UPSTRAM_PATCHSET_URI}
${GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI}"
S="${WORKDIR}/xen-${PV}"
fi
inherit bash-completion-r1 eutils flag-o-matic multilib python-single-r1 toolchain-funcs udev ${live_eclass}
DESCRIPTION="Xend daemon and tools"
HOMEPAGE="http://xen.org/"
DOCS=( README docs/README.xen-bugtool )
LICENSE="GPL-2"
SLOT="0"
IUSE="api custom-cflags debug doc flask hvm qemu ocaml pygrub screen static-libs xend"
REQUIRED_USE="hvm? ( qemu )
${PYTHON_REQUIRED_USE}"
DEPEND="dev-libs/lzo:2
dev-libs/glib:2
dev-libs/yajl
dev-libs/libgcrypt
dev-python/lxml[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
dev-python/pypam[${PYTHON_USEDEP}]
sys-libs/zlib
sys-power/iasl
dev-ml/findlib
hvm? ( media-libs/libsdl )
${PYTHON_DEPS}
api? ( dev-libs/libxml2
net-misc/curl )
${PYTHON_DEPS}
pygrub? ( ${PYTHON_DEPS//${PYTHON_REQ_USE}/ncurses} )
sys-devel/bin86
sys-devel/dev86
dev-lang/perl
app-misc/pax-utils
doc? (
app-doc/doxygen
dev-tex/latex2html[png,gif]
media-gfx/transfig
media-gfx/graphviz
dev-tex/xcolor
dev-texlive/texlive-latexextra
virtual/latex-base
dev-tex/latexmk
dev-texlive/texlive-latex
dev-texlive/texlive-pictures
dev-texlive/texlive-latexrecommended
)
hvm? ( x11-proto/xproto
!net-libs/libiscsi )"
RDEPEND="sys-apps/iproute2
net-misc/bridge-utils
ocaml? ( >=dev-lang/ocaml-4 )
screen? (
app-misc/screen
app-admin/logrotate
)
virtual/udev"
# hvmloader is used to bootstrap a fully virtualized kernel
# Approved by QA team in bug #144032
QA_WX_LOAD="usr/lib/xen/boot/hvmloader"
RESTRICT="test"
pkg_setup() {
python-single-r1_pkg_setup
export "CONFIG_LOMOUNT=y"
if has_version dev-libs/libgcrypt; then
export "CONFIG_GCRYPT=y"
fi
if use qemu; then
export "CONFIG_IOEMU=y"
else
export "CONFIG_IOEMU=n"
fi
if ! use x86 && ! has x86 $(get_all_abis) && use hvm; then
eerror "HVM (VT-x and AMD-v) cannot be built on this system. An x86 or"
eerror "an amd64 multilib profile is required. Remove the hvm use flag"
eerror "to build xen-tools on your current profile."
die "USE=hvm is unsupported on this system."
fi
if [[ -z ${XEN_TARGET_ARCH} ]] ; then
if use x86 && use amd64; then
die "Confusion! Both x86 and amd64 are set in your use flags!"
elif use x86; then
export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32"
elif use amd64 ; then
export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_64"
else
die "Unsupported architecture!"
fi
fi
use api && export "LIBXENAPI_BINDINGS=y"
use flask && export "FLASK_ENABLE=y"
}
src_prepare() {
# Upstream's patchset
if [[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]]; then
EPATCH_SUFFIX="patch" \
EPATCH_FORCE="yes" \
epatch "${WORKDIR}"/patches-upstream
fi
# Gentoo's patchset
if [[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]]; then
EPATCH_SUFFIX="patch" \
EPATCH_FORCE="yes" \
epatch "${WORKDIR}"/patches-gentoo
fi
# Drop .config, fixes to gcc-4.6
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch
# Xend
if ! use xend; then
sed -e 's:xm xen-bugtool xen-python-path xend:xen-bugtool xen-python-path:' \
-i tools/misc/Makefile || die "Disabling xend failed"
sed -e 's:^XEND_INITD:#XEND_INITD:' \
-i tools/examples/Makefile || die "Disabling xend failed"
fi
# if the user *really* wants to use their own custom-cflags, let them
if use custom-cflags; then
einfo "User wants their own CFLAGS - removing defaults"
# try and remove all the default cflags
find "${S}" \( -name Makefile -o -name Rules.mk -o -name Config.mk \) \
-exec sed \
-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O3\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-march=i686\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-fomit-frame-pointer\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-g3*\s\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2 \3/' \
-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O2\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-i {} + || die "failed to re-set custom-cflags"
fi
if ! use pygrub; then
sed -e '/^SUBDIRS-$(PYTHON_TOOLS) += pygrub$/d' -i tools/Makefile || die
fi
# Disable hvm support on systems that don't support x86_32 binaries.
if ! use hvm; then
sed -e '/^CONFIG_IOEMU := y$/d' -i config/*.mk || die
sed -e '/SUBDIRS-$(CONFIG_X86) += firmware/d' -i tools/Makefile || die
fi
# Don't bother with qemu, only needed for fully virtualised guests
if ! use qemu; then
sed -e "/^CONFIG_IOEMU := y$/d" -i config/*.mk || die
sed -e "s:install-tools\: tools/ioemu-dir:install-tools\: :g" -i Makefile || die
fi
# Fix texi2html build error with new texi2html, qemu.doc.html
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4-docfix.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4-qemu-xen-doc.patch
# Fix network broadcast on bridged networks
epatch "${FILESDIR}/${PN}-3.4.0-network-bridge-broadcast.patch"
# Prevent the downloading of ipxe, seabios
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4.2.0-anti-download.patch
cp "${DISTDIR}"/ipxe.tar.gz tools/firmware/etherboot/ || die
mv ../seabios-dir-remote tools/firmware/ || die
pushd tools/firmware/ > /dev/null
ln -s seabios-dir-remote seabios-dir || die
popd > /dev/null
# Fix bridge by idella4, bug #362575
epatch "${FILESDIR}/${PN}-4.1.1-bridge.patch"
# Don't build ipxe with pie on hardened, Bug #360805
if gcc-specs-pie; then
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/ipxe-nopie.patch
fi
# Prevent double stripping of files at install
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4.2.0-nostrip.patch
# fix jobserver in Makefile
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4.2.0-jserver.patch
# add missing header, Bug #467200
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-ulong.patch \
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.2-xen_disk_leak.patch
# Set dom0-min-mem to kb; Bug #472982
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-tools/}-4.2-configsxp.patch
# Bug 463840
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.2.2-install.patch
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.2.2-rt-link.patch
# Bug 472438
sed -e 's:^BASH_COMPLETION_DIR ?= $(CONFIG_DIR)/bash_completion.d:BASH_COMPLETION_DIR ?= $(SHARE_DIR)/bash-completion:' \
-i Config.mk || die
# Bug 445986
sed -e 's:$(MAKE) PYTHON=$(PYTHON) subdirs-$@:LC_ALL=C "$(MAKE)" PYTHON=$(PYTHON) subdirs-$@:' -i tools/firmware/Makefile || die
# Bug 379537
epatch "${FILESDIR}"/fix-gold-ld.patch
# fix QA warning, create /var/run/, /var/lock dynamically
sed -i -e "/\$(INSTALL_DIR) \$(DESTDIR)\$(XEN_RUN_DIR)/d" \
tools/libxl/Makefile || die
sed -i -e "/\/var\/run\//d" \
tools/xenstore/Makefile \
tools/pygrub/Makefile || die
sed -i -e "/\/var\/lock\/subsys/d" \
tools/Makefile || die
# xencommons, Bug #492332, sed lighter weight than patching
sed -e 's:\$QEMU_XEN -xen-domid:test -e "\$QEMU_XEN" \&\& &:' \
-i tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/xencommons || die
epatch_user
}
src_compile() {
export VARTEXFONTS="${T}/fonts"
local myopt
use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
use custom-cflags || unset CFLAGS
if test-flag-CC -fno-strict-overflow; then
append-flags -fno-strict-overflow
fi
unset LDFLAGS
unset CFLAGS
emake V=1 CC="$(tc-getCC)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" AR="$(tc-getAR)" RANLIB="$(tc-getRANLIB)" -C tools ${myopt}
use doc && emake -C docs txt html
emake -C docs man-pages
}
src_install() {
# Override auto-detection in the build system, bug #382573
export INITD_DIR=/tmp/init.d
export CONFIG_LEAF_DIR=../tmp/default
# Let the build system compile installed Python modules.
local PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE
export PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE
emake DESTDIR="${ED}" DOCDIR="/usr/share/doc/${PF}" install-tools \
XEN_PYTHON_NATIVE_INSTALL=y install-tools
# Fix the remaining Python shebangs.
python_fix_shebang "${ED}"
# Remove RedHat-specific stuff
rm -rf "${D}"tmp || die
# uncomment lines in xl.conf
sed -e 's:^#autoballoon=1:autoballoon=1:' \
-e 's:^#lockfile="/var/lock/xl":lockfile="/var/lock/xl":' \
-e 's:^#vifscript="vif-bridge":vifscript="vif-bridge":' \
-i tools/examples/xl.conf || die
# Reset bash completion dir; Bug 472438
mv "${D}"bash-completion "${D}"usr/share/ || die
if use doc; then
emake DESTDIR="${D}" DOCDIR="/usr/share/doc/${PF}" install-docs
dohtml -r docs/
docinto pdf
dodoc ${DOCS[@]}
[ -d "${D}"/usr/share/doc/xen ] && mv "${D}"/usr/share/doc/xen/* "${D}"/usr/share/doc/${PF}/html
fi
rm -rf "${D}"/usr/share/doc/xen/
doman docs/man?/*
if use xend; then
newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/xend.initd-r2 xend || die "Couldn't install xen.initd"
fi
newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/xendomains.confd xendomains
newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/xenstored.confd xenstored
newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/xenconsoled.confd xenconsoled
newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/xendomains.initd-r2 xendomains
newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/xenstored.initd xenstored
newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/xenconsoled.initd xenconsoled
newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/xencommons.initd xencommons
newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/xencommons.confd xencommons
if use screen; then
cat "${FILESDIR}"/xendomains-screen.confd >> "${ED}"/etc/conf.d/xendomains || die
cp "${FILESDIR}"/xen-consoles.logrotate "${ED}"/etc/xen/ || die
keepdir /var/log/xen-consoles
fi
if [[ "${ARCH}" == 'amd64' ]] && use qemu; then
mkdir -p "${D}"usr/$(get_libdir)/xen/bin || die
mv "${D}"usr/lib/xen/bin/qemu* "${D}"usr/$(get_libdir)/xen/bin/ || die
fi
# For -static-libs wrt Bug 384355
if ! use static-libs; then
rm -f "${D}"usr/$(get_libdir)/*.a "${D}"usr/$(get_libdir)/ocaml/*/*.a
fi
# xend expects these to exist
keepdir /var/run/xenstored /var/lib/xenstored /var/xen/dump /var/lib/xen /var/log/xen
# for xendomains
keepdir /etc/xen/auto
# Temp QA workaround
dodir "$(udev_get_udevdir)"
mv "${D}"/etc/udev/* "${D}/$(udev_get_udevdir)"
rm -rf "${D}"/etc/udev
# Remove files failing QA AFTER emake installs them, avoiding seeking absent files
find "${D}" \( -name openbios-sparc32 -o -name openbios-sparc64 \
-o -name openbios-ppc -o -name palcode-clipper \) -delete || die
}
pkg_postinst() {
elog "Official Xen Guide and the offical wiki page:"
elog "http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/xen-gu"${D}"usr/ide.xml"
elog "http://wiki.xen.org/wiki/Main_Page"
elog ""
elog "Recommended to utilise the xencommons script to config sytem at boot."
elog "Add by use of rc-update on completion of the install"
if [[ "$(scanelf -s __guard -q "${PYTHON}")" ]] ; then
echo
ewarn "xend may not work when python is built with stack smashing protection (ssp)."
ewarn "If 'xm create' fails with '<ProtocolError for /RPC2: -1 >', see bug #141866"
ewarn "This problem may be resolved as of Xen 3.0.4, if not post in the bug."
fi
# TODO: we need to have the current Python slot here.
if ! has_version "dev-lang/python[ncurses]"; then
echo
ewarn "NB: Your dev-lang/python is built without USE=ncurses."
ewarn "Please rebuild python with USE=ncurses to make use of xenmon.py."
fi
if has_version "sys-apps/iproute2[minimal]"; then
echo
ewarn "Your sys-apps/iproute2 is built with USE=minimal. Networking"
ewarn "will not work until you rebuild iproute2 without USE=minimal."
fi
if ! use hvm; then
echo
elog "HVM (VT-x and AMD-V) support has been disabled. If you need hvm"
elog "support enable the hvm use flag."
elog "An x86 or amd64 multilib system is required to build HVM support."
fi
if use xend; then
echo
elog "xend capability has been enabled and installed"
fi
if grep -qsF XENSV= "${ROOT}/etc/conf.d/xend"; then
echo
elog "xensv is broken upstream (Gentoo bug #142011)."
elog "Please remove '${ROOT%/}/etc/conf.d/xend', as it is no longer needed."
fi
}

7
app-emulation/xen-tools/xen-tools-4.2.4.ebuild
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen-tools/xen-tools-4.2.4.ebuild,v 1.1 2014/02/19 06:54:00 dlan Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen-tools/xen-tools-4.2.4.ebuild,v 1.3 2014/02/21 04:49:13 idella4 Exp $
EAPI=5
@ -19,12 +19,12 @@ else
GENTOO_VER=
[[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]] && \
UPSTRAM_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P/-tools/}-upstream-patches-${UPSTREAM_VER}.tar.xz"
UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P/-tools/}-upstream-patches-${UPSTREAM_VER}.tar.xz"
[[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]] && \
GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P/-tools/}-gentoo-patches-${GENTOO_VER}.tar.xz"
SRC_URI="http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz
${UPSTRAM_PATCHSET_URI}
${UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI}
${GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI}"
S="${WORKDIR}/xen-${PV}"
fi
@ -233,7 +233,6 @@ src_prepare() {
# Bug 445986
sed -e 's:$(MAKE) PYTHON=$(PYTHON) subdirs-$@:LC_ALL=C "$(MAKE)" PYTHON=$(PYTHON) subdirs-$@:' -i tools/firmware/Makefile || die
# fix QA warning, create /var/run/, /var/lock dynamically
sed -i -e "/\$(INSTALL_DIR) \$(DESTDIR)\$(XEN_RUN_DIR)/d" \
tools/libxl/Makefile || die

7
app-emulation/xen-tools/xen-tools-4.3.2.ebuild
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen-tools/xen-tools-4.3.2.ebuild,v 1.1 2014/02/19 06:54:00 dlan Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen-tools/xen-tools-4.3.2.ebuild,v 1.3 2014/02/21 04:49:13 idella4 Exp $
EAPI=5
@ -19,12 +19,12 @@ else
GENTOO_VER=
[[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]] && \
UPSTRAM_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P/-tools/}-upstream-patches-${UPSTREAM_VER}.tar.xz"
UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P/-tools/}-upstream-patches-${UPSTREAM_VER}.tar.xz"
[[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]] && \
GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P/-tools/}-gentoo-patches-${GENTOO_VER}.tar.xz"
SRC_URI="http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz
${UPSTRAM_PATCHSET_URI}
${UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI}
${GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI}"
S="${WORKDIR}/xen-${PV}"
fi
@ -229,7 +229,6 @@ src_prepare() {
sed -e "s:install-tools\: tools/ioemu-dir:install-tools\: :g" -i Makefile || die
fi
# Bug 472438
sed -e 's:^BASH_COMPLETION_DIR ?= $(CONFIG_DIR)/bash_completion.d:BASH_COMPLETION_DIR ?= $(SHARE_DIR)/bash-completion:' \
-i Config.mk || die

10
app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,6 +1,14 @@
# ChangeLog for app-emulation/xen
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog,v 1.153 2014/02/20 10:25:22 ago Exp $
# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog,v 1.155 2014/02/21 04:53:41 idella4 Exp $
21 Feb 2014; Ian Delaney <idella4@gentoo.org> xen-4.2.3.ebuild,
xen-4.2.4.ebuild, xen-4.3.2.ebuild:
correct typos, tidy
20 Feb 2014; Yixun Lan <dlan@gentoo.org> -xen-4.2.2-r1.ebuild,
-xen-4.2.2-r4.ebuild, -xen-4.3.1-r1.ebuild, -xen-4.3.1-r4.ebuild:
clean old versions
20 Feb 2014; Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org> xen-4.2.3.ebuild:
Stable for x86, wrt bug #500528

47
app-emulation/xen/Manifest
View file

@ -1,68 +1,35 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-1918-XSA-45_1.patch 7179 SHA256 760d8502747f2c03fb3bf6b683994860ae99b66a2fb6bbedebcc5b440404c404 SHA512 b2c8a5fde13b00734d67ac2da7ce09020d3e21f5d6d7ce7eb65f542324f42819704bbbcb784cf064b5640a18eebab8e85d51ccc1030d7325cf42e482114ba776 WHIRLPOOL 0637bbfa579b77ab6a1b1ce15417ca0740950cb1ff4bbe9ae851c8f143e4755450cd785ede5758d45b785265e53afe81ea3705813f1fd96d79affd40cc08dffe
AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-1918-XSA-45_2.patch 4941 SHA256 e8e20bc35017bbfa350c29cef848e294acc782c3eae8082e629b020563b3a2c1 SHA512 6f05628667c56c583abd345d59371a5da94f862744a41a49f2be0764e36878e276d79e58a20046ce303e57594984ea7551bd5c11cc55b386bb0e5f28b41ad76f WHIRLPOOL f8100dd80c9354e44c119a57eb5db0df0f81997bbe3823066bc7c31be211f083260a73402dc110f02e18855b4a9196efaa78d81dcd601e761d200ff113628090
AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-1918-XSA-45_3.patch 2621 SHA256 8f2efcd018179ff8abdd54164980fdb0d25968017aaf91947ff0a326a132cd90 SHA512 1dc3222675380a278de67c7c8ce27df61f5376cb5ea3b0cb4965cff20ec236dbc21b1717da778a1eb366f27229d4765b209a6593ec8c2ae79b9dddab0b615246 WHIRLPOOL 1019d125c7e2a762754519472498c13ed7987cbfd0709bfe7ac5dccec7f6b6b68f86f137f5f7727e187e17fb764be532011a96eb39d0efa8b08baa945bb0c306
AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-1918-XSA-45_4.patch 5813 SHA256 6eaefb1987f1ccf891cd68c03e9966bc7ccc6fd894ed2c366aa4a0d1f3a15459 SHA512 723478cfd9f067ba6134fabe480dd9e1d11321f9c7b62f94cf572010d35ac5ef412ee885a020f2b03e7c2baff2fbafcdc48c8ac0426331c508197c4c8c536f8f WHIRLPOOL 48fe9fdfcc93644554066053b72be390f41f4f63be845a8e2b0ed379a33ae489c97ec12063ff7aeb8600dd348850d87efc372e5be709be2d045302ea144b0785
AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-1918-XSA-45_5.patch 6257 SHA256 406e3bd7147fea805bdf6f201bc17322cd2cd662ede094b1a039ba71b095bb3e SHA512 976e5f72380921e89feb16c5aa5209a56a4b61f76676bca9ed15d7af787df5901a77f35e5d3506087ff9be259170636872218b7a755add938bb8b36b0a976203 WHIRLPOOL 71e3df3b62c6a007aebc3a0c732653bee22ecda4cb3cc6ff041a4db2de9ff16cbb8648389f645846d29cb6405c54e6f85db5334624ef764c925482a74a276179
AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-1918-XSA-45_6.patch 4291 SHA256 6e4344e3dcb544537bbef869a34cff38a4611cddc34d18469633d3b3d35db78b SHA512 a2da3415c07c77b8c38d52bc32b04ced955f272f4294572375ba16465aaed8a4a66ea0dd8034ef67e1f6e293b82f58988ec306908b7df6a86ee1c52890f47ca4 WHIRLPOOL 12c736899b40f7cad75fac5ab575b759160dcc0bf1ba9ca766c50258072bf20324f3663f60e3c7ed75323fdb91fab12390373d749d451ee68cfe72bb2ca70a93
AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-1918-XSA-45_7.patch 8129 SHA256 7fca1b6025d6ac1a444333b2fe1381af093ca601ac8045f68a29c2a83d520e48 SHA512 7f8fab52ca4aa361729eeb21f977fe1237f6b94b8f35e5d37ea783c60d7053da9a975af20c07c2cd1d21d52880121a5ea83ed0abd3ec2a38a75caee797489096 WHIRLPOOL 567cfd129d6347c95cd08d296053d043430b0c2ff157991a899b205c68b421614d4a8829eed8ff2748fb107b485db11b5d04599cd2a4c4bd5e225fe9821919a4
AUX xen-4-XSA-83.patch 598 SHA256 71ba62c024ed867f99f335ed63d7e04a7981d348cc29a3718e5c48f15a1e0fb1 SHA512 8ca0f9e896da10ad32b93e7dfa908550180912b0f1eeb8be214f54fb6cc6c7a925df26db6521a37430e5e66c31e3eafb8a7169ff92097adaff7227cb95759c14 WHIRLPOOL b7369455f0dbcb37c3a3b7afe8de1e47e3303ead0a37c7e2ae13c5ebd66031bbfca21b6f4fb8a1191e32ef17a5fe74564c93ec7861f4a8d7dbc815fecfb6e068
AUX xen-4-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch 1525 SHA256 943119cde08d16d05a927a85fb54ee4cee323cb4870dd0d90a552051fedc9907 SHA512 aa507594d96159c4e01ccfc4781f9afe7b6fe125c9df5925128c002f28fdf04999954b523cc53c6d7eaa49cb6e05120605f4e7d6f8bab6d5718d73a60b5accea WHIRLPOOL 6f4395203199b8037363ed56256e12f426f0c26f449c5e4a001c5454370a0e412f18cd03099866c30592ee0413556b85b3c374efb7172212db37ff3891c004af
AUX xen-4.2-2013-2076-XSA-52to54.patch 5214 SHA256 47c6609b32e6cebb73070a8b5767dc3bf44f2a73c8a5a1bfe41bbc9ac86981c1 SHA512 9f1a7fec53bf2d07667f0cb9a209cf3013e75b2881c5cae78ec5c3584994bb674034c77b9acbf5947c9d798276d50f2a5c09683afcae27741227abfb819e5ca9 WHIRLPOOL 53a62257456f8cdf8363dfafec0321c02547d04d1e084dc9c57307afc152765f3ec20de3cdc74e62eda88932e6e1ae647c8d3820f9214d2630aba6d7c22d9416
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-1432-XSA-58.patch 4630 SHA256 974d6495089b0168ff528d89009ddb5856dbeab5a2b366a412a58d8de574377c SHA512 d082d96adf31bf2507e96425081baeeb5ed7b639e4c41c295ec7e7d7a7617214883999a81890add93c7c833665ed1e3aa8fbce63b14260c00ddb41ffd37d00c4 WHIRLPOOL e2c744548500fe481094aad40c16c85477edef17610ac15849ee0a70c9577802000b31b7353b71b91434818477c20f2835a7072f73e5c5c98a12112e87c3aa59
AUX xen-4.2-CVE-2013-4553-XSA-74.patch 1499 SHA256 0f7d0bbfbd7f3f1b6f6005321fa45081524dad438587f691e6892cc393327f89 SHA512 cbcc6e8dd5cb9b1b699e5acd17ece100739e37d3c752f54320fda4526a79bd8280e24a1c7bd6fec32756d3602b5efdcdf274f9608b9850bbd0afe324c9152be1 WHIRLPOOL 5a4b34c7ebedb0f6e2114cfaddafa38cd160d43f9e0037387871c013ec9574d9a9c4541027e64f8cfb90a370879a7f7553bc5813f7252179fe065236aec80fda
AUX xen-4.2-XSA-84.patch 4943 SHA256 433f3c8a202482c51a48dc0e9e47ac8751d1c0d0759b7bcd22804e1856279a89 SHA512 b22b6d35b32384b49121958cab5b85bce7f46d4d00f238d0142a09e4844f24c837a86ae8673c703d44146458902bbe6e1608829099b216c48a80e5d2a368e3d4 WHIRLPOOL 51bbe7fa567040fbea228040fe8ec1638e5edb542d849f0051c114a14b61a296a19c6d09c31a1dae9fd502903484a1f7333cc5821a1f61f983443c5401b7032a
AUX xen-4.2-XSA-85.patch 948 SHA256 20571024e6815eeb40d2f92a3d70ae699047cffafb5431ec74b652e0843a5315 SHA512 43312c06ebba91a6ec1b343072c159cb1d488cc3cd2b5104b4ab210b9d157cf56f06d95514eef17433ea38c65d42fb3ebda16f8c6a6ca94b57ecbba001a6294b WHIRLPOOL 3854c41ef9f1e21d723d13f94cfd3d7f236c3348c49cf0affe162664d94c3e6bb9a6befc2f9e0959b0033af0a06cd1461474fdf10018b8a267c05a059f52c531
AUX xen-4.2-XSA-87.patch 616 SHA256 df9c1507d7bb0e5266a2fadd992d1e6ed0f7bf5be7466b8a93ed3bd8e3ab8e8d SHA512 819afdaefbf9d9033df6ffb0b0bc2e556e583fe64152f280d7cb9a7e4735239eb90eaec0b1d3a798ccb2c8f72c23ef4e8e04eb8ff5892be1e8128094370e0427 WHIRLPOOL b797fdb7844da641913414815716173c0d60e48b4304df5231ad5958c1d1690fbe04ea45158e380afbc2767303649551ff0dbec03142a8d95bdab5da60320dc4
AUX xen-4.2-efi.patch 2216 SHA256 0886961e2656fe7e140dd0ac0e6620d4c14ef0796b8f8889bda163e2a9f8db8b SHA512 ecaa4f1f1c3ca737931fe5343529708dfb7ec7040dbf2acf2b155e7c7f019ce3e2630ddb302213570a2647fe220dbf23eb6c28618d6b1be9161e25fcadd71cb4 WHIRLPOOL 63b56e22683b2755ae17e7871c1b535d750f655ff8c003979d039654f5ef3303457b5d4469f216c1744202d4d1f4561f7498c1d93171ab1110a93e3a2fa8db8d
AUX xen-4.3-CVE-2013-4553-XSA-74.patch 1389 SHA256 b505cdba662b1b1cd91d5611fac998c6b4e89e366780c6b9864b6965075afb38 SHA512 fc0c1a1777a751096bc5990eee04e754deed2f18b8c8a5d65bf19c71ba9788599369f51e2d518f613e8cea8cb0d2d22ad60cec4d1b8805d7bd8e0818a54afb2b WHIRLPOOL e324f4922f61a22840ac0268fe2643a0fe496409d12a5797d7ba057ecd4982f8a9224e20615721c34680d45145d3933090ca1a11644cd2ca8f312995c3cba96f
AUX xen-4.3-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-75.patch 1748 SHA256 039a74a4ccd1f17a5fd5341d160af87b14875dc1b2e46d8e4d337581031228d8 SHA512 195d147643b626ab9265d83ba2d7fbdef7b5716533682b723f32cbbbde6089fafb49e11c68ba6d323bb120fb0d34d85caf5ec5759048f60ba9096e479729c32b WHIRLPOOL eb52b7334ead997fea54810498be22bf47bcd2230a2ea2552b6125f3f78b5f9f9df49a7625c43ed700b3e56c6ea8979171e6be2e6d54d53c706517fc901d4702
AUX xen-4.3-CVE-2014-263-XSA-84-85.patch 6086 SHA256 91725c156bae4209f1401b38a37c1a38941ef6e9370ac3425523555fde81d835 SHA512 c26f9b3ecdb2894a72033850a532e0d9b735ba8e73c3cfc379171ec17c8f82e07596e6bd9824242702645d77e37054c0668279ad55effe10461d70e0831c39e8 WHIRLPOOL 94d0bf7fdc5064b0463344e1a09c81d9a41ab5c565c88accc511c547ed4ab3c0c7ac76443eab02c4b0153552ec2dc139da10960c5a8944aa9b49cee03160a911
AUX xen-4.3-XSA-87.patch 916 SHA256 a13ce270b177d33537d627b85471abaa01215cd458541f4c6524914d7c81eb38 SHA512 a1ad45f8311787ac0e1ed1a186f9c4e9aea924398ec7bbbc5b1e4b2d3b4617e113b385ff2aee854458270b0d73ed11defac5dfe603b1fd7b97f4c951def559b3 WHIRLPOOL b3a36c01d4e0bca3c5df42488f9bfc91e756af8c899d7414b81b7dac2bb60733555321b607ed229817ac546ebce65fddce0f8781909d7021d19b44a931fb85bf
AUX xen-4.3-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch 8854 SHA256 4e0d22acdb4ecc4a1d418ec91bc6ddb9ef1c283ee3ca1f67bac85d3116d76ccc SHA512 b4c969b0cf166862ea5c5cb0912d7dae8c5bf7befd6dd6bdf4e56df8a4daf85c0a36c94247053f74edc0f24b1c15a18e7ddae9d24ad28d54b726a1fbbab442be WHIRLPOOL de7b614ae486fd2cc591b405b475745b003c638c9be4c8153b61a368802af36d2a2974d1e022eb14fb58ad9260f9f82c438c84cb65c3499076c579f7e1c3e6ad
AUX xen-CVE-2013-1442-XSA-62.patch 1350 SHA256 364577f317a714099c068eb1ab771643ada99b5067fdd1eb5149fa5db649b856 SHA512 4738a229a6f18d670da07b3acbaf6e227af5fb3e7b0b414dc98671be02208aefc66ebe07f7396d9158d0fa15993b9d418fd65747880c64694b1a06b8be961419 WHIRLPOOL 758aed345d0c5792a5d5a53200ef5094e662be507823010bb7dcfcccd07bc38b897d67295abf2d5d5b3f1b93efc9c684af78da6e3e3d77ecb65ef69fe2f5fa6d
AUX xen-CVE-2013-4355-XSA-63.patch 5872 SHA256 32fa93d8ebdfbe85931c52010bf9e561fdae8846462c5b1f2fbc217ca36f3005 SHA512 f972de0910dff2109fc18911eeaf789963ec457d2a21029abc9615088d2c8446028effec6c1c01e080ae3479e704175e19040c09053c8ad60c0b38c7d2ec3859 WHIRLPOOL 186fcc663d6025164fc38d9aa5faf2272aaf6d3a7f2f8ba831fac28e672958776ae80cf3e92a9d6c99230bc80c6a4c83d5fa313225d4ba5594e06e1ad55e732f
AUX xen-CVE-2013-4356-XSA-64.patch 2401 SHA256 551c5b7afabc1ce10fcb2138a1d7f272dbf5482e339b005b18d9a2ca38b045b0 SHA512 d5da58e37ab6fae508b95cc3798f7d679ed3b9b58c28b453d6ff31716e75e31c186fcfb21f88e6981daef718f67e24a9a2a3eea6a9945d24e84332d8ce4e68ef WHIRLPOOL 9e3c3d9d86a1e334591351002b79557005ca3e5dea75610b64d19e741f74cf7f75184b062df7d174000b0f38c98fe7a62d99cdebe94ebbc949902e55fcecaa04
AUX xen-CVE-2013-4361-XSA-66.patch 839 SHA256 3a9b6bf114eb19d708b68dd5973763ac83b57840bc0f6fbd1fe487797eaffed4 SHA512 5abc6cb7685a9053e67c1646c6d9e06c25da6d6c7004e63e346e7b082270e1319fcc8a194a8db4e9c9cb903fe5dc29ae17169cda6fea94913fa9e0ff5aa9b451 WHIRLPOOL b98cf8aa37d259d8c5ec5cffd22ba78b5674948268e75349b3e867589052409c1872f0aa72f5cd9a1d8c44fdb74d3bfb97596bfa6ac2d201565275b6203f5095
AUX xen-CVE-2013-4368-XSA-67.patch 1307 SHA256 7de3ac9baa6cd9fead46e68912dfa0189e900095317645d0e33d85346fc8a028 SHA512 959e4760210ceb480da53c709fcdeed4bd9cec27eefbcdb7dfcf6d764184e5ecf4c225f817d8a46ff0bb74baa8d14d90c9ce39bb51c9a781cbc524227b02e153 WHIRLPOOL ee7dad69b15ecfc8636e56b2373660777ce594fcef6ee2b863b9cf3a4badf269d3214f193374addbee678a80f3bbbfb416189d78edb426baa6d25ac5df748637
AUX xen-CVE-2013-4375-XSA-71.patch 1628 SHA256 f1ef802098be2220ec1c0e0d20ff5385d34036b8cd312001dcc0e17fbe25f8d1 SHA512 9d057827933decc046506c46e1a482424169cc8d525ac49a39b296181615a4525383851e990fd3d46995db2f8261d92dc7955354cdf6ca15db8cbb89def17c6d WHIRLPOOL d1749db3dcceb5221dad395e2caede633456a304d922070096889b4b7d8e79bcda5fe4f7c8cb3e5f1e6c9dae349ef744d98290f286cbfc3737b0ff62f198e2a8
AUX xen-CVE-2013-4494-XSA-73.patch 3723 SHA256 1c070e66d1bea3c109f22ea4db2e8828f0f4b016d51d6d88667b775eec340514 SHA512 d14be9077685aec682f2cfa23886bc430fe55d985650e5392da0988f69f242ac0fa242c84448e8203ab6dd1b44904a2f38ad9e8976a829100193a1c06efb8417 WHIRLPOOL 96a15f94eed123a5ff53193c8dcf708aa17d21b3ebe23b5fc50b7ecbdf64ed4f827252389cc15249d05041d036853053f3846b3fea3538fc8724fe828ca57bde
AUX xen-CVE-2013-4554-XSA-76.patch 556 SHA256 8c4d460c71e8e8dffa32ce24f57ce872ccd8623ab72fd38be432f0a2b097e7c1 SHA512 4bfd4dfc560629968a81b4f9b7509d8366208ca6d7987f27da44a41caa840437f623ed5ab489c9a1623c99ba9e702a5d647aa833961ed7d4ab72d0141258d6a4 WHIRLPOOL 6a7020ff3df9020a716b3ecdd3dd11869025e7205c17a9314a8f2705812b1a9e6fd4a19d891d00ca5c750456f4c871317c0ec451ab84db3c985c57e92ecb47d4
AUX xen-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-78.patch 926 SHA256 63aeab44272c17d079c9b8e22732c8c31e767236bb0ceb73d9f6226c5ae31d35 SHA512 d6aa117c570881015bdb93efaaf386fc4f141ef012017ab0a51bd63a024f5e9eef3856243235533d46ac7b67bffd10e0913a06f65e194581a6a70cbd6a6bf5ca WHIRLPOOL 16b04f8191b2243c05541742a98dface491ebe8db47e050eb14e74352182bfd02a86867c1ad644b3cef209008cfbb5d0499073447fbef49c5de129e1bdf519d6
AUX xen-CVE-2013-6400-XSA-80.patch 2072 SHA256 d15e627c59dd48e1cacb2fbcd5e2148975daa426df1f693b991d69201c048e77 SHA512 119d4a183c8a56496b337bb5c797e63df99ac88f879d0700e6ed4573a21901dd45fbc997cbaa8d4d635da574eb46ceb6d91a846cfb20b6d0a0b42381cfb9144c WHIRLPOOL 217c68bbe0b179a0f81fd591b546389a21f82acc3d60b5bdf1d6323263ce4a6ceb18d45dc0089c3758f179937b50816f1d53287f9b9b6486b4303e92df6d9cb3
AUX xen-CVE-2013-6885-XSA-82.patch 1447 SHA256 db47b9dcb2124995754e7b43d7eedb5aae5c6d2dda6d43d313751b419ffd12e7 SHA512 f62b9bf0aae1eb22a551fc98d74f5baec391589be5252d472aa9b30012f426a7302063b02ceb3bc9b3fe88c67033eb771a4112727052ed3f9b5dc9d39f47f39d WHIRLPOOL 38678c9c32bc172a675bd0351a81743b92bbf72cbd14a29cc1a7ef15b8149bd4841816425142defdebc233a2dc58281e893533053e6310173ad3a5573233d1f5
DIST xen-4.2.2.tar.gz 15602746 SHA256 c9bfe91a5e72f8545acebad9889d64368020359bfe18044c0e683133e55ae005 SHA512 4943b18016ed8c2b194a3b55e6655b3b734b39ffb8cb7ee0a0580f2f4460a1d0e92e1de8ac23f5186272914fad1650586af51fd7c3644d0310eb16f2e11c5e80 WHIRLPOOL 519eb87cb2da694696cbc3e72070a0a3bdb07c46fa266d855d8379eec3a92adfa4d434af3ac01c37834ce4a9174081a6c40030b185a70902329b185cb8d0bbea
DIST xen-4.2.3-upstream-patches-0.tar.xz 84436 SHA256 7c2477b9b29c9d84bb26ed60bfc2700f2a614ed8040b93906e801831f3498b41 SHA512 a4e8b53a0efb9d64d4dc65ee3107422c8007537e03f9c8e6f1b2c838cf62e6819d447c1ed44aacb5c4e9979f0dad7ed313d2db61df6e6ad2d7708a81964a7e12 WHIRLPOOL cc3c2224bba3b2e5f057ec95f9e85e58b17bc0dce338da429c7970877967cddf69228258ff491be9c1d022169a90fcde34ef1bcb0c198c9123ca219707a5a99f
DIST xen-4.2.3.tar.gz 15613235 SHA256 69b6a73701383d609ad094a38925004e8595755fb39a6fafd579ba754e8667db SHA512 01521c8724354f92a2555683a8b103e5e16aedeb2c6166cc3ce40a0cc6cd9e07a601aa24930bb7391e00eb97f04003e6523dead09382cf86eb56f5b886509b9a WHIRLPOOL e7f7848ad632e5e77db95b2eb37c82f31a73021af4b6bb44091cc14103faa193bc2d6deb089e2a196daab5a08dbc08f135a8937a25a4ff5d31fe37c789bae1e9
DIST xen-4.2.4.tar.gz 15663999 SHA256 e23e6292affd7a6d82da99527e8bf3964e57eb7322144c67c2025692b1a21550 SHA512 3e5263511e7c40899f580f3384bd987f9c875b8e6816202fd1a5a64fe7e336803d09e58148af074938ef261f0ceeafad121ac541ddd2bf66b76c5aa4ad07c357 WHIRLPOOL 25d23f5d921139ba0f853fcd76ae998647d32292bccfd4e7c4f3b12f860a38fbb33ebda67c839657bf3a25d837c9c02b80d663362263d16d42284ffde09f0bc2
DIST xen-4.3.1.tar.gz 16429423 SHA256 3b5b7cc508b1739753585b5c25635471cdcef680e8770a78bf6ef9333d26a9fd SHA512 f5250ad5ad3defc5dc1207eb6208a3928128ef57ac4162018bd92b750dc1df1eaaf37835528aca33a0f9e04c82d5f8c4ba79c03a1780d2b72cbb90cc26f77275 WHIRLPOOL 087390786cea9aee273a5d81988436303991aa5ea92faf111d3b619517368f8c8feef84f4f8c602cac723980a344eb90414887db4ca88a2ee14bc6b0253e36ca
DIST xen-4.3.2.tar.gz 16472188 SHA256 17611d95f955302560ff72d97c08933b4e62bc2e8ffb71400fc54e388746ff69 SHA512 ec94d849b56ec590b89022075ce43768d8ef44b7be9580ce032509b44c085f0f66495845607a18cd3dea6b89c69bc2a18012705556f59288cd8653c3e5eca302 WHIRLPOOL 72250369fb2c90ba608e1da018cb6417b3089642c8ba59af9f2825ec5ba7c4e6c5d6f86140b20825817e4625727c6d58c5d38b00863c994e31c8a04927997bd3
EBUILD xen-4.2.2-r1.ebuild 3756 SHA256 2ad7f2faed080ea2e4d991d7dd902826059e4a22b444e2f1b74b5bc1e54d50a2 SHA512 c6041bf852ffa425d93134e9c08334c71e96dc9cb795c8bc7a5eb485fa46d55f5de61ff9db55d484cbe0b641d9e850e4eb7c0eefd1b021ed21a050e1e78c4177 WHIRLPOOL 86e7873cc84b01064c1e7cd46003a43104257a3f7330a1433d85ce841b658a0a35e18f9284b8520a497b408d4b5ab6ce76cb1af67fb42019b86517f4b51f2d61
EBUILD xen-4.2.2-r4.ebuild 4188 SHA256 b141799dd9644b3db75f52b849a1610c0a68db78a9188a6df7700ccdb90e4404 SHA512 26d6201b9fedafa9219bdccad75e8e0985d5dcfa2c4b5e133c2861848725f06784e3ac57cc6ea524c2b4697281cbe288fc8fcfd4357948e73b57d5f4dcbd8337 WHIRLPOOL 6d7c030927b19c99904b59f4d1f0796b2fcfa3857a0217959c718c5c45b7b2f467905f6bb425095a686b87d7c52d635886ff322c861301e509a4f54cb7c724ec
EBUILD xen-4.2.3.ebuild 4206 SHA256 3f512a5c18718406642045b29ddbc48fb4335c58b597685ca5c0b874d7b8e7c7 SHA512 8db1157adb3a1eb266678c8afcb7c5d9bcf2a11afb06997797011e274918f51bda20c1f1bd7cd43cfa71b4843041823e04e29a679f7c9b420f0363877ce538f9 WHIRLPOOL 66e68c39479600b986496d5bb6c98602a8ecdde02266b4673ee66b84e160eb3c70ffec07224c7415f610c974331c85e87c145a7e4300537baa5aff7f81c15720
EBUILD xen-4.2.4.ebuild 4208 SHA256 d833fce1323c30ff8799c3edcb69a5ac3e55622f6db058dd127ce62490e469b3 SHA512 e839e36c15d94408d111b01b8e6003c4107a196b564c89f6bc694751a84ea32d6f1f561c2c1da9111d804be8ec236ec5bccaf4ac25f5f3c1f510392861cf4f0a WHIRLPOOL cf3d54a317c2ddc84264e3b1a017834c2f149d9888a94ca6696fd9743e007f252d79233e14a0c1aa69f36269a65473fa86b23c5c884d30ee08839d6364b1c939
EBUILD xen-4.3.1-r1.ebuild 3901 SHA256 a94af83d0bb8ffcebd66223309818da75c60507ae2c9e803eac7488fd3970de9 SHA512 12ea99f6475d9c40c00b3aae81ba620a28fd65f72e93c93c5cd516e61966a6fc3d7a5b17919cb2704e08c9ff354b9d7fa610c461ff71ec99e11eed82ad7735f5 WHIRLPOOL 0c8ba609acb43bdc3df00b1298519b1bbabb941f032f43a6b386b5570da83767d929fbd1ef07e2b5a80b538544fcd2ec1cd0807f4f58840b6f7d7e25205fafc4
EBUILD xen-4.3.1-r4.ebuild 4046 SHA256 ca2891ecaba07397c621ac68746be1d40159cdd5f1b57d38a1db28d9fdeff1ca SHA512 d9af0ff66b69e43b5853ebe389a86beb02950a4c7be7d083c2dacda4ff2f05bc502e5a665304430659bc64b88057ec3d550688a43474b05e4d01fad8763df213 WHIRLPOOL ed60050e57c54a43094a33bb3f9bb6a9b7ca5d8df88e1c4ef0b474ec6fb3834b55488a1a1ce1a8c2058dcc1226eca6660bc8ca7aafc74b20cd9d786883deb5aa
EBUILD xen-4.2.3.ebuild 4212 SHA256 f09e7ea233bef41c17089ca7a046c6944f214e81907fb09ee0940e3735bed992 SHA512 d9d42dabf5114fb259c22eb6cd2b1a956cabbaf18131dcb562c23dcd55698607ae5049667c954f4454bb6adb0cfc46054bb23215cf5bf29ec16aeb13b85d46f2 WHIRLPOOL 935e22e705fc0364c41bb18b4780a435de2e8c48bb1fb8f6ebfa501f486f03f03c064bfc77d045afb961d4bfc2db1e12b276bbbbfece359cd54885df822016be
EBUILD xen-4.2.4.ebuild 4213 SHA256 99be813c840774024cff83f02b0d2bb7d9e479882d60d48aa114ea302e576379 SHA512 e5ed5103ac91a0fd1acb1209db063c2b145e45f5e171f235499acad5faaf571e4b06c80113fa0f4e7d891df31c331159403b28a8c470122d27f1246bf2920f9b WHIRLPOOL 43b307924681ffaf7f31647b490091e6ec25909fe73548e3b215b2457706a407050bdf1684ce13f825a58272e37a977b6dc202083567329c80b487941e691dd5
EBUILD xen-4.3.1-r5.ebuild 4118 SHA256 acac2edea0a26f1025254f754e864e386e70488d9d0d7d9a5743552c61022b9b SHA512 c75f3cee4665776b2f350101f7cde6efa916c45976ee1f690a4d0ed07cffd051d0bfdc0cc006b7f0a463e747a5cc7b41900ecbaa1ab32505f0fefd68811c610f WHIRLPOOL e6a4eda3889fbb94430ddc50be50cb71a3a292595dd19399d14d1bcdd06f19ea40bdc3c0a926cd8791c3af9cb883bb3564a35acd1ca647aed2b4cd179261871a
EBUILD xen-4.3.2.ebuild 4102 SHA256 b731dc04d1cfb6d354420388dc79ae166b6f707fca840e49ba28579c8d06963e SHA512 f38bd957b3fe0d0ec1567f47d0388f8ad878072df8d8b49d892ad0cc928553b33fc724f5e1f42f42155e9b4518a98442308930f69350b1519aa863ac0309419d WHIRLPOOL ba361cc30d89c2d2df6cbe8e1f127bab3c4584fdc6a22ae756b46f9b757f6cb950551e2ed5a221146ad7ca84aee18a4a77ccbfddde6ba6151312e578db260ab7
MISC ChangeLog 28046 SHA256 0731acd2e896315c5df2df0610d64fc5734210e3f196c16fb2b46e878bad1c3b SHA512 6e47348d60ea818691bd5fc335b8cdf3977f38cab419a20034d532da072d277277e6ddbf5927421ee0e7ea8d7b2b0580411ba1101515e338f02ebdf5b52cc666 WHIRLPOOL be9a311d5718626fc979ff6f94ebb57fa6dd3912dca2efe54341e626a6e967f62f69335dcade637aaab491869e71f7883c972b34e7b9210fca2043c293c6844c
EBUILD xen-4.3.2.ebuild 4107 SHA256 ffd84a6285e31ab05435e2143522c00ddd71683e9199a82189db406be8b0703f SHA512 2ece621e74731ae5a41b4de59b0a68be449941a12e0464cca4c5664e14f9f75cce3f109829c4d3c0adb3558c5b39a5f73b6b924c2e32e348b885258def75aa1f WHIRLPOOL bc4da56fdd53440a1a85ce1a872d39a30ec460e0ce0b8726cfc54c6aea42854b8e2691d53d49abc3140526d9a1884d113fa7e0ca40022f04c63c756a4face81a
MISC ChangeLog 28332 SHA256 35fe6917922426c6cd99c498ab7805b7e21c6beb36ea2731ea065028d1a0d19c SHA512 bb20d1c890fa3a1102b181c0c70affa0f0f73797718b842b3945a7de7f56ff9aec4842656b8b51a51cc2c921401b7bb4adc44dd6abe783d6363be5bb9ca2447f WHIRLPOOL 93a57b93e1459802c779aa507b7ba9e4307fd50ccc9e229390ddeb990a5f62d206a5b784c82d272c712e114e8fc713dfb99f6d2ecc7f821dd4d1d49dd6eafc4f
MISC metadata.xml 480 SHA256 c6d867148db1480748552aea9692bdee95fb98a94fcfadab0d128cbf1102b0d5 SHA512 888aa860cbb74d79c76f096107d8b22975470373ab11249da2c4ae9c4e172bc52fee73fdfaf07c19e977cabbbdf35ea5b3c6508d4a6f555b771ab6729806fe5c WHIRLPOOL c4d10589ca2c8b4e8bbd877dfc8f4f3b66ce8ae7bece71617e9571f07a39270f54c41f5fbbb2b29020ffc6473e2341064bd708813af3e20a31d5b9bd0510ebe2
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)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=OqGr
iEYEAREIAAYFAlMG2lQACgkQso7CE7gHKw2p+wCgqZQsXHchIF6ig+5NmkoN1kGk
nDwAoIU+UsF0GspoUcZwk9qbyQoQC/7j
=ZcWd
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

252
app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1918-XSA-45_1.patch
View file

@ -1,252 +0,0 @@
x86: make vcpu_destroy_pagetables() preemptible
... as it may take significant amounts of time.
The function, being moved to mm.c as the better home for it anyway, and
to avoid having to make a new helper function there non-static, is
given a "preemptible" parameter temporarily (until, in a subsequent
patch, its other caller is also being made capable of dealing with
preemption).
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -73,8 +73,6 @@ void (*dead_idle) (void) __read_mostly =
static void paravirt_ctxt_switch_from(struct vcpu *v);
static void paravirt_ctxt_switch_to(struct vcpu *v);
-static void vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *v);
-
static void default_idle(void)
{
local_irq_disable();
@@ -1058,7 +1056,7 @@ void arch_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v)
if ( !is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
{
destroy_gdt(v);
- vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v);
+ vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v, 0);
}
else
{
@@ -2069,63 +2067,6 @@ static int relinquish_memory(
return ret;
}
-static void vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *v)
-{
- struct domain *d = v->domain;
- unsigned long pfn;
-
-#ifdef __x86_64__
- if ( is_pv_32on64_vcpu(v) )
- {
- pfn = l4e_get_pfn(*(l4_pgentry_t *)
- __va(pagetable_get_paddr(v->arch.guest_table)));
-
- if ( pfn != 0 )
- {
- if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
- put_page(mfn_to_page(pfn));
- else
- put_page_and_type(mfn_to_page(pfn));
- }
-
- l4e_write(
- (l4_pgentry_t *)__va(pagetable_get_paddr(v->arch.guest_table)),
- l4e_empty());
-
- v->arch.cr3 = 0;
- return;
- }
-#endif
-
- pfn = pagetable_get_pfn(v->arch.guest_table);
- if ( pfn != 0 )
- {
- if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
- put_page(mfn_to_page(pfn));
- else
- put_page_and_type(mfn_to_page(pfn));
- v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_null();
- }
-
-#ifdef __x86_64__
- /* Drop ref to guest_table_user (from MMUEXT_NEW_USER_BASEPTR) */
- pfn = pagetable_get_pfn(v->arch.guest_table_user);
- if ( pfn != 0 )
- {
- if ( !is_pv_32bit_vcpu(v) )
- {
- if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
- put_page(mfn_to_page(pfn));
- else
- put_page_and_type(mfn_to_page(pfn));
- }
- v->arch.guest_table_user = pagetable_null();
- }
-#endif
-
- v->arch.cr3 = 0;
-}
-
int domain_relinquish_resources(struct domain *d)
{
int ret;
@@ -2143,7 +2084,11 @@ int domain_relinquish_resources(struct d
/* Drop the in-use references to page-table bases. */
for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
- vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v);
+ {
+ ret = vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v, 1);
+ if ( ret )
+ return ret;
+ }
if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
{
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -2808,6 +2808,82 @@ static void put_superpage(unsigned long
#endif
+static int put_old_guest_table(struct vcpu *v)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if ( !v->arch.old_guest_table )
+ return 0;
+
+ switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(v->arch.old_guest_table, 1) )
+ {
+ case -EINTR:
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+
+ v->arch.old_guest_table = NULL;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *v, bool_t preemptible)
+{
+ unsigned long mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(v->arch.guest_table);
+ struct page_info *page;
+ int rc = put_old_guest_table(v);
+
+ if ( rc )
+ return rc;
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+ if ( is_pv_32on64_vcpu(v) )
+ mfn = l4e_get_pfn(*(l4_pgentry_t *)mfn_to_virt(mfn));
+#endif
+
+ if ( mfn )
+ {
+ page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
+ if ( paging_mode_refcounts(v->domain) )
+ put_page(page);
+ else
+ rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, preemptible);
+ }
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+ if ( is_pv_32on64_vcpu(v) )
+ {
+ if ( !rc )
+ l4e_write(
+ (l4_pgentry_t *)__va(pagetable_get_paddr(v->arch.guest_table)),
+ l4e_empty());
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ if ( !rc )
+ {
+ v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_null();
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+ /* Drop ref to guest_table_user (from MMUEXT_NEW_USER_BASEPTR) */
+ mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(v->arch.guest_table_user);
+ if ( mfn )
+ {
+ page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
+ if ( paging_mode_refcounts(v->domain) )
+ put_page(page);
+ else
+ rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, preemptible);
+ }
+ if ( !rc )
+ v->arch.guest_table_user = pagetable_null();
+#endif
+ }
+
+ v->arch.cr3 = 0;
+
+ return rc;
+}
int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long mfn)
{
@@ -2994,12 +3070,21 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
unsigned int foreigndom)
{
struct mmuext_op op;
- int rc = 0, i = 0, okay;
unsigned long type;
- unsigned int done = 0;
+ unsigned int i = 0, done = 0;
struct vcpu *curr = current;
struct domain *d = curr->domain;
struct domain *pg_owner;
+ int okay, rc = put_old_guest_table(curr);
+
+ if ( unlikely(rc) )
+ {
+ if ( likely(rc == -EAGAIN) )
+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
+ __HYPERVISOR_mmuext_op, "hihi", uops, count, pdone,
+ foreigndom);
+ return rc;
+ }
if ( unlikely(count & MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED) )
{
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ int compat_mmuext_op(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(mm
: mcs->call.args[1];
unsigned int left = arg1 & ~MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED;
- BUG_ON(left == arg1);
+ BUG_ON(left == arg1 && left != i);
BUG_ON(left > count);
guest_handle_add_offset(nat_ops, i - left);
guest_handle_subtract_offset(cmp_uops, left);
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
@@ -464,6 +464,7 @@ struct arch_vcpu
pagetable_t guest_table_user; /* (MFN) x86/64 user-space pagetable */
#endif
pagetable_t guest_table; /* (MFN) guest notion of cr3 */
+ struct page_info *old_guest_table; /* partially destructed pagetable */
/* guest_table holds a ref to the page, and also a type-count unless
* shadow refcounts are in use */
pagetable_t shadow_table[4]; /* (MFN) shadow(s) of guest */
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ void audit_domains(void);
int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long pfn);
void make_cr3(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long mfn);
void update_cr3(struct vcpu *v);
+int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *, bool_t preemptible);
void propagate_page_fault(unsigned long addr, u16 error_code);
void *do_page_walk(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr);

169
app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1918-XSA-45_2.patch
View file

@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
x86: make new_guest_cr3() preemptible
... as it may take significant amounts of time.
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -2889,44 +2889,69 @@ int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long mfn)
{
struct vcpu *curr = current;
struct domain *d = curr->domain;
- int okay;
+ int rc;
unsigned long old_base_mfn;
#ifdef __x86_64__
if ( is_pv_32on64_domain(d) )
{
- okay = paging_mode_refcounts(d)
- ? 0 /* Old code was broken, but what should it be? */
- : mod_l4_entry(
+ rc = paging_mode_refcounts(d)
+ ? -EINVAL /* Old code was broken, but what should it be? */
+ : mod_l4_entry(
__va(pagetable_get_paddr(curr->arch.guest_table)),
l4e_from_pfn(
mfn,
(_PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_RW|_PAGE_USER|_PAGE_ACCESSED)),
- pagetable_get_pfn(curr->arch.guest_table), 0, 0, curr) == 0;
- if ( unlikely(!okay) )
+ pagetable_get_pfn(curr->arch.guest_table), 0, 1, curr);
+ switch ( rc )
{
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case -EINTR:
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ default:
MEM_LOG("Error while installing new compat baseptr %lx", mfn);
- return 0;
+ return rc;
}
invalidate_shadow_ldt(curr, 0);
write_ptbase(curr);
- return 1;
+ return 0;
}
#endif
- okay = paging_mode_refcounts(d)
- ? get_page_from_pagenr(mfn, d)
- : !get_page_and_type_from_pagenr(mfn, PGT_root_page_table, d, 0, 0);
- if ( unlikely(!okay) )
+ rc = put_old_guest_table(curr);
+ if ( unlikely(rc) )
+ return rc;
+
+ old_base_mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(curr->arch.guest_table);
+ /*
+ * This is particularly important when getting restarted after the
+ * previous attempt got preempted in the put-old-MFN phase.
+ */
+ if ( old_base_mfn == mfn )
{
- MEM_LOG("Error while installing new baseptr %lx", mfn);
+ write_ptbase(curr);
return 0;
}
- invalidate_shadow_ldt(curr, 0);
+ rc = paging_mode_refcounts(d)
+ ? (get_page_from_pagenr(mfn, d) ? 0 : -EINVAL)
+ : get_page_and_type_from_pagenr(mfn, PGT_root_page_table, d, 0, 1);
+ switch ( rc )
+ {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case -EINTR:
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ default:
+ MEM_LOG("Error while installing new baseptr %lx", mfn);
+ return rc;
+ }
- old_base_mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(curr->arch.guest_table);
+ invalidate_shadow_ldt(curr, 0);
curr->arch.guest_table = pagetable_from_pfn(mfn);
update_cr3(curr);
@@ -2935,13 +2960,25 @@ int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long mfn)
if ( likely(old_base_mfn != 0) )
{
+ struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(old_base_mfn);
+
if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
- put_page(mfn_to_page(old_base_mfn));
+ put_page(page);
else
- put_page_and_type(mfn_to_page(old_base_mfn));
+ switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1) )
+ {
+ case -EINTR:
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG_ON(rc);
+ break;
+ }
}
- return 1;
+ return rc;
}
static struct domain *get_pg_owner(domid_t domid)
@@ -3239,8 +3276,13 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
}
case MMUEXT_NEW_BASEPTR:
- okay = (!paging_mode_translate(d)
- && new_guest_cr3(op.arg1.mfn));
+ if ( paging_mode_translate(d) )
+ okay = 0;
+ else
+ {
+ rc = new_guest_cr3(op.arg1.mfn);
+ okay = !rc;
+ }
break;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -2407,12 +2407,23 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
#endif
}
page = get_page_from_gfn(v->domain, gfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
- rc = page ? new_guest_cr3(page_to_mfn(page)) : 0;
if ( page )
+ {
+ rc = new_guest_cr3(page_to_mfn(page));
put_page(page);
+ }
+ else
+ rc = -EINVAL;
domain_unlock(v->domain);
- if ( rc == 0 ) /* not okay */
+ switch ( rc )
+ {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case -EAGAIN: /* retry after preemption */
+ goto skip;
+ default: /* not okay */
goto fail;
+ }
break;
}

74
app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1918-XSA-45_3.patch
View file

@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
x86: make MMUEXT_NEW_USER_BASEPTR preemptible
... as it may take significant amounts of time.
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -3296,29 +3296,56 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
break;
}
+ old_mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(curr->arch.guest_table_user);
+ /*
+ * This is particularly important when getting restarted after the
+ * previous attempt got preempted in the put-old-MFN phase.
+ */
+ if ( old_mfn == op.arg1.mfn )
+ break;
+
if ( op.arg1.mfn != 0 )
{
if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
okay = get_page_from_pagenr(op.arg1.mfn, d);
else
- okay = !get_page_and_type_from_pagenr(
- op.arg1.mfn, PGT_root_page_table, d, 0, 0);
+ {
+ rc = get_page_and_type_from_pagenr(
+ op.arg1.mfn, PGT_root_page_table, d, 0, 1);
+ okay = !rc;
+ }
if ( unlikely(!okay) )
{
- MEM_LOG("Error while installing new mfn %lx", op.arg1.mfn);
+ if ( rc == -EINTR )
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ else if ( rc != -EAGAIN )
+ MEM_LOG("Error while installing new mfn %lx",
+ op.arg1.mfn);
break;
}
}
- old_mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(curr->arch.guest_table_user);
curr->arch.guest_table_user = pagetable_from_pfn(op.arg1.mfn);
if ( old_mfn != 0 )
{
+ struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(old_mfn);
+
if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
- put_page(mfn_to_page(old_mfn));
+ put_page(page);
else
- put_page_and_type(mfn_to_page(old_mfn));
+ switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1) )
+ {
+ case -EINTR:
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ okay = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG_ON(rc);
+ break;
+ }
}
break;

200
app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1918-XSA-45_4.patch
View file

@ -1,200 +0,0 @@
x86: make vcpu_reset() preemptible
... as dropping the old page tables may take significant amounts of
time.
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -1051,17 +1051,16 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
#undef c
}
-void arch_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v)
+int arch_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v)
{
if ( !is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
{
destroy_gdt(v);
- vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v, 0);
- }
- else
- {
- vcpu_end_shutdown_deferral(v);
+ return vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v);
}
+
+ vcpu_end_shutdown_deferral(v);
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -2085,7 +2084,7 @@ int domain_relinquish_resources(struct d
/* Drop the in-use references to page-table bases. */
for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
{
- ret = vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v, 1);
+ ret = vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v);
if ( ret )
return ret;
}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -3509,8 +3509,11 @@ static void hvm_s3_suspend(struct domain
for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
{
+ int rc;
+
vlapic_reset(vcpu_vlapic(v));
- vcpu_reset(v);
+ rc = vcpu_reset(v);
+ ASSERT(!rc);
}
vpic_reset(d);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
@@ -252,10 +252,13 @@ static void vlapic_init_sipi_action(unsi
{
case APIC_DM_INIT: {
bool_t fpu_initialised;
+ int rc;
+
domain_lock(target->domain);
/* Reset necessary VCPU state. This does not include FPU state. */
fpu_initialised = target->fpu_initialised;
- vcpu_reset(target);
+ rc = vcpu_reset(target);
+ ASSERT(!rc);
target->fpu_initialised = fpu_initialised;
vlapic_reset(vcpu_vlapic(target));
domain_unlock(target->domain);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -2827,7 +2827,7 @@ static int put_old_guest_table(struct vc
return rc;
}
-int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *v, bool_t preemptible)
+int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *v)
{
unsigned long mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(v->arch.guest_table);
struct page_info *page;
@@ -2847,7 +2847,7 @@ int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu
if ( paging_mode_refcounts(v->domain) )
put_page(page);
else
- rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, preemptible);
+ rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1);
}
#ifdef __x86_64__
@@ -2873,7 +2873,7 @@ int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu
if ( paging_mode_refcounts(v->domain) )
put_page(page);
else
- rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, preemptible);
+ rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1);
}
if ( !rc )
v->arch.guest_table_user = pagetable_null();
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -779,14 +779,18 @@ void domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(
domain_unpause(d);
}
-void vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v)
+int vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v)
{
struct domain *d = v->domain;
+ int rc;
vcpu_pause(v);
domain_lock(d);
- arch_vcpu_reset(v);
+ set_bit(_VPF_in_reset, &v->pause_flags);
+ rc = arch_vcpu_reset(v);
+ if ( rc )
+ goto out_unlock;
set_bit(_VPF_down, &v->pause_flags);
@@ -802,9 +806,13 @@ void vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v)
#endif
cpumask_clear(v->cpu_affinity_tmp);
clear_bit(_VPF_blocked, &v->pause_flags);
+ clear_bit(_VPF_in_reset, &v->pause_flags);
+ out_unlock:
domain_unlock(v->domain);
vcpu_unpause(v);
+
+ return rc;
}
--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
@@ -306,8 +306,10 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_domc
if ( guest_handle_is_null(op->u.vcpucontext.ctxt) )
{
- vcpu_reset(v);
- ret = 0;
+ ret = vcpu_reset(v);
+ if ( ret == -EAGAIN )
+ ret = hypercall_create_continuation(
+ __HYPERVISOR_domctl, "h", u_domctl);
goto svc_out;
}
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ void audit_domains(void);
int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long pfn);
void make_cr3(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long mfn);
void update_cr3(struct vcpu *v);
-int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *, bool_t preemptible);
+int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *);
void propagate_page_fault(unsigned long addr, u16 error_code);
void *do_page_walk(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr);
--- a/xen/include/xen/domain.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/domain.h
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ typedef union {
struct vcpu *alloc_vcpu(
struct domain *d, unsigned int vcpu_id, unsigned int cpu_id);
struct vcpu *alloc_dom0_vcpu0(void);
-void vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v);
+int vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *);
struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo;
void getdomaininfo(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info);
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ void arch_dump_vcpu_info(struct vcpu *v)
void arch_dump_domain_info(struct domain *d);
-void arch_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v);
+int arch_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *);
extern spinlock_t vcpu_alloc_lock;
bool_t domctl_lock_acquire(void);
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -644,6 +644,9 @@ static inline struct domain *next_domain
/* VCPU is blocked due to missing mem_sharing ring. */
#define _VPF_mem_sharing 6
#define VPF_mem_sharing (1UL<<_VPF_mem_sharing)
+ /* VCPU is being reset. */
+#define _VPF_in_reset 7
+#define VPF_in_reset (1UL<<_VPF_in_reset)
static inline int vcpu_runnable(struct vcpu *v)
{

204
app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1918-XSA-45_5.patch
View file

@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
x86: make arch_set_info_guest() preemptible
.. as the root page table validation (and the dropping of an eventual
old one) can require meaningful amounts of time.
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -858,6 +858,9 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
if ( !v->is_initialised )
{
+ if ( !compat && !(flags & VGCF_in_kernel) && !c.nat->ctrlreg[1] )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
v->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_base = c(ldt_base);
v->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_ents = c(ldt_ents);
}
@@ -955,24 +958,44 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
if ( rc != 0 )
return rc;
+ set_bit(_VPF_in_reset, &v->pause_flags);
+
if ( !compat )
- {
cr3_gfn = xen_cr3_to_pfn(c.nat->ctrlreg[3]);
- cr3_page = get_page_from_gfn(d, cr3_gfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
-
- if ( !cr3_page )
- {
- destroy_gdt(v);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- if ( !paging_mode_refcounts(d)
- && !get_page_type(cr3_page, PGT_base_page_table) )
- {
- put_page(cr3_page);
- destroy_gdt(v);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ else
+ cr3_gfn = compat_cr3_to_pfn(c.cmp->ctrlreg[3]);
+#endif
+ cr3_page = get_page_from_gfn(d, cr3_gfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
+ if ( !cr3_page )
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ else if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
+ /* nothing */;
+ else if ( cr3_page == v->arch.old_guest_table )
+ {
+ v->arch.old_guest_table = NULL;
+ put_page(cr3_page);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * Since v->arch.guest_table{,_user} are both NULL, this effectively
+ * is just a call to put_old_guest_table().
+ */
+ if ( !compat )
+ rc = vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v);
+ if ( !rc )
+ rc = get_page_type_preemptible(cr3_page,
+ !compat ? PGT_root_page_table
+ : PGT_l3_page_table);
+ if ( rc == -EINTR )
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ }
+ if ( rc )
+ /* handled below */;
+ else if ( !compat )
+ {
v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_from_page(cr3_page);
#ifdef __x86_64__
if ( c.nat->ctrlreg[1] )
@@ -980,56 +1003,44 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
cr3_gfn = xen_cr3_to_pfn(c.nat->ctrlreg[1]);
cr3_page = get_page_from_gfn(d, cr3_gfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
- if ( !cr3_page ||
- (!paging_mode_refcounts(d)
- && !get_page_type(cr3_page, PGT_base_page_table)) )
+ if ( !cr3_page )
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ else if ( !paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
{
- if (cr3_page)
- put_page(cr3_page);
- cr3_page = pagetable_get_page(v->arch.guest_table);
- v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_null();
- if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
- put_page(cr3_page);
- else
- put_page_and_type(cr3_page);
- destroy_gdt(v);
- return -EINVAL;
+ rc = get_page_type_preemptible(cr3_page, PGT_root_page_table);
+ switch ( rc )
+ {
+ case -EINTR:
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ v->arch.old_guest_table =
+ pagetable_get_page(v->arch.guest_table);
+ v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_null();
+ break;
+ }
}
-
- v->arch.guest_table_user = pagetable_from_page(cr3_page);
- }
- else if ( !(flags & VGCF_in_kernel) )
- {
- destroy_gdt(v);
- return -EINVAL;
+ if ( !rc )
+ v->arch.guest_table_user = pagetable_from_page(cr3_page);
}
}
else
{
l4_pgentry_t *l4tab;
- cr3_gfn = compat_cr3_to_pfn(c.cmp->ctrlreg[3]);
- cr3_page = get_page_from_gfn(d, cr3_gfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
-
- if ( !cr3_page)
- {
- destroy_gdt(v);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (!paging_mode_refcounts(d)
- && !get_page_type(cr3_page, PGT_l3_page_table) )
- {
- put_page(cr3_page);
- destroy_gdt(v);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
l4tab = __va(pagetable_get_paddr(v->arch.guest_table));
*l4tab = l4e_from_pfn(page_to_mfn(cr3_page),
_PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_RW|_PAGE_USER|_PAGE_ACCESSED);
#endif
}
+ if ( rc )
+ {
+ if ( cr3_page )
+ put_page(cr3_page);
+ destroy_gdt(v);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ clear_bit(_VPF_in_reset, &v->pause_flags);
if ( v->vcpu_id == 0 )
update_domain_wallclock_time(d);
--- a/xen/common/compat/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/compat/domain.c
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ int compat_vcpu_op(int cmd, int vcpuid,
rc = v->is_initialised ? -EEXIST : arch_set_info_guest(v, cmp_ctxt);
domain_unlock(d);
+ if ( rc == -EAGAIN )
+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op, "iih",
+ cmd, vcpuid, arg);
+
xfree(cmp_ctxt);
break;
}
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -849,6 +849,11 @@ long do_vcpu_op(int cmd, int vcpuid, XEN
domain_unlock(d);
free_vcpu_guest_context(ctxt);
+
+ if ( rc == -EAGAIN )
+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op, "iih",
+ cmd, vcpuid, arg);
+
break;
case VCPUOP_up: {
--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
@@ -338,6 +338,10 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_domc
domain_pause(d);
ret = arch_set_info_guest(v, c);
domain_unpause(d);
+
+ if ( ret == -EAGAIN )
+ ret = hypercall_create_continuation(
+ __HYPERVISOR_domctl, "h", u_domctl);
}
svc_out:

127
app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1918-XSA-45_6.patch
View file

@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
x86: make page table unpinning preemptible
... as it may take significant amounts of time.
Since we can't re-invoke the operation in a second attempt, the
continuation logic must be slightly tweaked so that we make sure
do_mmuext_op() gets run one more time even when the preempted unpin
operation was the last one in a batch.
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -3123,6 +3123,14 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
return rc;
}
+ if ( unlikely(count == MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED) &&
+ likely(guest_handle_is_null(uops)) )
+ {
+ /* See the curr->arch.old_guest_table related
+ * hypercall_create_continuation() below. */
+ return (int)foreigndom;
+ }
+
if ( unlikely(count & MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED) )
{
count &= ~MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED;
@@ -3146,7 +3154,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
- if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ if ( curr->arch.old_guest_table || hypercall_preempt_check() )
{
rc = -EAGAIN;
break;
@@ -3266,7 +3274,17 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
break;
}
- put_page_and_type(page);
+ switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1) )
+ {
+ case -EINTR:
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ rc = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG_ON(rc);
+ break;
+ }
put_page(page);
/* A page is dirtied when its pin status is cleared. */
@@ -3587,9 +3605,27 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
}
if ( rc == -EAGAIN )
+ {
+ ASSERT(i < count);
rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
__HYPERVISOR_mmuext_op, "hihi",
uops, (count - i) | MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED, pdone, foreigndom);
+ }
+ else if ( curr->arch.old_guest_table )
+ {
+ XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(void) null;
+
+ ASSERT(rc || i == count);
+ set_xen_guest_handle(null, NULL);
+ /*
+ * In order to have a way to communicate the final return value to
+ * our continuation, we pass this in place of "foreigndom", building
+ * on the fact that this argument isn't needed anymore.
+ */
+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
+ __HYPERVISOR_mmuext_op, "hihi", null,
+ MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED, null, rc);
+ }
put_pg_owner(pg_owner);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
@@ -268,6 +268,13 @@ int compat_mmuext_op(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(mm
int rc = 0;
XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(mmuext_op_t) nat_ops;
+ if ( unlikely(count == MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED) &&
+ likely(guest_handle_is_null(cmp_uops)) )
+ {
+ set_xen_guest_handle(nat_ops, NULL);
+ return do_mmuext_op(nat_ops, count, pdone, foreigndom);
+ }
+
preempt_mask = count & MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED;
count ^= preempt_mask;
@@ -370,12 +377,18 @@ int compat_mmuext_op(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(mm
guest_handle_add_offset(nat_ops, i - left);
guest_handle_subtract_offset(cmp_uops, left);
left = 1;
- BUG_ON(!hypercall_xlat_continuation(&left, 0x01, nat_ops, cmp_uops));
- BUG_ON(left != arg1);
- if (!test_bit(_MCSF_in_multicall, &mcs->flags))
- regs->_ecx += count - i;
+ if ( arg1 != MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED )
+ {
+ BUG_ON(!hypercall_xlat_continuation(&left, 0x01, nat_ops,
+ cmp_uops));
+ if ( !test_bit(_MCSF_in_multicall, &mcs->flags) )
+ regs->_ecx += count - i;
+ else
+ mcs->compat_call.args[1] += count - i;
+ }
else
- mcs->compat_call.args[1] += count - i;
+ BUG_ON(hypercall_xlat_continuation(&left, 0));
+ BUG_ON(left != arg1);
}
else
BUG_ON(err > 0);

255
app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1918-XSA-45_7.patch
View file

@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
x86: make page table handling error paths preemptible
... as they may take significant amounts of time.
This requires cloning the tweaked continuation logic from
do_mmuext_op() to do_mmu_update().
Note that in mod_l[34]_entry() a negative "preemptible" value gets
passed to put_page_from_l[34]e() now, telling the callee to store the
respective page in current->arch.old_guest_table (for a hypercall
continuation to pick up), rather than carrying out the put right away.
This is going to be made a little more explicit by a subsequent cleanup
patch.
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -1241,7 +1241,16 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_
#endif
if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
+ {
+ ASSERT(preemptible >= 0);
return __put_page_type(l3e_get_page(l3e), preemptible);
+ }
+
+ if ( preemptible < 0 )
+ {
+ current->arch.old_guest_table = l3e_get_page(l3e);
+ return 0;
+ }
return put_page_and_type_preemptible(l3e_get_page(l3e), preemptible);
}
@@ -1254,7 +1263,17 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_
(l4e_get_pfn(l4e) != pfn) )
{
if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
+ {
+ ASSERT(preemptible >= 0);
return __put_page_type(l4e_get_page(l4e), preemptible);
+ }
+
+ if ( preemptible < 0 )
+ {
+ current->arch.old_guest_table = l4e_get_page(l4e);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return put_page_and_type_preemptible(l4e_get_page(l4e), preemptible);
}
return 1;
@@ -1549,12 +1568,17 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_in
if ( rc < 0 && rc != -EAGAIN && rc != -EINTR )
{
MEM_LOG("Failure in alloc_l3_table: entry %d", i);
+ if ( i )
+ {
+ page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
+ page->partial_pte = 0;
+ current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ }
while ( i-- > 0 )
{
if ( !is_guest_l3_slot(i) )
continue;
unadjust_guest_l3e(pl3e[i], d);
- put_page_from_l3e(pl3e[i], pfn, 0, 0);
}
}
@@ -1584,22 +1608,24 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_in
page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
page->partial_pte = partial ?: 1;
}
- else if ( rc == -EINTR )
+ else if ( rc < 0 )
{
+ if ( rc != -EINTR )
+ MEM_LOG("Failure in alloc_l4_table: entry %d", i);
if ( i )
{
page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
page->partial_pte = 0;
- rc = -EAGAIN;
+ if ( rc == -EINTR )
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ else
+ {
+ if ( current->arch.old_guest_table )
+ page->nr_validated_ptes++;
+ current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ }
}
}
- else if ( rc < 0 )
- {
- MEM_LOG("Failure in alloc_l4_table: entry %d", i);
- while ( i-- > 0 )
- if ( is_guest_l4_slot(d, i) )
- put_page_from_l4e(pl4e[i], pfn, 0, 0);
- }
if ( rc < 0 )
return rc;
@@ -2047,7 +2073,7 @@ static int mod_l3_entry(l3_pgentry_t *pl
pae_flush_pgd(pfn, pgentry_ptr_to_slot(pl3e), nl3e);
}
- put_page_from_l3e(ol3e, pfn, 0, 0);
+ put_page_from_l3e(ol3e, pfn, 0, -preemptible);
return rc;
}
@@ -2110,7 +2136,7 @@ static int mod_l4_entry(l4_pgentry_t *pl
return -EFAULT;
}
- put_page_from_l4e(ol4e, pfn, 0, 0);
+ put_page_from_l4e(ol4e, pfn, 0, -preemptible);
return rc;
}
@@ -2268,7 +2294,15 @@ static int alloc_page_type(struct page_i
PRtype_info ": caf=%08lx taf=%" PRtype_info,
page_to_mfn(page), get_gpfn_from_mfn(page_to_mfn(page)),
type, page->count_info, page->u.inuse.type_info);
- page->u.inuse.type_info = 0;
+ if ( page != current->arch.old_guest_table )
+ page->u.inuse.type_info = 0;
+ else
+ {
+ ASSERT((page->u.inuse.type_info &
+ (PGT_count_mask | PGT_validated)) == 1);
+ get_page_light(page);
+ page->u.inuse.type_info |= PGT_partial;
+ }
}
else
{
@@ -3218,21 +3252,17 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
}
if ( (rc = xsm_memory_pin_page(d, pg_owner, page)) != 0 )
- {
- put_page_and_type(page);
okay = 0;
- break;
- }
-
- if ( unlikely(test_and_set_bit(_PGT_pinned,
- &page->u.inuse.type_info)) )
+ else if ( unlikely(test_and_set_bit(_PGT_pinned,
+ &page->u.inuse.type_info)) )
{
MEM_LOG("Mfn %lx already pinned", page_to_mfn(page));
- put_page_and_type(page);
okay = 0;
- break;
}
+ if ( unlikely(!okay) )
+ goto pin_drop;
+
/* A page is dirtied when its pin status is set. */
paging_mark_dirty(pg_owner, page_to_mfn(page));
@@ -3246,7 +3276,13 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
&page->u.inuse.type_info));
spin_unlock(&pg_owner->page_alloc_lock);
if ( drop_ref )
- put_page_and_type(page);
+ {
+ pin_drop:
+ if ( type == PGT_l1_page_table )
+ put_page_and_type(page);
+ else
+ curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ }
}
break;
@@ -3652,11 +3688,28 @@ long do_mmu_update(
void *va;
unsigned long gpfn, gmfn, mfn;
struct page_info *page;
- int rc = 0, i = 0;
- unsigned int cmd, done = 0, pt_dom;
- struct vcpu *v = current;
+ unsigned int cmd, i = 0, done = 0, pt_dom;
+ struct vcpu *curr = current, *v = curr;
struct domain *d = v->domain, *pt_owner = d, *pg_owner;
struct domain_mmap_cache mapcache;
+ int rc = put_old_guest_table(curr);
+
+ if ( unlikely(rc) )
+ {
+ if ( likely(rc == -EAGAIN) )
+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
+ __HYPERVISOR_mmu_update, "hihi", ureqs, count, pdone,
+ foreigndom);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if ( unlikely(count == MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED) &&
+ likely(guest_handle_is_null(ureqs)) )
+ {
+ /* See the curr->arch.old_guest_table related
+ * hypercall_create_continuation() below. */
+ return (int)foreigndom;
+ }
if ( unlikely(count & MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED) )
{
@@ -3705,7 +3758,7 @@ long do_mmu_update(
for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
- if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ if ( curr->arch.old_guest_table || hypercall_preempt_check() )
{
rc = -EAGAIN;
break;
@@ -3886,9 +3939,27 @@ long do_mmu_update(
}
if ( rc == -EAGAIN )
+ {
+ ASSERT(i < count);
rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
__HYPERVISOR_mmu_update, "hihi",
ureqs, (count - i) | MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED, pdone, foreigndom);
+ }
+ else if ( curr->arch.old_guest_table )
+ {
+ XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(void) null;
+
+ ASSERT(rc || i == count);
+ set_xen_guest_handle(null, NULL);
+ /*
+ * In order to have a way to communicate the final return value to
+ * our continuation, we pass this in place of "foreigndom", building
+ * on the fact that this argument isn't needed anymore.
+ */
+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
+ __HYPERVISOR_mmu_update, "hihi", null,
+ MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED, null, rc);
+ }
put_pg_owner(pg_owner);

127
app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.2-2013-2076-XSA-52to54.patch
View file

@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
x86/xsave: fix information leak on AMD CPUs
Just like for FXSAVE/FXRSTOR, XSAVE/XRSTOR also don't save/restore the
last instruction and operand pointers as well as the last opcode if
there's no pending unmasked exception (see CVE-2006-1056 and commit
9747:4d667a139318).
While the FXSR solution sits in the save path, I prefer to have this in
the restore path because there the handling is simpler (namely in the
context of the pending changes to properly save the selector values for
32-bit guest code).
Also this is using FFREE instead of EMMS, as it doesn't seem unlikely
that in the future we may see CPUs with x87 and SSE/AVX but no MMX
support. The goal here anyway is just to avoid an FPU stack overflow.
I would have preferred to use FFREEP instead of FFREE (freeing two
stack slots at once), but AMD doesn't document that instruction.
This is CVE-2013-2076 / XSA-52.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
@@ -78,6 +78,21 @@ void xrstor(struct vcpu *v, uint64_t mas
struct xsave_struct *ptr = v->arch.xsave_area;
+ /*
+ * AMD CPUs don't save/restore FDP/FIP/FOP unless an exception
+ * is pending. Clear the x87 state here by setting it to fixed
+ * values. The hypervisor data segment can be sometimes 0 and
+ * sometimes new user value. Both should be ok. Use the FPU saved
+ * data block as a safe address because it should be in L1.
+ */
+ if ( (mask & ptr->xsave_hdr.xstate_bv & XSTATE_FP) &&
+ !(ptr->fpu_sse.fsw & 0x0080) &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD )
+ asm volatile ( "fnclex\n\t" /* clear exceptions */
+ "ffree %%st(7)\n\t" /* clear stack tag */
+ "fildl %0" /* load to clear state */
+ : : "m" (ptr->fpu_sse) );
+
asm volatile (
".byte " REX_PREFIX "0x0f,0xae,0x2f"
:
#x86/xsave: recover from faults on XRSTOR
#
#Just like FXRSTOR, XRSTOR can raise #GP if bad content is being passed
#to it in the memory block (i.e. aspects not under the control of the
#hypervisor, other than e.g. proper alignment of the block).
#
#Also correct the comment explaining why FXRSTOR needs exception
#recovery code to not wrongly state that this can only be a result of
#the control tools passing a bad image.
#
#This is CVE-2013-2077 / XSA-53.
#
#Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
#
--- a/xen/arch/x86/i387.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/i387.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static inline void fpu_fxrstor(struct vc
/*
* FXRSTOR can fault if passed a corrupted data block. We handle this
* possibility, which may occur if the block was passed to us by control
- * tools, by silently clearing the block.
+ * tools or through VCPUOP_initialise, by silently clearing the block.
*/
asm volatile (
#ifdef __i386__
--- a/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
@@ -93,10 +93,25 @@ void xrstor(struct vcpu *v, uint64_t mas
"fildl %0" /* load to clear state */
: : "m" (ptr->fpu_sse) );
- asm volatile (
- ".byte " REX_PREFIX "0x0f,0xae,0x2f"
- :
- : "m" (*ptr), "a" (lmask), "d" (hmask), "D"(ptr) );
+ /*
+ * XRSTOR can fault if passed a corrupted data block. We handle this
+ * possibility, which may occur if the block was passed to us by control
+ * tools or through VCPUOP_initialise, by silently clearing the block.
+ */
+ asm volatile ( "1: .byte " REX_PREFIX "0x0f,0xae,0x2f\n"
+ ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
+ "2: mov %5,%%ecx \n"
+ " xor %1,%1 \n"
+ " rep stosb \n"
+ " lea %2,%0 \n"
+ " mov %3,%1 \n"
+ " jmp 1b \n"
+ ".previous \n"
+ _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 2b)
+ : "+&D" (ptr), "+&a" (lmask)
+ : "m" (*ptr), "g" (lmask), "d" (hmask),
+ "m" (xsave_cntxt_size)
+ : "ecx" );
}
bool_t xsave_enabled(const struct vcpu *v)
#x86/xsave: properly check guest input to XSETBV
#
#Other than the HVM emulation path, the PV case so far failed to check
#that YMM state requires SSE state to be enabled, allowing for a #GP to
#occur upon passing the inputs to XSETBV inside the hypervisor.
#
#This is CVE-2013-2078 / XSA-54.
#
#Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
#
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -2205,6 +2205,11 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
if ( !(new_xfeature & XSTATE_FP) || (new_xfeature & ~xfeature_mask) )
goto fail;
+ /* YMM state takes SSE state as prerequisite. */
+ if ( (xfeature_mask & new_xfeature & XSTATE_YMM) &&
+ !(new_xfeature & XSTATE_SSE) )
+ goto fail;
+
v->arch.xcr0 = new_xfeature;
v->arch.xcr0_accum |= new_xfeature;
set_xcr0(new_xfeature);

130
app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-1432-XSA-58.patch
View file

@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
x86: fix page refcount handling in page table pin error path
In the original patch 7 of the series addressing XSA-45 I mistakenly
took the addition of the call to get_page_light() in alloc_page_type()
to cover two decrements that would happen: One for the PGT_partial bit
that is getting set along with the call, and the other for the page
reference the caller hold (and would be dropping on its error path).
But of course the additional page reference is tied to the PGT_partial
bit, and hence any caller of a function that may leave
->arch.old_guest_table non-NULL for error cleanup purposes has to make
sure a respective page reference gets retained.
Similar issues were then also spotted elsewhere: In effect all callers
of get_page_type_preemptible() need to deal with errors in similar
ways. To make sure error handling can work this way without leaking
page references, a respective assertion gets added to that function.
This is CVE-2013-1432 / XSA-58.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -941,6 +941,10 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
if ( v->vcpu_id == 0 )
d->vm_assist = c(vm_assist);
+ rc = put_old_guest_table(current);
+ if ( rc )
+ return rc;
+
if ( !compat )
rc = (int)set_gdt(v, c.nat->gdt_frames, c.nat->gdt_ents);
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
@@ -980,18 +984,24 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
}
else
{
- /*
- * Since v->arch.guest_table{,_user} are both NULL, this effectively
- * is just a call to put_old_guest_table().
- */
if ( !compat )
- rc = vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v);
+ rc = put_old_guest_table(v);
if ( !rc )
rc = get_page_type_preemptible(cr3_page,
!compat ? PGT_root_page_table
: PGT_l3_page_table);
- if ( rc == -EINTR )
+ switch ( rc )
+ {
+ case -EINTR:
rc = -EAGAIN;
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ default:
+ if ( cr3_page == current->arch.old_guest_table )
+ cr3_page = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
}
if ( rc )
/* handled below */;
@@ -1018,6 +1028,11 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
pagetable_get_page(v->arch.guest_table);
v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_null();
break;
+ default:
+ if ( cr3_page == current->arch.old_guest_table )
+ cr3_page = NULL;
+ case 0:
+ break;
}
}
if ( !rc )
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -718,7 +718,8 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_pagenr
get_page_type_preemptible(page, type) :
(get_page_type(page, type) ? 0 : -EINVAL));
- if ( unlikely(rc) && partial >= 0 )
+ if ( unlikely(rc) && partial >= 0 &&
+ (!preemptible || page != current->arch.old_guest_table) )
put_page(page);
return rc;
@@ -2638,6 +2639,7 @@ int put_page_type_preemptible(struct pag
int get_page_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
{
+ ASSERT(!current->arch.old_guest_table);
return __get_page_type(page, type, 1);
}
@@ -2848,7 +2850,7 @@ static void put_superpage(unsigned long
#endif
-static int put_old_guest_table(struct vcpu *v)
+int put_old_guest_table(struct vcpu *v)
{
int rc;
@@ -3253,7 +3255,8 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
rc = -EAGAIN;
else if ( rc != -EAGAIN )
MEM_LOG("Error while pinning mfn %lx", page_to_mfn(page));
- put_page(page);
+ if ( page != curr->arch.old_guest_table )
+ put_page(page);
break;
}
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
@@ -374,6 +374,7 @@ void put_page_type(struct page_info *pag
int get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type);
int put_page_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page);
int get_page_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type);
+int put_old_guest_table(struct vcpu *);
int get_page_from_l1e(
l1_pgentry_t l1e, struct domain *l1e_owner, struct domain *pg_owner);
void put_page_from_l1e(l1_pgentry_t l1e, struct domain *l1e_owner);

41
app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.2-CVE-2013-4553-XSA-74.patch
View file

@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
x86: restrict XEN_DOMCTL_getmemlist
Coverity ID 1055652
(See the code comment.)
This is CVE-2013-4553 / XSA-74.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -385,6 +385,26 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
break;
}
+ /*
+ * XSA-74: This sub-hypercall is broken in several ways:
+ * - lock order inversion (p2m locks inside page_alloc_lock)
+ * - no preemption on huge max_pfns input
+ * - not (re-)checking d->is_dying with page_alloc_lock held
+ * - not honoring start_pfn input (which libxc also doesn't set)
+ * Additionally it is rather useless, as the result is stale by
+ * the time the caller gets to look at it.
+ * As it only has a single, non-production consumer (xen-mceinj),
+ * rather than trying to fix it we restrict it for the time being.
+ */
+ if ( /* No nested locks inside copy_to_guest_offset(). */
+ paging_mode_external(current->domain) ||
+ /* Arbitrary limit capping processing time. */
+ max_pfns > GB(4) / PAGE_SIZE )
+ {
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ break;
+ }
+
spin_lock(&d->page_alloc_lock);
if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) ) {

153
app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.2-XSA-84.patch
View file

@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
flask: fix reading strings from guest memory
Since the string size is being specified by the guest, we must range
check it properly before doing allocations based on it. While for the
two cases that are exposed only to trusted guests (via policy
restriction) this just uses an arbitrary upper limit (PAGE_SIZE), for
the FLASK_[GS]ETBOOL case (which any guest can use) the upper limit
gets enforced based on the longest name across all boolean settings.
This is XSA-84.
Reported-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_sem);
/* global data for booleans */
static int bool_num = 0;
static int *bool_pending_values = NULL;
+static size_t bool_maxstr;
static int flask_security_make_bools(void);
extern int ss_initialized;
@@ -71,9 +72,15 @@ static int domain_has_security(struct do
perms, NULL);
}
-static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(char) u_buf, char **buf, uint32_t size)
+static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(char) u_buf, char **buf,
+ size_t size, size_t max_size)
{
- char *tmp = xmalloc_bytes(size + 1);
+ char *tmp;
+
+ if ( size > max_size )
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ tmp = xmalloc_array(char, size + 1);
if ( !tmp )
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -99,7 +106,7 @@ static int flask_security_user(struct xe
if ( rv )
return rv;
- rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->u.user, &user, arg->size);
+ rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->u.user, &user, arg->size, PAGE_SIZE);
if ( rv )
return rv;
@@ -210,7 +217,7 @@ static int flask_security_context(struct
if ( rv )
return rv;
- rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->context, &buf, arg->size);
+ rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->context, &buf, arg->size, PAGE_SIZE);
if ( rv )
return rv;
@@ -303,7 +310,7 @@ static int flask_security_resolve_bool(s
if ( arg->bool_id != -1 )
return 0;
- rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->name, &name, arg->size);
+ rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->name, &name, arg->size, bool_maxstr);
if ( rv )
return rv;
@@ -334,7 +341,7 @@ static int flask_security_set_bool(struc
int num;
int *values;
- rv = security_get_bools(&num, NULL, &values);
+ rv = security_get_bools(&num, NULL, &values, NULL);
if ( rv != 0 )
goto out;
@@ -440,7 +447,7 @@ static int flask_security_make_bools(voi
xfree(bool_pending_values);
- ret = security_get_bools(&num, NULL, &values);
+ ret = security_get_bools(&num, NULL, &values, &bool_maxstr);
if ( ret != 0 )
goto out;
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/include/conditional.h
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/include/conditional.h
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
#ifndef _FLASK_CONDITIONAL_H_
#define _FLASK_CONDITIONAL_H_
-int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values);
+#include <xen/types.h>
+
+int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values, size_t *maxstr);
int security_set_bools(int len, int *values);
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c
@@ -1900,7 +1900,7 @@ int security_find_bool(const char *name)
return rv;
}
-int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
+int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values, size_t *maxstr)
{
int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
@@ -1908,6 +1908,8 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char **
if ( names )
*names = NULL;
*values = NULL;
+ if ( maxstr )
+ *maxstr = 0;
*len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
if ( !*len )
@@ -1929,16 +1931,17 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char **
for ( i = 0; i < *len; i++ )
{
- size_t name_len;
+ size_t name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]);
+
(*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
if ( names ) {
- name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
- (*names)[i] = (char*)xmalloc_array(char, name_len);
+ (*names)[i] = xmalloc_array(char, name_len + 1);
if ( !(*names)[i] )
goto err;
- strlcpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
- (*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
+ strlcpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len + 1);
}
+ if ( maxstr && name_len > *maxstr )
+ *maxstr = name_len;
}
rc = 0;
out:
@@ -2056,7 +2059,7 @@ static int security_preserve_bools(struc
struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
struct cond_node *cur;
- rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
+ rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues, NULL);
if ( rc )
goto out;
for ( i = 0; i < nbools; i++ )

31
app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.2-XSA-85.patch
View file

@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
From 593bc8c63d582ec0fc2b3a35336106cf9c3a8b34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Date: Sun, 12 Jan 2014 14:29:32 +1300
Subject: [PATCH] xsm/flask: correct off-by-one in
flask_security_avc_cachestats cpu id check
This is XSA-85
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
index 4426ab9..22878f5 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ static int flask_security_avc_cachestats(struct xen_flask_cache_stats *arg)
{
struct avc_cache_stats *st;
- if ( arg->cpu > nr_cpu_ids )
+ if ( arg->cpu >= nr_cpu_ids )
return -ENOENT;
if ( !cpu_online(arg->cpu) )
return -ENOENT;
--
1.8.5.2

21
app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.2-XSA-87.patch
View file

@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
x86: PHYSDEVOP_{prepare,release}_msix are privileged
Yet this wasn't being enforced.
This is XSA-87.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
@@ -612,7 +612,9 @@ ret_t do_physdev_op(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_H
case PHYSDEVOP_release_msix: {
struct physdev_pci_device dev;
- if ( copy_from_guest(&dev, arg, 1) )
+ if ( !IS_PRIV(v->domain) )
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ else if ( copy_from_guest(&dev, arg, 1) )
ret = -EFAULT;
else
ret = pci_prepare_msix(dev.seg, dev.bus, dev.devfn,

46
app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-1442-XSA-62.patch
View file

@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
x86/xsave: initialize extended register state when guests enable it
Till now, when setting previously unset bits in XCR0 we wouldn't touch
the active register state, thus leaving in the newly enabled registers
whatever a prior user of it left there, i.e. potentially leaking
information between guests.
This is CVE-2013-1442 / XSA-62.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
@@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ int validate_xstate(u64 xcr0, u64 xcr0_a
int handle_xsetbv(u32 index, u64 new_bv)
{
struct vcpu *curr = current;
+ u64 mask;
if ( index != XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK )
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -320,9 +321,23 @@ int handle_xsetbv(u32 index, u64 new_bv)
if ( !set_xcr0(new_bv) )
return -EFAULT;
+ mask = new_bv & ~curr->arch.xcr0_accum;
curr->arch.xcr0 = new_bv;
curr->arch.xcr0_accum |= new_bv;
+ mask &= curr->fpu_dirtied ? ~XSTATE_FP_SSE : XSTATE_NONLAZY;
+ if ( mask )
+ {
+ unsigned long cr0 = read_cr0();
+
+ clts();
+ if ( curr->fpu_dirtied )
+ asm ( "stmxcsr %0" : "=m" (curr->arch.xsave_area->fpu_sse.mxcsr) );
+ xrstor(curr, mask);
+ if ( cr0 & X86_CR0_TS )
+ write_cr0(cr0);
+ }
+
return 0;
}

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show more